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results of empirical studies about financial contagion. Mäeltsemees, S; Reiljan, 
J. (Eds.). Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy, pp. 176–194, Berlin, 
Tallinn: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Mattimar4. 
As the dissertation, although being based on the articles, is practically in the 
form of a monograph, this means it is possible for the publications to be 
amended and brought up-to-date. In addition, there were some reduplicative 
paragraphs and small shortcomings in some of the publications that have been 
fixed in the monograph. Therefore, the dissertation can be thought of as an 
improved version of the publications. In all of these publications the 
contribution of the author of the dissertation has been the greatest in all parts of 
the publications. A more detailed overview of the contribution of the individual 
authors in these papers will be given later in the introduction section. 
 
Background and motivation for the research 
Managing and preventing financial crises have long been important challenges 
for policy makers. Several crises in the 1980s, 1990s and in the present century 
were transmitted rapidly to other countries that were sometimes quite different 
in size and economic structure compared to the country of origin, and often 
even located on the other side of the globe. Researchers in the field of 
                                                 
1  Full text of the article in Appendix 7.1. 
2  Full text of the article in Appendix 7.2. 
3  Full text of the article in Appendix 7.3. 
4  Full text of the article in Appendix 7.4. 
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economics have borrowed an expression from epidemiology to describe this 
phenomenon as financial contagion, although when and by whom the term was 
first coined is probably not known. It is important to make clear that it is not yet 
contagion – as defined in the dissertation – if a crisis spills over from one 
country to another. Transmissions of crises may be caused by strong stable 
fundamental linkages between countries – financial, real or political – and these 
transmissions are not considered to be incidences of contagion. However, if 
there are breaks in the international transmition mechanisms of the crises, that is 
what financial contagion is all about. 
The issue of contagion has been one of the most debated topics in 
international finance since the Asian crisis (1997) and the phenomenon is by no 
means only a thing of the past. It has been argued (e.g. by Didier, Mauro and 
Schmukler 2008) that the factors underlying the channels that generated 
contagion during the crises in the 1990s seem potentially to be at least as strong 
today as they were one and half decades ago. Considering the events of 2008, 
when yet another financial crisis snowballed around the world, the phenomenon 
of financial contagion is perhaps more important than ever before to examine, 
interpret and understand. 
In the globally integrated world there is no doubt that crises that occur in one 
country spill over into one or more other countries. However, only some and not 
all of these propagations of crises can be considered contagious. There are 
several reasons why distinguishing between contagion and simple funda-
mentals-based spillovers (interdependence between countries) is necessary. The 
importance of this distinction and of contagion studies generally is clearest in 
relation to the merits of international diversification. The rationale being that 
theoretically, international diversification should significantly reduce portfolio 
risk, but in the case of financial contagion when cross-country correlations 
increase during crises, much of the rationale is undermined. So, if the contagion 
hypothesis holds, it can be assumed that the irrational behaviour of financial 
agents (at the collective rather than individual level, where the same behaviour 
may be rational) plays an important role, and that the benefit of a internationally 
diversified portfolio is substantially diminished. 
At the government level it is important to know what can be done to prevent 
crises from spilling over into a country, and whether and how the susceptibility 
to financial contagion can be decreased. In the case of strong financial con-
tagion it is advisable for countries to keep some finances in reserves during the 
good times, even if there seems no particular reason to expect the economic 
outlook to worsen. As there is no good way to defend your economy against the 
propagation of crises, countries should at least have some tools at their disposal 
to deal with the consequences. 
In spite of significant theoretical and empirical interest on the topic, the 
financial contagion puzzle is still open to discussion and it seems that every new 
analysis undermines the rationale of those developed earlier. Therefore, an 
assessment of previous empirical findings is clearly called for. However, 
11 
aggregates of previous empirical results have so far been limited to qualitative 
analysis and no quantitative summaries have yet been conducted. It is one of the 
main motivations of the thesis to fill this void and by doing so, complete the 
tasks left undone by previous qualitative analyses. This will be accomplished 
using a meta-analysis approach. 
Meta-analysis methods and techniques are widely used in the behavioural 
sciences and medicine, but are quite uncommon among economic scientists. In 
the field of financial contagion, no meta-analysis has been conducted before, 
despite the fact that considering the multi-dimensionality of the research 
problem, this seems to be the best way to get something useful from results that 
seem hopelessly mixed at first glance. The application of a meta-analysis not 
only helps to identify a clear quantitative conclusion from this seemingly un-
navigable jungle, it also allows us to detect moderating variables, which de-
termine the contagiousness of the crises. 
Another motivation is to identify how susceptible Eastern European count-
ries, as small open economies with a post-socialist path dependence, are to 
financial contagion. The case of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
is particularly interesting in view of their entry into the third stage of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. The Maastricht criteria require that 
candidate countries should not have devalued their currency in the two years 
prior to adopting the euro, and should also have avoided sharp movements of 
certain other financial variables such as inflation and long-term interest rates. In 
the context of financial turmoil, these criteria are not likely to be met. In this 
field, the research task of the thesis is to examine whether recent instabilities in 
the stock markets in these countries have been due to financial contagion or 
poor policies and fundamentals. Additionally, the thesis investigates whether 
CEE economies exhibit above or below average susceptibility to financial 
contagion. 
There are two main reasons why CEE countries may differ from the average 
in terms of their openness to contagion. On the one hand, the economic open-
ness that is taken almost to extremes in some of CEE countries and was one of 
the main reasons for their noticeable success in the transition period, may have 
now performed a disservice to these countries, as one can expect such a level of 
openness could make a country more vulnerable to financial contagion. This 
hypothesis is supported by the findings of Didier et al (2012)5. On the other 
hand, there has been less speculative financing in the stock markets of CEE 
economies compared to many other countries, which decreases the likelihood of 
bubbles occurring, and should offer some protection against financial contagion. 
It would be an interesting finding to discover which of these two aspects is 
dominant. 
                                                 
5  Findings of Didier et al (2012) show that financial openness may increase susceptibility 
to contagion in crisis period while there is no such evidence for trade openness. 
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Yet another motivation relates to the inclusion of the present crisis, which 
took off in the US in 2007 and became serious in global terms in 2008. The 
contagiousness of this crisis has been so far investigated only shallowly in the 
literature. As the 2008 crisis6 spilled over practically across the entire world, 
one can expect that the crisis was very contagious, but without confirming 
evidence, this level of propagation could also be associated with a strong 
interdependence between countries. The present thesis will attempt to provide 
some answers in regard to this question. 
 
The aim and research tasks of the dissertation 
The aim of the study is to find out whether the propagation of financial crises in 
numerous past crisis episodes has been amplified by financial contagion or is 
based solely on stable fundamental linkages between countries. The reasons for 
this distinction can be summarised as follows. If crises are transmitted through 
stable fundamental linkages, then only countries with weak economic funda-
mentals will be affected and good fundamentals can offer protection. On the 
other hand, if there is something other than fundamentals driving the trans-
mission of the crisis – be it speculative attacks, financial panic, herd behaviour 
or some other form of irrational behaviour by the financial agents – then even 
countries with good fundamentals can be seriously affected. From here, 
depending on the results, the abovementioned inferences can be drawn about 
country-level economic policies and international investment strategies. 
To be absolutely clear it is worth mentioning that the thesis does not test 
whether crises are propagated from country to country – it is assumed that they 
do. The question is whether the transmission is contagious, and this necessitates 
identifying whether a structural break occurs in the linear transmission mecha-
nism of financial shocks during periods of crisis. 
To achieve the aim, the following research tasks were identified: 
1. Provide a theoretical overview of theories explaining propagation of 
shocks and crises; 
2. Explore theoretical frameworks of financial contagion including 
definitions, transmission channels and testing methodologies; 
3. Qualitatively analyse previous empirical findings on the subject; 
4. Work out suitable measure that affords quantitative aggregation of results 
of individual studies and conduct meta-analysis of empirical literature 
using values of this measure as input; 
5. Analyse contagiousness of the last worldwide crisis that took off in the 
US in 2007. 
                                                 
6  In the literature the recent global financial crisis is called sometimes as crisis of 2007 and 
sometimes as crisis of 2008. It is true that the crisis started in the US already in 2007 but it 
become serious globally in 2008, therefore the crisis is named the US 2008 crisis in the 
dissertation. 
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Research methodology and data 
The methodology for fulfilling the research task is as follows. First, the 
theoretical background of financial contagion is explored to achieve a good 
basis or framework for subsequent analysis. Secondly, the qualitative analysis 
of empirical literature is conducted with the aim of obtaining some preliminary 
and general results. Next, a meta-analysis of empirical study results is 
conducted to obtain more tangible and reliable results. Finally, as the US 2008 
crisis is left out of the meta-analysis (because of no data points), a separate 
analysis is conducted based on this crisis using two alternative frameworks. 
Firstly, correlation coefficients based method is used to test whether corre-
lations of returns in stock indeces have been significantly higher during the 
crisis period relative to the non-crisis period. Secondly, volatility spillovers in 
stock markets are investigated using a generalized conditional autoregressive 
heteroskedasticity model. During all these steps, particular attention is paid to 
CEE economies as destination countries. 
The data for the meta-analysis comes from previous empirical analyses. 
When searching for appropriate studies, the Thomson Reuters (formerly ISI) 
Web of Knowledge database and the Contagion of Financial Crises Website 
from the World Bank Group are used. From the Web of Knowledge database, 
studies corresponding to the keywords financial contagion are used. As in the 
empirical section, contagion is defined as an increase in cross-country asset 
price correlations during times of crisis relative to asset price correlations 
during non-crisis times, only studies that report on the correlations of both pre-
crisis and post-crisis asset prices between countries are included. These 
restrictions reduce the data set to 716 data points, of which 394 are independent 
(independent means that these data points come from different sources or differ 
in some important characteristics like investigated crisis, destination country or 
financial index). The data set has been drawn from 28 constructs (17 studies by 
12 authors). 
To investigate the contagiousness of the US 2008 crisis, daily stock returns 
from between 3 March 2008 and 9 March 2009 are used with the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 as the starting point of the crisis. Stock 
returns data for the Baltic countries are collected from the official web pages of 
the Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius stock exchanges and the historic data for S&P 500 
comes from google.com/finance. 
 
Contribution of individual authors in the studies  
of the dissertation 
All four studies the dissertation is based on, and which are given in the list of 
papers above, are co-authored and the author of this dissertation performed the 
central part in all studies. The respective contributions of the author of the 
dissertation and the co-authors in the studies will now be described. 
4
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In Study 1, the general research framework, the theoretical part of the study 
and the qualitative analysis were prepared and put into practice by the author. 
Additionally, the conclusions and discussion of the findings were mainly the 
responsibility of the author. In Study 1, the co-author primarily assisted in 
highlighting the main findings and important policy implications. In Study 2, 
the dissertation author was responsible for the study framework, the theoretical 
background of the analysis, the data gathering process, the empirical data 
analysis and the discussion of the findings. The co-authors helped in formu-
lating the aim, contribution, policy implications and limitations of the study and 
also in editing the text. In Study 3, the author contributed by designing the 
theoretical approach, collecting data via a comprehensive literature review, 
conducting empirical data analysis and elaborating the discussion. A co-author 
assisted mainly with suggestions regarding the interpretation and implications 
of the empirical results, but also with ideas regarding the introduction and 
discussion sections. In Study 4, the co-author again primarily contributed to the 
introduction and discussion, while the author of the thesis was responsible for 
the general research framework, data collection, and theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Note that Study 3 is an updated version of Study 4. Table 1 provides 
an overview of how the author contributed to each study and how this then 
formed the basis of the corresponding sub-chapters of the thesis.  
 
Table 1. Contribution of the author to the studies and the chapters in the thesis 
corresponding to the respective studies  
Studies Contribution of the author 
Corresponding sub-
chapters in the 
thesis 
Study 1 
Development of theoretical framework 
Working with the literature 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis 





Development of theoretical framework 
Data gathering process 
Data analysis 




Development of research framework 
Data gathering process 
Data processing and analysis 




Development of research framework 
Data gathering process 
Data processing and analysis 
Discussion of the findings 
3.1 
4.1.1 




The present thesis contributes to the literature on contagion of financial crises in 
many novel ways. First, a meta-analysis is conducted, which has not been used 
before in this field. To this end, the thesis offers a conceptual feature to 
facilitate a meta-analytic test of the significance in the increase of correlation 
coefficients. The thesis proposes the use of the difference between post- and 
pre-crisis correlations of asset returns between a crisis and destination country 
as a common measure in all relevant studies, and to use the same differences as 
individual effect sizes in the subsequent meta-analysis. It is argued in the thesis 
that the given individual effect sizes can be handled in two alternative ways in 
meta-analytic computations – as treatment effects or as correlations – and is 
shown through practical analysis that the results differ only slightly. Secondly, 
the analysis of a new and until recently practically uninvestigated crisis (the US 
2008 crisis) is added. At the time that the abovementioned four articles were 
written, there were no publications investigating the contagiousness of the US 
2008 crisis; therefore, it was impossible to include this crisis in the meta-
analysis, and a separate article analysing the US 2008 crisis had to be written by 
the author. By now, a few publications analysing the contagiousness of the US 
2008 crisis have emerged, and therefore, the first of these articles is a little out-
dated. This is one of the main reasons why it was decided to present the thesis 
in the form of a monograph as this allows the author to include these recent 
additions in the thesis, so the thesis can be considered an updated version of the 
four published articles. 
In addition to these main contributions, the thesis also gives the most 
comprehensive qualitative summary of previous empirical research findings 
from among all publications so far. Previous literature reviews mainly focus on 
the questions of which definition of financial contagion is investigated and 
which testing methodology is used; practically no one bothers to try to sum-
marise the results (findings regarding the existence of financial contagion) of 
empirical analyses. Because of the multidimensionality of the research problem 
of financial contagion, this ignorance is fully understandable. However, the 
thesis still accepts the challenge and tries to find and compare the frequencies of 
different results. 
The findings of the research provide economic policy makers a good basis 
for decision-making in the context of global crises. Supplied with this kind of 
knowledge, decision-makers at the government level have an important tool at 
their disposal in order to prevent or mitigate the negative effects of financial 
contagion. Developing an understanding of the way financial crises spread from 
country to country and what can be done to prevent this happening are therefore 





Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter begins with an overview 
of alternative definitions, interpretations and main transmission channels of 
financial contagion (sub-chapter 1.1). The chapter then offers a brief introduc-
tion to theories that explain why shocks and crises spill over to other countries 
and how to differentiate which transmission channels are in accordance with 
financial contagion and which are not (sub-chapter 1.2). Sub-chapter 1.1 is 
based on Study 1 (see list of papers) while sub-chapter 1.2 is an addition written 
specially for the thesis (for an overview of how the sub-chapters are based on 
each study, see Table 1). 
The second chapter presents a review of previous empirical studies. It starts 
by introducing theoretical aspects that may influence the results of empirical 
studies. Next, the previous empirical studies are divided into four groups on the 
basis of their testing methodologies, and an overview of all empirical findings is 
given separately for these groups. The chapter concludes with a summarising 
qualitative analysis of the findings of the empirical literature. This chapter is 
based on Study 1 with the exception of the sub-chapter 2.7, which updates the 
thesis with the very latest information. 
The third chapter of the thesis introduces the data and testing methodologies 
used in the empirical part of the study. The first part of the chapter is dedicated 
to the framework and main components and tools of the meta-analysis. It begins 
by introducing the meta-analysis, its methodology and the steps involved. Next, 
special aspects are introduced that are specific to the analysis of the present 
thesis. In addition, the data used in the meta-sample is introduced. The first half 
of the third chapter (sub-chapter 3.1) is based on Studies 3 and 4. In the second 
part of the chapter, the methods used in analysing the contagiousness of the US 
financial crisis in 2008 is explained. Both the cross-market correlation 
coefficients based method and the MA (1) – GARCH (1, 1) – M model from the 
ARCH-GARCH framework are presented and data used in these analyses is 
introduced. The second half of chapter three (sub-chapter 3.2) is based on Study 
2 with slight improvement in the testing method regarding to the correlation 
coefficients based analysis. 
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, the results of the empirical investigation 
are presented. As in the third chapter, the main findings obtained using the 
meta-analysis are brought out first and then the results of the separate analysis 
of the US crisis in 2008 are given. The chapter ends with a comparison of the 
results of the two alternative methodologies. Sub-chapter 4.1.1 is based on 
Studies 3 and 4, while sub-chapter 4.1.2 on Study 3 alone. The analyses in these 
papers have been updated for the thesis by adding financial markets as a 
potential moderator to the analysis. Sub-chapter 4.2 is based on Study 2, but the 
data set is slightly modified (two-day rolling average changes in logarithmic 
stock prices are used instead of changes in logarithmic two-day moving average 
stock prices), and an alternative length of the rolling average period (weekly 
average in addition to two-day average) is added for robustness purposes. 
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Therefore, the results of the sub-chapter differ a little from those in the 
respective article, but the general conclusion does not change much. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion that summarises the main findings of the 
research. Based on these findings, the section suggests some policy recommen-
dations, which would help in mitigating the negative effects of financial 
contagion. The concluding section also points out some limitations in the thesis 
and suggests potential future research in the field of financial contagion. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, the dissertation is pri-
marily based on the four published papers listed above. In addition to the 
findings of these publications, the theoretical framework of the study, the 
overview of the research methodology and the main generalized empirical 
results are presented in this volume. Some minor shortcomings in these papers 
are also corrected and some sections are updated in the thesis. As financial 
contagion is extremely topical, new findings develop quickly and theoretical 
ideas emerge rapidly. That is why the thesis is in the form of a monograph, so 
as to take into account up-to-date information, and present the thesis as an 
improved version of the initial publications. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR FINANCIAL CONTAGION 
1.1. Definitions and relevance of financial contagion 
Financial contagion has become an increasingly popular research field in recent 
decades. Several crises in the last twenty or thirty years were transmitted rapidly 
to other countries, some seemingly exhibiting no similarity, no geographical 
proximity nor strong fundamental links with the country of origin. Borrowing 
the phrase from epidemiology this phenomenon has been called financial 
contagion in the economic literature. Until the 1980s, the issue of financial 
contagion had practically not been explored at all. The reason for this is that 
financial contagion, as it is currently defined, was not seen as a plausible reason 
for countries falling victim of financial crises. Even in the 1980s, when many 
countries one after another, especially in South America, had to face severe 
devaluations and banking crises, the possibility of financial contagion was 
largely ignored and the blame was apportioned to poor domestic policies and 
high real interest rates in the US. Only in the 1990s did the picture change 
drastically due to the contagious nature of the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1997) 
crises, among others. According to Rigobon (2002), the issue of contagion has 
been one of the most debated topics in international finance since the Asian 
crisis, and even crises from the previous decade started to be looked at in a 
different light. The last decade of the twentieth century is considered especially 
contagious given the speed and virulence of the propagation of crises at that 
time, but as argued by Didier, Mauro and Schmukler (2008), the factors 
underlying the channels that generated contagion during the crises of the 1990s 
seem to be potentially at least as strong today as they were back then. Events in 
recent years have seen yet another financial crisis ‘snowball’ around the world, 
and as such, the need to understand this kind of contagion is increasingly 
important, particularly for policy makers looking to avoid or manage the spread 
of possible future crises. This crisis is a typical example emphasizing the 
importance of improvements in the activities of financial institutions and their 
management. When seeking to improve the activities of financial institutions, 
the possible transmission channels of crises, the role of monitoring and data 
quality as well as the systematic analysis of the lessons learnt from previous 
crises and their contagion should be taken into account. The results of such 
analyses offer additional information to help improve national policies and the 
institutional environment and thereby enhance risk management. 
One of the main interests in contagion studies is associated with the merits of 
international diversification. The rationale being that theoretically international 
diversification should significantly reduce portfolio risk, but when cross-
country correlations increase during crises much of this rationale is undermined. 
In addition, issues such as appropriate financial architecture and investment 
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opportunities and risks for local markets can be answered by studies of financial 
contagion. 
In spite of significant theoretical and empirical interest in the topic, there is 
still no consensus among researchers either on the theoretical or empirical 
procedure for identifying financial contagion. The economic literature offers 
conceptually different definitions of financial contagion. Using the Contagion of 
Financial Crises Website summary (the World Bank Group 2009), three main 
definitions of financial contagion can be distinguished: 
1) Definition 1. The broadest definition considers contagion as the cross-
country transmission of shocks or as general cross-country spillover 
effects. Unlike other definitions this one includes fundamental linkages as 
a channel of financial contagion, and therefore, is sometimes called 
fundamentals-based contagion (Calvo and Reinhart 1996) or recently 
interdependence (Forbes and Rigobon 2001, 2002) in the literature. 
2) Definition 2. Contagion is the transmission of shocks to other countries or 
cross-country correlations, beyond any fundamental linkages between 
countries and beyond common shocks. For example Masson (1999) 
defines contagion to mean only those transmissions of crises that cannot 
be identified with observed changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Going for a somewhat different testing methodology, Eichengreen et al 
(1996) argue that there is contagion if the probability of a crisis in a given 
country increases conditional on the occurrence of a crisis elsewhere, 
after controlling for the standard set of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This definition is sometimes referred as excess co-movement (e.g. 
Edwards, 2000) – a correlation that remains even after controlling for 
fundamentals and common shocks. Herding behaviour is usually argued 
to be responsible for that more-than-expected co-movement. 
3) Definition 3. According to the most restrictive approach, contagion 
occurs when there exist not only the transmissions of shocks to other 
countries but these transmissions also have to be different (in practice this 
means linkages through which shocks transmit are stronger) during times 
of crisis compared to tranquil times. This definition is sometimes referred 
to as shift-contagion (term coined by Forbes and Rigobon 2001 and 
2002) or pure contagion (Masson, 1999), and it excludes a constant high 
degree of co-movement in a crisis period. In the latter case, markets are 
just interdependent. This definition is used in the empirical analysis of the 
thesis. 
In addition to the abovementioned approaches, there also exist some other 
definitions of this phenomenon that are less often used. For example, according 
to Sola et al (2002) there is contagion if the probability of having a crisis at 
home country equals one if there is crisis in another market; on the other hand, 
Bae et al (2003) consider coincidence of extreme return shocks across countries 
as evidence of financial contagion. 
20 
In the theoretical part of the dissertation (first two chapters) alternative 
definitions of financial contagion are considered, as the objective is to have a 
comprehensive view of the subject. In the empirical part, however, a choice has 
to be made, and therefore, only the third, most restrictive definition (shift-
contagion) is used. 
 
 
1.2. Theoretical framework of mechanisms  
for the transmission of shocks and crises 
1.2.1. Introduction 
The current understanding of the phenomenon of financial contagion is closely 
related to its transmission channels, but the authors of papers considering 
financial crises have not yet achieved consensus on the channels through which 
contagion spreads. Several trade issues, the macro environment, common 
lender, market psychology and so on have all been considered as determinants 
of the degree of contagion. Different opinions are well summarised by the 
World Bank Group (2009): “Some claim that contagion is explained by real 
links, while others provide a financial explanation. At the same time, other 
studies argue that herding behaviour is the key element to understand the recent 
contagious episodes. Although one can show that these factors are present in the 
cross-country transmission of crises, an even more difficult problem is to 
determine the relative importance of each component.” This summary accords 
with the statement pointed out by Dornbusch et al (2000a) who argue that the 
exact causes and channels of contagion are both unknown as are the precise 
policy interventions that can most effectively reduce it. 
Starting from the influential studies by Forbes and Rigobon (2001 and 
2002), which can be considered as the cornerstone in the field of financial 
contagion, a distinction has been made between contagion and interdependence 
according to transmission channels (see also Rigobon 2002 and Kleimeier et al 
2008). If crises are transmitted through stable fundamental linkages, then only 
countries with weak economic fundamentals will be affected and good 
fundamentals can offer protection. On the other hand, if irrational behaviour by 
agents (in the form of speculative attacks, financial panic and/or herd 
behaviour) is the transmission force, then even countries with good 
fundamentals can be seriously affected. In the former case we have only 
interdependence and not contagion between countries, while in the latter case 
we have true contagion. Considering this distinction, the first definition 
presented above (sub-chapter 1.1) may only be interdependence and not 
contagion. 
There are a lot of theories that explain how shocks and crises are propagated 
internationally. It is important to understand these theories to be able to 
determine whether or not the propagation of crisis can be considered contagion. 
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These theories can be classified into two groups according to whether they 
assume that transmission channels do or do not change during times of crisis: 
crisis-contingent theories and non-crisis-contingent theories7. This kind of 
distinction was first made by Forbes and Rigobon (2001) and helps to 
distinguish shift-contagion (the third definition) from the broader definitions. 
Non-crisis contingent theories are in accordance with interdependence or the 
broader definitions of contagion. Financial contagion is non-existent according 
to these theories, and crises spill over into countries because of strong but 
unchangeable linkages. Crisis-contingent theories, on the other hand, are in 
accordance with financial contagion even in its most restrictive definition. 
 
1.2.2. Non-crisis contingent theories 
Non-crisis-contingent theories are those that assume transmission mechanisms 
are the same during a crisis as during more stable periods, and therefore, cross-
market linkages do not increase after a shock. Large cross-market correlations 
after a shock are a continuation of linkages that exist before the crisis. Because 
of the nature of the majority of propagation channels brought out by this group 
of theories, they are sometimes called real links based or fundamentals-based 
contagion in the literature, but of course, if we are distinguishing between 
contagion and interdependence, these kinds of transmissions are not contagion 
at all. Non-crisis contingent theories can be divided into four broad channels 
according to Forbes and Rigobon (2001): trade, policy coordination, country re-
evaluation and random aggregate shocks. A similar classification is given by 
Costinot et al (2000), only policy coordination is replaced by financial links and 
country re-evaluation is called “learning”. Instead of four, Dornbusch et al 
(2000b) present three non-crisis contingent theories. In their classification, 
compared to that of Costinot et al (2000), financial links remain in place as also 
do random aggregate shocks, but these are called common shocks. They also 
agree with Costinot et al (2000) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001) that trade 
linkages should be one channel here, but Dornbusch et al (2000b) combine them 
with competitive devaluations. A brief overview of all these channels is given 
below. 
Trade spillovers come from the fact that when a country faces a significant 
depreciation of its currency, other countries, as trading partners or competitors 
in the same foreign markets, can suffer from decreased competitiveness of 
export and domestic sales within the country. If the loss in competitiveness is 
severe enough, it could also increase the expectation of an exchange rate 
devaluation in these countries, which in turn increases the probability of 
                                                 
7  Dornbusch et al (2000b) use different classification with similar idea: fundamentals-




currency attacks, especially when currencies are not freely floating (Dornbusch 
et al 2000b, Forbes and Rigobon 2001). 
Dornbusch et al (2000b) make a distinction between trade links and 
competitive devaluations within this concept. According to their approach the 
transmission of shocks through trade links means that any major trade partner in 
a country where a financial crisis has caused significant currency depreciation 
could experience problems because investors foresee a decline in its exports to 
the crisis country, and therefore, some deterioration in its trade account. When 
talking about competitive devaluations as a transmission channel these authors 
point to the fact that devaluation in the first crisis country increases its 
competitiveness in third markets, which puts pressure on the currencies of the 
main trading partners. This pressure can be especially high when those 
currencies are not floating freely. 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999), Forbes (2001, 2004) and Glick and Rose 
(1999) who investigated the 1992–1993 European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, and the 1999 
Brazilian crisis respectively, have argued that trade links are the primary 
channel through which the crises were transmitted to other countries. Eichen-
green et al (1996) and Valdes (1997) have also found some empirical evidence 
to support this theory. On the other hand, Didier, Mauro and Schmukler (2008) 
argue that although the trade channel seems to have played a role to different 
degrees in the crises of the 1990s, it does not explain the contagion observed in 
the context of the 1998 Russian crisis, where the trade links among the affected 
countries were quite limited. Thus, the experience of the Russian crisis suggests 
that trade is unlikely to be the only channel of contagion, and other channels are 
also necessary to account for these observations (For models of contagion based 
on trade linkage and macroeconomic similarities see Eichengreen et al 1996, 
Goldstein 1998 and Gerlach and Smets 1995). 
The second transmission mechanism in this group – referred to as country 
re-evaluation by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), wake-up call by Goldstein (1998), 
learning by Costinot et al (2000) and demonstration effects by Didier et al 
(2012) – conveys the idea that investors may apply the lessons learned after a 
shock to one country to other countries with similar macroeconomic structures 
and policies. 
Goldstein (1998) argues that a crisis in one country constitutes a “wake-up 
call” for other economies. This happens when the fundamentals of these other 
economies are bad, but investors do not realize this until problems in the crisis 
country arise. According to Goldstein (1998), these wake-up calls were one of 
the main reasons for the spreading of the Asian crisis. He argues that after the 
crisis hit Thailand, many international investors reassessed the creditworthiness 
of Asian borrowers and in doing so found that many Asian economies had 
similar weaknesses to those in Thailand (weak financial sector, large external 
deficit, appreciating real exchange rates and so on). This, of course, was fatal to 
the outlook for these countries and the crisis spread. This idea is supported by 
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empirical analysis conducted by Goldstein and Hawkins (1998), who found that 
a weighted average of fourteen important (according to the literature) funda-
mentals, which places Thailand (the first economy to get into trouble) as the 
most vulnerable, indicates Indonesia (the economy subsequently worst affected) 
as the second-most vulnerable. Fundamental-based rankings correspond much 
more closely to the observed impact on economies than do rankings of the 
economies on the basis of their bilateral relationship with Thailand. In the case 
of the US crisis in 2008, the economic vulnerabilities that were likely to make 
investors revaluate the creditworthiness of a country were low levels of bank 
capital, high bank exposure to the real estate sector and high corporate leverage 
(Didier et al (2012)). 
It is important to note that these wake-up calls are also considered an 
example of multiple equilibria (explained below as part of crisis-contingent 
theory) by some authors (e.g. Masson 1999, 2004). His reasoning being that 
although in reality there has always been only one (bad) equilibrium, the 
practical progress of events rather favours the multiple equilibria story. For 
example, in the case of the Thai crisis, an optimistic view of East Asian eco-
nomies prevailed for a long time, the change in this view was rapid and the 
resulting crisis was so sudden and severe that it supports a multiple equilibria 
hypothesis. Masson claims that shifts in sentiment towards investing in Asia 
were not all related to learning about these countries’ true fundamentals. 
The third non-crisis-contingent theory policy coordination occurs as one 
country responds to another country’s economic shock with similar policies to 
the ones employed by the crisis country. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) offer the 
example of when a trade agreement might include a clause in which lax 
monetary policy in one country forces other members to raise trade barriers. 
The fourth non-crisis-contingent theory has many names in the literature. As 
mentioned above, Forbes and Rigobon (2001) call it random aggregate shocks 
or global shocks, Dornbusch et al (2000b) use the term common shocks, 
Costinot et al (2000) call it common external factors, and finally, Masson 
(2004) suggests the term monsoonal effects. What is meant by all of these terms 
is that major economic shifts could simultaneously affect the fundamentals of 
several economies and lead to co-movement in asset prices or capital flows. 
Often used examples of common shocks are the rise in international interest 
rates, a slowdown in world aggregate demand and others. 
There are financial links between countries when these countries are 
connected through an international financial system. According to Costinot et al 
(2000), these links can induce the propagation of shocks when investors are 
induced to rebalance their portfolios after the initial shock because of risk 
management or liquidity problems. Defined as such, this channel is close to 
endogenous liquidity, which will be discussed later in the sub-chapter dedicated 
to crisis-contingent theories. 
Dornbusch et al (2000b) define financial links as the shock transmission 
channel somewhat differently apportioning to it a more fundamental basis and 
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distinguishing it from behavioural aspects. They argue that in the presence of 
heavy economic integration, which typically involves both trade and financial 
links, if one country is hit by a crisis, it limits the ability of others to engage in 
foreign direct investments and extend credit. 
Two examples given by the World Bank Group (2009) are as follows. 
Firstly, financial links can be distinguished when leveraged institutions face 
margin calls. When the value of their collateral falls due to a negative shock in 
one country, leveraged companies need to increase their reserves. Therefore, 
they sell part of their valuable holdings on the countries that are still unaffected 
by the initial shock. This mechanism propagates the shock to other economies. 
Secondly, financial links can be distinguished if open-end mutual funds foresee 
future redemptions after there is a shock in one country. Mutual funds need to 
raise cash and, consequently, they sell assets in third countries. These examples 
show that the World Bank Group definition of a financial linkages based trans-
mission is rather similar to that of Costinot et al (2000) given above, and hardly 
distinguishable from the endogenous liquidity problems based transmission (see 
next sub-chapter). 
Therefore, although Dornbusch et al (2000b) consider financial links as one 
of the fundamentals, it is not easy to delimit these links outside behavioural 
aspects. That is probably the reason why Forbes and Rigobon (2001) have not 
used this channel at all in their classification. 
According to Didier, Mauro and Schmukler (2008), financial links appear to 
have been the main transmission channel of the Mexican 1994 crisis. Also, Baig 
and Goldfajn (1999), Caramazza et al (2004), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) have argued that the financial links was 
the main channel of transmission for shocks across countries during the 1990s 
(For those models see Calvo 2005, Calvo and Mendoza 2000 and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 2000). 
Didier et al (2012) distinguish between direct and indirect financial linkages. 
According to their approach direct financial linkages arise due to direct finan-
cial exposures between the crisis-hit country and other countries, while indirect 
financial linkages involve the actions of international investors that lead to co-
movement across the various countries where they hold assets either because of 
margin calls, changes in risk aversion or herding behaviour. Thus, direct 
financial linkages are in accordance with non-crisis contingent theories and 
indirect financial linkages with crisis-contingent theories. 
Hernandez and Valdez (2001) investigate the relative importance of alter-
native fundamental links during the Thai, Russian and Brazilian crises. Results 
differ according to whether the crises are measured on the basis of changes in 
sovereign bond spreads or stock market returns. In the former case, financial 
links seem to be clearly the dominant transmission channel. In the latter case, 
both trade links and neighbourhood effects appear to be relevant contagion 
channels during the Thai and Brazilian crises, while financial competition 
remains the only relevant channel in the case of the Russian crisis. 
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Rigobon (2003) presents two main implications of non-crisis-contingent 
theories. Firstly, stock market indices tend to be integrated with one another, 
and secondly, transmission channels of shocks are similar in tranquil and crisis 
periods. The first of these implications implies that crises do propagate from 
one country to others, and the second suggests that this propagation can only be 
considered contagious if using broader definitions of financial contagion. 
 
1.2.3. Crisis contingent theories 
Crisis-contingent theories assume that transmission mechanisms change during 
a crisis, and therefore, cross-market linkages increase after a shock. These 
theories explain what is behind the changes in transmission mechanisms, which 
means they refer to cases where the transmission is not justified either by real 
linkages between markets or economic and financial fundamentals. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2001) present three basic mechanisms that according to these theories 
are behind the international transmission of shocks and crises: multiple 
equilibria, endogenous liquidity shocks and political economy. Costinot et al 
(2000) also mention three channels, but herding behaviour is suggested instead 
of political contagion. Some main characteristics of all these channels are 
introduced as follows. 
Multiple equilibria as a propagation channel is based on investor psychology 
and occurs when a crisis in one country coordinates investor expectations for 
another economy, mostly negatively (Masson 1999). Investors, after a shock in 
one country, shift in a coordinated fashion from good to bad equilibrium for 
another country and in doing so cause a crisis there. It is important to note that 
the shift from good to bad equilibrium takes place without any change in a 
country’s fundamentals and is driven solely by a change in investor beliefs that 
are self-fulfilling. 
One reason why this kind of thing can easily happen is given by Masson 
(1999, 2004) and Dornbusch et al (2000b) – namely when a crisis in one 
country is used as a sunspot for other countries. A crisis in one country affects 
investor expectations in the second, which induces a coordination of investor 
expectations on the bad equilibrium for this country. 
Another explanation for shifting from good to bad equilibrium is given by 
Mullainathan (2002). His approach is based on narratives that associate the 
crises and the imperfect memory of financial agents. When a crisis hits it 
triggers investors’ memories of past crises, which are usually related to negative 
emotions. Therefore, investors assign a higher probability of a bad equilibrium 
and reconsider their investments. The resulting switch to bad equilibrium thus 
occurs because of the correlated memories of the investors, not the correlated 
fundamentals of the countries. 
An important implication highlighted by Jeanne (1997) is that multiple 
equilibria are only possible in a certain range for macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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If this hypothesis holds, contagion cannot completely be separated from funda-
mentals, and policymakers should try to avoid that critical range. 
Jeanne and Masson (2000) have pointed out that incomplete and asymmetric 
information are not necessary criteria for multiple equilibria to occur. The 
switch to bad equilibrium may simply happen if investors are sufficiently for-
ward-looking. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) summarise that in the multiple equilibria based 
models the shift from a good to bad equilibrium and the transmission of the 
initial shock is therefore driven by a change in investor expectations or beliefs 
and not by any real linkages. Multiple equilibria based theories are able to 
explain why speculative attacks occur in economies that appear to be funda-
mentally sound. After the crisis in the first victim economy, investors change 
their expectations, and therefore, transmit the shock through a propagation 
mechanism that does not exist during stable periods. 
A second category of crisis-contingent theories is endogenous liquidity. This 
theory refers to a situation where a crisis in one country reduces the liquidity of 
market participants. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) argue that in this kind of 
situation investors are more or less forced to recompose their portfolio and sell 
assets in other countries in order to continue operating in the market, satisfy 
margin calls or meet regulatory requirements. If the liquidity shock is large 
enough, a crisis in one country could increase the degree of credit rationing and 
force investors to sell their holdings of assets in countries not affected by the 
initial crisis. This kind of model was developed by Valdes (1997), who shows 
that the probability of the repayment of one country is negatively affected by 
the degree of illiquidity in other countries. 
Calvo (2005, preliminary version as a working paper 1999) and Kodres and 
Pritsker (2002) introduce liquidity problems in the conditions where asym-
metrical information is present. The logic is that when informed investors are 
hit by liquidity shocks, and therefore, are forced to sell their holdings, the 
uninformed investors are unaware whether the reason for these jumping out is 
liquidity problems or some bad signal that these (presumably) informed inves-
tors received. At least some of uninformed agents expect the latter and behave 
respectively. The distinction between this kind of model and the herding 
behaviour based model (see later in the sub-chapter) is quite thin. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) draw parallels between models presented by 
Valdes and Calvo (introduced above) summarising that in both of these models, 
the liquidity shock leads to an increased correlation in asset prices. This 
transmission mechanism does not occur during stable periods and only occurs 
after the initial shock (which makes this branch of theories crisis-contingent). 
An often pointed out (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998) implication of 
liquidity constraints based models is that countries where asset returns have a 
higher correlation with the asset returns of the crisis country are also more 
vulnerable to the propagation of the crisis. Another implication is given by 
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Calvo and Mendoza (2000), who argue that the more country assets are traded 
on financial markets the more vulnerable the country is to contagion. 
Multiple equilibria and endogenous liquidity are both based on investor 
behaviour, and it is not easy in practice to determine which of these two has 
been the main transmission channel. This is, for example, the case in the 
explanation by Calvo and Mendoza (2000) and Agenor and Aizenman (1997), 
who argue that in response to a negative shock, investors often withdraw their 
money from the assets markets of the region without confirming whether the 
market they have invested in has been affected or not by that shock. It is 
difficult to say in these cases whether the retreat was due to some weaknesses 
that the crisis elsewhere has highlighted or because of liquidity problems (or 
even herd behaviour). 
The third transmission mechanism that can be categorized as crisis-contin-
gent, political contagion, can be defined as a mechanism of contagion that is 
intrinsically political (Drazen 1999), meaning that contagion arises due to 
decisions made by policy makers with solely political (not economical) objec-
tives. An example of this kind of political contagion can easily arise if a group 
of countries have fixed exchange rates. If one of these countries decides to 
abandon its peg, this reduces the political costs to other countries of abandoning 
their respective pegs, which in turn makes it more likely that these countries 
also abandon their pegs. Therefore, exchange rate crises are likely to spread 
because of political contagion. This kind of progress of events, according to 
many authors (Goldstein 1998, Drazen 1999), was evident in the ERM crisis of 
1992–1993. Dornbusch et al (2000b) argue that if investors do expect this kind 
of “game“ of competitive devaluations after a currency crisis in one country, it 
is most natural for them to sell their holdings of securities in other countries, 
which results in still greater depreciation relative to what could have been 
attained in a cooperative equilibrium. 
If one compares the explanation in terms of political links with those 
focusing on trade links (see previous sub-chapter), it can be seen that the 
distinction between the two in practice is rather difficult. What happens is more 
or less the same – after the devaluation of the currency in one country, other 
countries also devalue their currencies. What is different is why these 
successive devaluations occur. The theory of the trade links based propagation 
of shocks says the reason for this is that the first devaluation worsens the 
competitiveness of other countries and devaluation or abandoning their peg can 
improve their competiveness and their currencies are more susceptible to 
speculative attacks, while according to the theory of political contagion the 
same thing happens because the political costs of abandoning the peg is lower if 
another country has already done that. Finding out the true reason may of course 
not be an easy task in practice. 
Herding behaviour needs special attention as this phenomenon is present in 
the majority of episodes of the propagation of shocks based on investor or other 
financial agent behaviour. Many authors have found that fundamental links (and 
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commons shocks) do not fully explain the relationship and changes in relation-
ships among countries. That being the case, herding behaviour is suggested as 
one reason for spillover effects and contagion between countries. Herding 
behaviour refers to the situation where instead of incurring expenses for 
obtaining missing information, under-informed investors observe the actions of 
supposedly better informed investors and try to follow them as they think these 
actions are based on superior information. The typical conditions for herding 
behaviour to arise are when information about countries’ fundamentals is 
incomplete, asymmetrical and too expensive for less informed investors and 
there are no serious restrictions for investors choosing their actions8. If some 
investors take their holdings out of a country, it may seem to others that this 
action was due to certain information and they may also retreat from the market. 
But it is possible that those supposedly well informed investors did not act on 
the basis of information about the countries’ fundamentals, but were just 
making adjustments to their portfolio after having experienced losses in a 
country hit by the crisis. This kind of herding behaviour based model was first 
presented by Calvo (1996). 
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) have not included herding as a crisis-contingent 
channel in their classification, but it has an important role to play in both 
multiple equilibria and liquidity problems theories. When discussing multiple 
equilibria as a channel for the transmission of shocks and crises, these authors 
claim that the shift from a good to bad equilibrium is driven by a change in 
investor expectations or beliefs, but for many of the agents (probably even the 
majority of them) these changes in beliefs do not stem from the sunspots but 
from the behaviour of other, presumably better informed investors. Similar 
mimicking behaviour may occur when some investors are forced to sell their 
holdings because of liquidity problems. It is not easy for other investors to 
know whether these sales are due to liquidity issues or some signals with a 
negative undertone. To ensure against the latter, it seems rational to follow the 
herd. 
In the case of herding behaviour, individual investors may act rationally but 
the whole market does not, and therefore, even countries with sound funda-
mentals are not protected against the transmission of crises. According to 
Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2003), the pull effect caused by investors all 
behaving in the same way makes economic fundamentals unimportant and leads 
to the rapid withdrawal of capital from the economies concerned or possibly 
even from entire regions. Claessens et al (2001) argue that as spreads directly 
reflect the risk perception of financial markets, pure contagion may be solely 
the result of the behaviour of investors or other financial agents. 
                                                 
8  For a good overview of financial crises based on the asymmetric information approach 
see Mishkin (1991), for a more general overview of information asymmetry see Rotschild 
and Stiglitz (1976). 
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Evidence of herding or some other form of investor behaviour based trans-
mission of crises has been found by many authors. Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996) highlight that the countries that came under speculative attack 
during the ERM crisis had heterogeneous macroeconomic fundamentals, and 
only in some cases could the attack be justified by the fundamentals. Pindyck 
and Rotemberg (1990 and 1993) find that after taking into account common 
fundamentals there is still residual co-movement across stocks with very 
different industry and idiosyncratic fundamentals. These results point to the 
important role played during the crisis by irrationally behaving investors and 
speculators. Also, Moussalli (2007), Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2003) and 
Woo (2000) have argued that herding is the main channel for spillover effects 
between countries. Findings from a recent study by Boschi and Goenka (2012) 
show that financial crises can be transmitted across seemingly unrelated 
countries through the risk attitudes of international investors. Thus, the authors 
argue, to understand financial crises it is not sufficient to look at the countries in 
question, but also at the portfolios of international investors. Here what is 
important is not the magnitude of absolute losses but the losses of investors 
relative to their portfolios. 
Common to all crisis-contingent theories is the fact that the crisis causes a 
structural shift, a break in linkages between countries. As the transmission 
mechanism changes, the propagation of shocks and crises that occur in corres-
pondence to these theories can be considered as financial contagion. 
One key word that characterizes most crisis-contingent theories is irratio-
nality. There is something irrational in the behaviour of financial agents (it does 
not mean that investors individually act irrationally, but rather that their 
collective behaviour is not rational) that fosters or even causes the propagation 
of shocks. This irrationality based propagation makes lot of sense, as financial 
contagion does not affect all countries in a similar fashion, not even those with 
similar levels of development or economic conditions (Ramirez and Martinez 
2011).  
According to crisis-contingent theories only countries behind an iron curtain 
are protected against financial contagion. Sound fundamentals offer no pro-
tection because they are overruled by the self-fulfilling expectations of 
investors. 
Note that these channels (both crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent) 
are called both transmission channels of shocks and transmission channels of 
contagion in the literature. Some (mostly earlier) papers use these two more or 
less as synonyms. But if we adopt the most restrictive (third) definition of 
financial contagion, only transmission mechanisms in accordance with crisis-
contingent theories can be called channels of contagion. Shocks and crises 
propagate through other channels also, of course, but this kind of transmission 
is not considered contagious. 
As can be seen from the previous overview, the distinctions between the 
different theories are sometimes quite thin and even in the case of some crisis-
8 
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contingent and non-crisis-contingent theories. Here the author of the thesis 
suggests thinking in terms of non-crisis-contingent theories as those that 
describe the propagation of crises via fundamental linkages and crisis-contin-
gent theories as those that explain such propagations through investor 
behaviour. 
To summarise the findings of the chapter, it can be concluded that the eco-
nomic literature provides heterogeneous views on financial contagion and its 
transmission channels, and therefore, it is understandable that the results of 
empirical studies may also vary depending on the theoretical and empirical 
frameworks for considering the concept of financial contagion as well as several 
other factors. The next chapter focuses on the qualitative analysis of empirical 
evidence of financial contagion, first of all taking into account the variability of 
the methodological approaches used in empirical studies. 
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2. QUALITATIVE OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
2.1. Some main reasons explaining the variability  
of empirical evidence 
Drawing finite conclusions on financial contagion based on the results of 
previous empirical findings is not easy. Empirical analyses differ in terms of the 
conceptual definition of contagion adopted, the crises under analysis, desti-
nation countries and the financial market under investigation, but all of these 
aspects may affect the results of the empirical studies. In addition, as pointed 
out by Billio and Pellizon (2003), Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) and Serwa 
and Bohl (2005), the problems of omitted variables, feedback dependencies 
between stock markets, different time zones and the arbitrary selection of crisis 
periods can all affect the results of financial contagion tests. This diversity of 
results is well illustrated in the research by Daniel Serwa (2005), who used four 
different testing methodologies and different samples for robustness purposes 
only to achieve mixed results. According to his findings, contagion is a rather 
rare phenomenon, but patterns of capital and information flow to stock markets 
still change during turbulent periods. 
There is also no consensus on the issue of whether the contagiousness of 
crises increases or decreases over time. A lot of discussion has focused on the 
theme of whether recent crises have been more contagious than those before the 
1990s. While some authors (Haile and Pozo 2008) argue that currency crises 
prior to the 1990s did not appear to spread across countries with the virulence 
and speed observed recently, others (Bordo and Murshid 2000a and b) have 
found no evidence to confirm this. 
Finally, there are also other problems measuring contagion (see for instance 
Cheung et al (2009). Rigobon (2002 and 2003) points out that financial con-
tagion has been associated with high frequency events: it has been measured on 
stock market returns, interest rates, exchange rates or linear combinations of 
them. Rigobon argues that this data is plagued with simultaneous equations, 
omitted variables, conditional and unconditional heteroskedasticity, serial corre-
lations, non-linearity and non-normality problems. Unfortunately, no such 
procedure has yet been found that can handle all these problems at the same 
time without representing some important restrictions (see Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001) and Rigobon (2002)). 
Following in the footsteps of some earlier papers (for example Dornbusch et 
al, 2000a), recent empirical analyses are divided into the following categories 
according to the testing methodology adopted: tests based on cross-market 
correlation coefficients, tests based on the conditional probabilities of financial 
crisis and tests measuring changes in volatility. Furthermore, there are some 
more seldom used tests discussed under the heading “other tests”. An overview 
of papers investigating financial contagion and the results of previous empirical 
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studies is presented in Appendices 1–4. In compiling this overview, the focus is 
primarily on empirical evidence found in the papers (contagion or not), but also 
the particularities of the data sets (variability of countries, time periods, crises 
under investigation) and financial markets (stocks, bonds, exchange rates etc). 
A short introduction to the methodology is given at the beginning of the each of 
the following sub-chapters. That is as far as this thesis extends in terms of 
introducing specific mathematical models for each methodological framework, 
as this is outside the scope of the study. The two most popular of these metho-
dologies – those based on correlation coefficients and volatility changes – are 
also used in the thesis, and therefore, a detailed overview of these models is 
given in chapter 3. To obtain an in-depth overview of these models see for 
example Wolf (1999) or Serwa (2005). 
 
 
2.2. Tests based on cross-market correlation 
coefficients 
Tests based on cross-market correlation coefficients are the most common and 
widely used approach to testing for contagion. These tests measure the 
correlation in returns between two markets during a stable period and then test 
for a significant increase in this correlation coefficient after a shock. A signi-
ficant increase in the correlation coefficient after a crisis is considered evidence 
of contagion. These tests are mainly consistent with the third definition of finan-
cial contagion. An overview of contagion studies that implement correlation 
coefficient based tests is presented in Appendix 1. 
The majority of studies that estimate correlations among markets and do not 
adjust for the presence of heteroskedasticity have found evidence for contagion. 
For instance, in one of the pioneering studies of financial contagion, King and 
Wadhwani (1990) found that correlations between the US, UK and Japan 
increased significantly after the US 1987 crisis. Lee and Kim (1993) came to 
the same conclusion using a sample of 12 major markets. Baig and Goldfajn 
(1999) found evidence of contagion between emerging markets during the 
1997–98 East Asian crises.  
Several authors have found that the Mexican crisis in 1994 was contagious. 
Evidence for contagion has been found by Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and 
Frankel and Schmukler (1998) using the sample of Asian and Latin American 
emerging markets; by Valdes (1997) using the sample of Latin America and by 
Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (1998) using the sample of Argentina. 
However, Forbes and Rigobon (2001 and 2002) and Rigobon (2002 and 
2003) argue that simple correlations are biased due to the presence of heteroske-
dasticity, endogeneity and omitted variables. Therefore, they argue, an increase 
in correlations among markets in different countries may not be evidence of 
contagion but only interdependence. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity of asset price movements, an increase in 
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correlation could be just a continuation of strong transmission mechanisms, 
which also exist in tranquil times. Given that volatility usually increases during 
a crisis, the heteroskedasticity is actually likely and expected. If there is histori-
cally high cross correlation among markets, then a rapid and extensive change 
in one market will also lead to significant changes in the other markets, and 
according to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), these changes should not be counted 
as evidence of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) also show that an increase 
in correlations of asset prices may result when changes in economic funda-
mentals, risk perception and preferences are correlated without any additional 
contagion being present. 
A deeper, mathematical, explanation to why it is necessary to distinguish 
contagion from interdependence is amongst others given by Forbes and Rigo-
bon (2002), Rigobon (2002), Boyer et al (1999), Loretan and English (2000) 
and Corsetti et al (2005), and goes along the following lines. When two random 
variables X and Y are positively correlated, their correlation coefficient may be 
an increasing function of the variance of each of them. In particular, this is 
always the case if X and Y are normally distributed or if one variable is a linear 
function of the other variable. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) conclude that in 
general, correlation coefficients in specific subsamples tend to be biased in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity or if some variables are omitted. 
Therefore, they argue, when comparing correlation coefficients over a specific 
subsample, one needs to correct the bias in the coefficients generated by the 
different variances in that subsample. For instance, during the crisis periods, 
economic variables generally show an increase in volatility. Hence, empirical 
tests that do not correct for the bias typically tend to favour the hypothesis of 
excessive transmission. 
Unfortunately, to adjust for the effects of heteroskedasticity some restrictive 
assumptions have to be made; nevertheless, this may be the lesser evil. Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002, first version of the paper 1999) show that correlation 
coefficients across multi-country returns are not significantly higher during 
crisis periods (1987 US stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and 
the 1997 East Asian crisis) if the problems of endogenous variables, omitted 
variables and changes in the variance of residuals are properly corrected for. 
Their revolutionary result of no contagion, only interdependence means that 
large cross-market linkages after a shock are simply a continuation of strong 
transmission mechanisms that exist in more stable periods, and has been the 
object of heated discussion and controversy since. Forbes and Rigobon (2000) 
find no clear evidence of contagion in stock and bond markets during the Latin 
American crises in the 1990s. Similarly, Arias, Hausman and Rigobon (1998) 
find only limited evidence for contagion. Boyer et al (1999) and Loretan and 
English (2000) use a slightly refined methodology (by calculating corrected 
correlation coefficients under the assumption of normally distributed variables) 
and also find no evidence for contagion. 
9 
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Gelos and Sahay (2001) apply a simplified version of this methodology and 
find no contagion from the Czech Republic, Asia and Russia to CEE stock 
markets. However, they find significant changes in the relationship between 
exchange markets in the crisis-origin country (Russia and Czech Republic) and 
other markets during the crisis periods. Serwa (2005) uses the extension of the 
models presented by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli, and 
Sbracia (2005) to investigate 7 crises using the sample of a selection of CEE 
and Western European countries and found that contagion occurred hardly ever 
or not frequently during the investigated crises. 
However, some authors have found evidence of financial contagion even 
after controlling for heteroskedasticity. For example, Favero and Giavazzi 
(1999) find that, after controlling for normal interdependence in the context of 
an ERM crisis there was still evidence of contagion in interest rates residuals. 
Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) show that even after correcting for inter-sample 
heteroskedasticity and intra-sample GARCH effects the terrorist attack in the 
United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in contagion. Baig and Goldfajn 
(1999) find clear evidence for contagion with regards to sovereign spreads 
(however, evidence with regards to exchange rates, stock markets and interest 
rates co-movements is mixed at best). Kleimeier et al (2008) use a time-
alignment-of-data approach and also find evidence of contagion9. The same 
result is found by Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008), who investigate excess co-
movement in US stock indices using adjustments proposed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002). Sander and Kleimeier (2003) extend the measurement metho-
dology by directly investigating changing causality patterns by using the 
Granger-causality methodology and find that Asian crisis episodes were 
contagious. 
Corsetti et al (2005) show that the finding of no contagion only inter-
dependence obtained by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is due to some arbitrary 
assumptions that concerned the variance of the market-specific noise in the 
country where the crisis originated. These assumptions cause the tests to be 
biased towards the null hypothesis of interdependence and against the 
hypothesis of contagion. And indeed, Corsetti et al (2005) find evidence for 
contagion from Hong Kong to the stock markets in Singapore, the Philippines, 
France, Italy and the UK. In addition, Serwa (2005) shows that the adjusted 
correlation coefficients of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) (and its extension by 
Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia 2005), that may have different values in stable 
and crisis periods, may in some situations be biased. Kleimeier et al (2008) have 
gone even so far as to claim that it is a well known fact that the no contagion 
only interdependence result of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is due to the poor 
size properties of their methodology. 
                                                 
9  Kleimeier et al (2008) make an important step forward investigating synchronized data. 
Whether this kind of data needs to be time-aligned or not may be one of the main discussion 
objects in the future research. 
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Bordo and Murshid (2000b) examine the contagiousness of financial crises 
over the past 120 years and find some evidence that correlations among markets 
were higher during crisis periods. However, as the volatility in correlation 
coefficients is quite high in turbulent periods, they (using the same reasoning as 
given by Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) find no solid evidence that contagion has 
been increasing over time. 
Recently, Choe et al (2012) have come out with the interesting revelation 
that heteroskedasticity is not only an econometric factor that can cause a 
statistical bias in correlation coefficient based contagion tests, but also an 
important risk factor that can induce the intertemporal risk-return adjustment 
among risk-averse investors. These authors show that there is a significant 
relationship between cross-market co-movement and volatility, and that the 
time-varying component of cross-market co-movements is attributed to the 
intertemporal risk-return adjustment among risk-averse investors in responding 
to changing volatility. Thus, they cast doubt on the entire family of constant 
correlation tests claiming that these tests are not capable of incorporating the 
time-varying aspect of cross-market co-movements into the test for contagion. 
Instead, these authors propose a time-varying conditional correlation test for 
contagion and define financial contagion as a structural break in the dynamics 
of the conditional correlation process during a crisis, while a temporal change in 
the correlation dynamics is defined as a reflection of time-varying cross-market 
co-movements induced by the intertemporal risk-return adjustment. Using this 
methodology and the dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH 
model as an estimation tool, Choe et al (2012) find that out of the countries 
reporting contagion evidence under the constant correlation test, none of the 
countries exhibits contagion evidence from the 1997 Asian crisis. As this reve-
lation is still very new and there has not been enough time for proper criticism, 
this approach is not followed in the present dissertation. 
In sum, the overview of the previous empirical studies applying tests based 
on cross-market correlation analysis confirms the opinion that empirical 
evidence of financial contagion is sensitive to data sets and testing methods. 
When the correlations are not adjusted for the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
evidence for contagion is found in the majority of studies and periods, but when 




2.3. Tests based on the conditional  
probabilities of crisis 
Rather than using raw correlations some authors study conditional correlation or 
probabilities to test financial contagion. The overview of the main studies that 
investigate the presence of financial contagion using conditional probability 
based tests is presented in Appendix 2. 
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The most commonly used methodology, introduced by Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), examines whether 
the likelihood of crisis is higher in a given country when there are crises in 
some other country (countries) by estimating the probability of a crisis con-
ditional on information about the occurrence of crisis elsewhere. This approach 
has some clear advantages: first, it permits statistical tests of the existence of 
contagion, and second, these tests can also try to investigate the channels 
through which contagion may occur (Dornbusch et al 2000b). However, these 
tests do not allow testing whether there have been structural breaks in the 
transmission mechanisms of crises, and therefore, one cannot straightforwardly 
distinguish crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent propagation channels. 
Using a probit model and a sample of 20 industrial economies from 1959 
through 1993, Eichengreen et al (1996) show that the probability of a domestic 
currency crisis increases with a speculative attack elsewhere. Using a similar 
methodology, De Gregorio and Valdes (1999) found that the 1994 Mexican 
crisis was less contagious than the 1982 debt crisis and the Asian crisis. They 
also concluded that debt composition and exchange rate flexibility limit the 
extent of contagion, whereas capital controls do not appear to curb it. 
Caramazza et al (2000 and 2004) on the other hand have found that the 
contagious nature of the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises does not differ 
much. 
Haile and Bozo (2008) use quarterly data (1960–1998) for a set of 37 
advanced and emerging-market economies and find that countries face currency 
crises because of both unsustainable macroeconomic fundamentals and con-
tagion. Other important findings of their work are that contagion is regional and 
it operates through the trade channel. Glick and Rose (1999) apply a similar 
approach to five episodes of currency crises and 161 countries and find that 
trade linkages are important in propagating a crisis. They argue that contagion 
tends to be rather regional than global because trade tends to be more intra-
regional than inter-regional (see also Diwan and Hoekman 1999). Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) find some evidence for contagion, but similarly to Haile 
and Bozo (2008) and Glick and Rose (1999) conclude it has been a primarily 
regional phenomenon (see also Calvo and Reinhart 1996, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler 2003). 
Alba et al (1998) argue that the effects of competitive devaluations alone 
could not have explained the large depreciation of other regional currencies 
after the Thai devaluation, which hints at some evidence for contagion. For 
transition economies, Gelos and Sahay (2001) find that correlations in exchange 
market pressures can be explained by direct trade links, but not by measures of 
other fundamentals. According to their study shock propagation mechanisms 
were weak during the Asian and Czech crises, but strong during the Russian 
crisis. Forbes (1999 and 2004) finds that country-specific effects and trade are 
all important transmission mechanisms during the Asian and Russian crises. 
Using closed-end country fund data, Frankel and Schmukler (1998) test whether 
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adverse shocks from the Mexican crisis were transmitted directly to other Latin 
American and East Asian countries or through New York. They find that the 
Mexican crisis was spread through Wall Street to East Asian countries, but was 
directly transmitted to other Latin American countries. Lomakin and Paiz 
(1999) use a probit analysis and find that after adjustment for hetero-
skedasticity, the strength of cross-country linkages are significantly reduced. 
An approach analogous to the conditional probability approach is taken by 
Hartmann et al (2001) who derive non-parametric estimates for the expected 
number of market crashes given that at least one market crashes. Using G-5 
countries as a sample they find only very weak evidence for contagion and 
suggest it may be advisable to differentiate between the various types of 
countries (as destination) in future research. 
To summarise the findings obtained using conditional probability based 
tests, it can be said that results once again are mixed. One has to keep in mind 
that these tests usually do not investigate the shift-contagion (the most re-
strictive definition of contagion), which makes it more likely to find supporting 
evidence for contagion. 
 
 
2.4. Tests measuring changes in volatility 
Tests measuring changes in volatility examine whether conditional variances of 
financial variables are related to each other among countries during the crisis 
period. This means using an ARCH or GARCH framework to estimate changes 
in the variance-covariance matrix (Hamao et al 1990; Edwards 1998) or the co-
integrating vector across countries (Chou et al 1994; Longin and Solnik 1995). 
Some of the authors have additionally to conditional variances (volatility con-
tagion) investigated relationships in conditional means (mean contagion), which 
can also be done using the ARCH and GARCH model test equations. The 
overview of the main contagion studies that measure changes in volatility is 
presented in Appendix 3. 
Using this procedure Chou et al (1994) and Hamao et al (1990) find 
evidence of contagion after the 1987 US stock market crisis. Using an aug-
mented GARCH model, Edwards (1998) focuses on the 1994 Mexican crisis 
and finds that there was strong evidence for contagion from Mexico to 
Argentina, but not from Mexico to Chile. Park and Song (1998) apply a 
GARCH model and find that the effects of the crisis in Indonesia and Thailand 
were transmitted to the Korean foreign exchange market, while the Korean 
crisis was not contagious to the two Southeast Asian countries. Longin and 
Solnik (1995) find that the correlation of monthly excess returns for seven 
major countries over the period 1960–90 rises in periods of high volatility. In a 
subsequent paper the same authors (Longin and Solnik 2001) investigate five 
major stock markets (US, UK, Germany, France, Japan) over the period 1959–
1996 and also find evidence for contagion. Supporting evidence for the 
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contagion hypothesis is also found by Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) who 
investigate the 2001 terrorist attack and use stock markets from 25 countries as 
the sample.  
Rigobon (2000, 2002 and 2003) has investigated variance-covariance 
matrices several times. He has focused on the crises in the 1990s and used data 
for all bonds, stocks and Brady bonds, but clear evidence of contagion was not 
found in any of his three studies. Baur (2003) introduces a test that concentrates 
on the transmission mechanism of shocks directly and differentiates between 
mean contagion and volatility contagion in an asymmetrical manner. Empirical 
results for 11 Asian stock markets show that there was mean and volatility con-
tagion in the Asian crisis. 
It is important to note that authors using these testing approaches usually 
have not controlled for fundamentals, and therefore, the tests do not make it 
possible to distinguish between pure (shift-contagion) and fundamentals-based 
contagion (interdependence) (Dornbusch et al (2000b). As it is easier to come to 
a conclusion that supports financial contagion in the case of less restrictive 
definitions, it is not surprising that such findings dominate. Subsequent studies 
that use more refined models have come to the no contagion conclusion much 
more frequently than older ones. 
 
 
2.5. Other tests 
There are also many more tests that are used less often (see Appendix 4). One 
of the most popular is a methodology called the Markov switching framework. 
Sola et al (2002) use this approach and find some support for financial 
contagion from Thailand to South Korea during the 1997 Asian crisis. However, 
in the case of South Korea and Brazil, contagion hypothesis is rejected. Serwa 
(2005) introduces the concept of causality using the same framework and finds 
no evidence for contagion between the Japanese (Nikkei 225) and Hong Kong 
(HSI) markets during the Asian crisis. 
Abeysinghe (2001) applies a full trade model for crisis-affected East Asian 
countries and finds that, although transmission through trade played an 
important role, the immediate economic contractions are largely a result of 
direct shocks that are attributable to pure contagion10 (see Dornbusch et al 
2000b). Serwa (2005) employs a threshold vector autoregressive model to 
investigate the 1997 Asian crisis and finds evidence for financial contagion 
according to both the following definitions: financial crisis spilling over from 
one market to other markets (practically the same as definition 1 above) and a 
break in the interdependency structure between countries (definition 3 above or 
shift-contagion). 
                                                 
10  The authors consider the most restrictive definition of contagion as pure contagion. 
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Gravelle et al (2003) developed a methodology to detect shift-contagion in 
pairs of asset returns using a bootstrap procedure. Their findings suggest that 
shift-contagion occurs among the currency markets in developed countries (for 
the period 1985–2001) but not bond markets in emerging-market countries 
(1991–2001). Kali and Reyes (2005) use quite original methods that they call a 
network approach. Their main finding is that the network effect of the crisis 
epicentre country was substantially higher for the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 
Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis than for the Venezuelan and Argentine 
crises. That was the reason, they argue, why these first three crises were highly 
contagious while the other two were not. 
Craig, Dravid and Richardson (1995) and Iwatsubo and Inagaki (2006) 
propose alternative (to the mainstream) measures for identifying financial con-
tagion between non-synchronous trading markets11. Craig, Dravid and Richard-
son (1995) find that Japanese Nikkei index-based futures traded in the US 
provide complete information about contemporaneous overnight Japanese 
returns. The finding that information is rationally incorporated into prices even 
across international markets casts doubts on irrational financial agents based 
models. Iwatsubo and Inagaki (2006) investigate the bilateral contagion effects 
between US and Asian stock markets and find that there exist significant 
bilateral contagion effects in returns and return volatility between US and Asian 
markets, and the intensity of contagion was significantly greater during the 
Asian financial crisis than after the crisis. 
Villar Frexedas and Vaya (2005) and Kelejian et al (2006) have used spatial 
econometric tools to investigate the financial contagion phenomenon. Both 
papers detect that contagion seems to have a clearly regional component. 
Tornell (1999) does not actually test for the presence of contagion, but rather 
how the crisis, if it occurs, spreads across emerging markets. His findings 
suggest that crises do not spread to countries with strong fundamentals, which 
of course does not support the contagion hypothesis (at least in terms of the 
more restrictive definitions of contagion). 
In summary, the results of empirical studies investigating financial crises and 
applying different test methods are highly heterogeneous, and do not provide a 
clear and synthesized picture of financial contagion. Thus, the application of 
additional methodological approaches that make it possible to systematically 
analyse and adequately summarise the consequences of previous financial crises 
is necessary when examining the phenomenon of financial contagion. 
 
                                                 
11  In the models used by Craig, Dravid and Richardson (1995), given informationally 
efficient market investors’ perceptions about the given stock market (Japan in their case) that 
are reflected in the returns of this stock market index, futures traded in some other market 
with different trading hours (US) influence one-to-one returns in the given (Japanese) stock 
market when it opens. A similar idea is used in the models of Iwatsubo and Inagaki (2006). 
Most of the other models suggest that this kind of information is ignored by the investors 
and observed price movements in the other (US) market make them react accordingly. 
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2.6. Findings for CEE countries 
The literature investigating financial contagion in the case of transition eco-
nomies is rather vague focusing mainly on only three CEE economies (Hun-
gary, Poland and the Czech Republic). Wang and Moore (2008) investigate the 
co-movement between a set of three major CEE emerging markets (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the aggregate eurozone market using the 
dynamic conditional correlation technique12. Between these two collectives, the 
authors find significant dynamic correlations and a higher level of linkages in 
the aftermath of the crises. The authors’ findings include a revelation that the 
increase in stock market co-movements cannot be explained by the macro-
economic convergence process or by monetary convergence with the eurozone, 
so contagion may well have been a driving force. 
Gelos and Sahay (2001) find that correlations in foreign exchange market 
pressures can be explained by direct trade links, but not by other measured 
fundamentals. They find no financial contagion spillovers from either the Czech 
Republic or Asia to CEE stock markets, but shocks to the Russian stock market 
Granger caused movements in the Czech, Hungarian and Polish stock markets. 
Serwa (2005) uses an extension of the models presented by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al (2005) to investigate seven financial crises on 
a sample of selected CEE and Western European countries. His findings show 
that financial contagion infrequently or rarely occurred over the course of the 
investigated financial crises. Jokipii and Lucey (2006) investigate co-
movements in the banking sector for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
over a period of approximately ten years. They find that financial contagion 
spreads from the Czech Republic to Hungary. Schotman and Zalewska (2006) 
analyze the impact of Asian and Russian crises on CEE stock markets and find 
that the Hungarian market was the most and the Czech market the least affected. 
Lucey and Voronkova (2008) examine contagion from Russia to Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland during the Russian crisis and find contagion 
supporting evidence in the case of short-term links. In addition to the papers 
testing contagion, some others have investigated links between CEE and 
selected major markets. These papers include Scheicher (2001), Gilmore and 
McManus (2002), Voronkova (2004), Syriopoulos (2004 and 2007) and Syllig-
nakis and Kouretas (2010) and typically some albeit modest links were found. 
An important theoretical statement according to the susceptibility to fi-
nancial contagion in CEE transition economies has been made by Weller and 
Morzuch (2000), who argue that during historic times as well as more recent 
times of global financial turmoil, default risk has been lower in CEE transition 
countries than in other developing economies. The authors posit an explanation 
that there is apparently less speculative financing and a reduced chance of asset 
market bubbles in CEE transition countries, and consequently, a diminished 
                                                 
12  The dynamic conditional correlation measures the contemporaneous conditional corre-
lation between the two series. 
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vulnerability to short-term capital flows. Given that default and maturity risks 
would generally be lower in CEE transition countries than in other emerging 
economies during past periods of global financial turmoil, it is suspected by 
Weller and Morzuch (2000) that interest rate risk and exchange rate risk are also 
less likely to materialize. Thus, they conclude, as long as no appreciable 
problems afflict the financial sector or the real sector in CEE transition 
countries, international investors tend to be less inclined to withdraw their funds 
from these markets. Of course one has to keep in mind that this reasoning is 
more than ten years old now, and given the shifty political and economic 
situation in CEE economies, it is also subject to change. 
 
 
2.7. Studies investigating contagiousness  
in the US 2008 crisis 
Next, studies investigating contagiousness in the US 2008 crisis will be 
examined. A separate section is dedicated to the US 2008 financial crisis as 
studies investigating this crisis were not available at the time the dissertation 
articles were written. Therefore, this section is completely new and is not 
covered in the publications listed in the list of papers and given in the 
attachments. 
The very first papers investigating the contagiousness of the US 2008 crisis 
were already published as preliminary versions in 2008, and therefore, only 
took into account the beginning of the crisis when the crisis had not yet peaked. 
Idier (2011) and Fry et al (2010) use the Markov switching framework to 
investigate the US 2008 crisis13, while Dungey et al (2010) construct a latent 
factor model based on that by Kodres and Pritsker (2002) that takes into account 
several crises over a ten-year period. All these authors find evidence of financial 
contagion during the US 2008 crisis. 
Longstaff (2010) investigates the pricing of the subprime asset-packed 
collateralized debt obligations and their contagion effects on other markets. 
Using a VAR framework, the author finds clear evidence of shift-contagion. 
The relevance of alternative propagation channels from the crisis are also 
investigated in the study. The findings show that contagion spread mainly via 
liquidity and financing channels, but not via the correlated information channel. 
Horta et al (2010) use copula theory, which has become popular in recent 
years, to investigate contagion from US to European stock markets in the NYSE 
Euronext group. Their time frame also ends in the middle of the crisis (April 
2008), and the starting point of the crisis is chosen as 1 August 2007. Their 
findings show that co-movements between analysed stock markets have become 
more pronounced after the bursting of the mortgage bubble, which confirms the 
                                                 
13  Fry et al (2010) also investigate the Hong Kong 1997 crisis, while Idier (2011) examines 
altogether seven crisis episodes. 
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shift-contagion hypothesis. Additionally, not only did the strength of the links 
between markets become stronger during the crisis, but also their nature was 
significantly changed and the connections with the US market became more 
heterogeneous. One more interesting finding reveals that the crisis affected all 
countries in the sample with similar strength. 
Chiang and Wang (2011) study how the stock markets in G7 countries were 
influenced by the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007. They investigate 
volatility contagion instead of contagion in returns by using a time-varying 
logarithmic conditional autoregressive range model with a lognormal distri-
bution and find that volatility contagion did occur from the US to the French, 
UK, Italian and Japanese markets during the subprime mortgage crisis period. 
Aloui et al (2011) employ a multivariate copula approach to investigate 
extreme co-movement between the US and four emerging markets, namely 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. They find evidence of extreme co-movement 
for all market pairs in a bearish market, but the same applies for bullish markets 
as well, so no strong evidence of shift-contagion was found. Interestingly, they 
did find that dependency from the US is stronger for commodity-price de-
pendent markets (Brazil and Russia) than for finished-product export-oriented 
markets (India and China). 
Xue et al (2012) investigate the contagiousness of the US 2008 crisis for 
Asian markets. Their findings suggest that financial contagion might not play a 
crucial role in transmitting the crisis from the US to Asia. This seemingly 
surprising finding comes, in their opinion, from the relatively conservative 
banking philosophy in Asian countries. The losses in banks in developed Asia-
Pacific regions were relatively small compared to European countries such as 
the UK or Germany, because Asian banks were less aggressive in their invest-
ments. The authors suggest that the US crisis propagated to Asia via trade 
channels. 
Similar findings appear in the study by Burdekin and Siklos (2012). Their 
dynamic conditional correlations based methodology suggests decreasing co-
movement between the US and Asia-Pacific markets and rising co-movement 
among all Asia-Pacific markets over time, accelerating after the onset of the 
global financial crisis in 2007. 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) use daily data on stock market indexes 
for the US and 15 euro area countries to test for the presence of the transmission 
of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises. They consider both a 
financials sector index and a non-financials market index (i.e. total market index 
excluding financials) and find strong evidence of crisis transmission from US 
non-financials to European non-financials, whereas the increase in the depen-
dence of European financials on US financials is rather limited. Results also 
show that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financials become much 
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more dependent on changes in Greek CDS14 spreads compared to the pre-
Lehman sub-period. However, the increase is modest for non-financials. 
Didier et al (2012) examined the relative importance of three transmission 
channels, namely trade links, financial links and demonstration effects, in 
determining co-movement between US stock market returns and local stock 
market returns across 83 countries during the US 2008 crisis. Their findings 
showed that the main factors driving co-movement were financial, which, of 
course, was not a big surprise given the nature of the crisis and the fact that the 
focus was on financial markets. The authors also found evidence of demonst-
ration effects in the first stage of the crisis, when countries with vulnerable 
banking and corporate sectors exhibited a higher co-movement with the US 
stock market. Despite a collapse in trade across countries, evidence for trade 
linkages as the driving factor for co-movement with the US across countries 
was not found. One additional interesting finding was that it showed that 
financial openness makes countries significantly more vulnerable to the pro-
pagation of crises. 
Syllignakis and Kouretas (2010) analyse three crisis episodes: the Asian 
crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 1998 and recent financial crisis that took 
off in the US in 2007 and became global in 2008. Therefore, this paper is one of 
the very few that put together the US 2008 crisis and CEE economies as 
destination countries in financial contagion analysis. The authors use the 
framework of the multivariate dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model 
and find substantial evidence of the existence of contagion effects due to 
herding behaviour during the period of 2007–2009, and in particular in the 
second half of 2008. The authors suggest that herding behaviour may be 
attributed to the increased participation of foreign investors in the CEE stock 
markets, as well as to the increased financial liberalization, particularly after the 
accession of CEE countries to the European Union in 2004. Additionally, their 
rolling regression analysis of the conditional correlations with the conditional 
volatility provided further evidence of the presence of contagion effects around 
the peak of the financial crisis in October 2008. Other financial crisis episodes 
investigated were not found to be contagious. 
Summing up the findings of the sub-chapter one might conclude that most of 
the studies analysing the US 2008 crisis have found the crisis to be contagious 
with the only exception being the propagation of the crisis to the Pacific-Asian 
economies, which was not contagious. As the testing methods used are quite 
different, the finding can be considered rather robust. However, there are still 
some contradictions with some papers claiming that the crisis affected all 
countries with a similar strength, while others propose that Asia-Pacific count-
ries were significantly better protected compared to European countries. 
 
 
                                                 
14  Credit Default Swap. 
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2.8. Summary of qualitative analysis 
So far qualitative literature reviews in the field of financial contagion (e.g. 
Dornbusch et al 2000a, Cheung et al 2009, Pericoli and Sbracia 2003, and 
others) have been clearly biased towards the methodology used instead of the 
results obtained. Of course, it is the main findings of the individual studies that 
are brought out in these overviews, but practically no effort has been made to 
summarise the findings of different studies with the only exception being the 
conclusion that earlier works that used correlation coefficients based tests and 
did not adjust for the presence of heteroskedasticity almost unanimously found 
evidence of financial contagion. Given the multidimensionality of the research 
problem, this kind of approach is understandable, as it is not clear whether the 
findings from different analyses are comparable – quite different aspects may be 
investigated under the single heading financial contagion. Therefore, the 
following attempt to summarise the empirical findings by simple counting is 
actually something that has not been done previously. 
Appendices 1–4 summarise the empirical results in the field of financial 
contagion presenting information about the analysis methodology, data, markets 
observed as well as the results concerning evidence of contagion (Yes, No, 
Mixed). As it can be seen from the tables in Appendices 1–4 and from the 
preceding literature review, the results obtained in studies of financial contagion 
are highly heterogeneous. One should keep in mind that in many cases the 
chosen result in favour of Yes, No or Mixed in the Appendices is not clear-cut. 
For example, in correlation coefficients based tests, there are mostly different 
results in the studies – some correlations have increased significantly during 
crises, some have not changed much and some have even decreased. Also, note 
that not all the papers presented in this overview actually test for the presence of 
financial contagion. So in some cases the results presented in the fourth column 
of the table (whether evidence for contagion has been found or not) may be 
somewhat disputable (see also different definitions of financial contagion). So 
simply summing up the results for a single Yes or No conclusion may not be the 
perfect way to conclude contagion analysis. The following briefly summarises 
the main results from four previously defined groups of studies, which are 
separated according to financial contagion testing methodologies. 
Appendix 1 summarises the results obtained by studies using correlation 
coefficients based methodologies. Clearly, results supporting the contagion 
hypothesis dominate here being twice as frequent as the no-contagion result. 
However, the Yes results are undermined by later papers because the testing 
methodologies applied are questionable. As pointed out earlier, it has been 
suggested that not adjusting for the presence of heteroskedasticity may affect 
the results and the findings tend to be biased towards the existence of contagion. 
When papers with heteroskedasticity adjusted post-crises correlations are taken 
into account, Yes and No results are found to be quite balanced. 
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Moving on to the Appendix 2, and papers using conditional probability 
based tests, it is clear that results supporting the contagion hypothesis dominate. 
From 11 studies, seven have found clear evidence of contagion and three more 
have found support for the contagion hypothesis. Still, one has to keep in mind 
that these papers do not investigate the most restrictive definition of financial 
contagion (shift-contagion), which makes finding supporting evidence more 
likely. 
Appendix 3 summarises the results from studies that investigate volatility 
changes to test for contagion. Again the majority of the studies using this 
methodology have found evidence of contagion with only a few studies resul-
ting in the opposite or mixed results. But, of course, this may be attributable to 
the fact that these studies usually only test for the two broader definitions of 
financial contagion and most of them do not even control for fundamentals. 
Appendix 4 summarises the results from studies that use other methodo-
logies than those presented in Appendices 1–3. From these studies the Markov 
switching framework has been used the most. Both results supporting and 
contradicting the contagion hypothesis have been found using this metho-
dology. From studies using other methodologies both results have also been 
found many times with slightly stronger support for the existence of contagion. 
It is beyond the aim of this study to estimate the quality of each model or 
methodology, so no attempt is made in the thesis to prefer one or another and a 
neutral view is taken (with the exception of the unadjusted correlation 
coefficients based method, which has been proven to be inferior). As pointed 
out earlier, there are so many problematic aspects in financial contagion 
analysis that no methodology so far has been able to take into account all of 
them without making some restricting assumptions. Improvements in previous 
models will probably continue and it is hard to imagine when a model that 
everybody accepts as correct will emerge. The author’s suggestion in this 
respect is rather to put more emphasis on finding singular numerical values that 
are interpretable and comparable across relevant studies (and therefore can be 
aggregated), than trying to find a statistical significance measure of a certain 
parameter of contagion. The author strongly believes that a much better picture 
of financial contagion can be achieved if all the authors of the individual studies 
work towards increasing the volume of input for future meta-analyses. 
There are so many dimensions in financial contagion studies that drawing 
definitive conclusions based on a qualitative literature review is probably too 
much to ask. If we forget for a moment all these heterogeneities, it can be 
concluded that results supporting the financial contagion hypothesis are clearly 
dominant. However, a lot of times the supporting findings have been found by 
studies not adjusting for the presence of heteroskedasticity. If one wants to 
specify the definition of contagion clearly separating it from interdependence 
and to take into account heteroskedasticity problems, a completely different 
picture emerges and the debate over the existence of financial contagion is 
pretty much open. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR  
ANALYSING FINANCIAL CONTAGION 
3.1. The main steps in implementing  
a meta-analysis and the data sources 
As seen from the previous chapter despite of a lot of investigation the financial 
contagion puzzle is pretty much unsolved. It is still not clear whether crises 
spread from one country to others because of fundamental links between 
countries or is there also something that can be considered financial contagion, 
behind these transmissions. As qualitative analysis was not able to provide 
answers turning attention to the quantitative approach seems like logical 
continuation. This is done in the thesis by using the approach of meta-analysis. 
Given the multiple dimensions of the financial contagion research problem it 
is surprising that no meta-analysis has been conducted so far on the subject. It is 
well known in behavioural sciences that this kind of research problems cannot 
usually be solved satisfactorily by qualitative literature review, even more so by 
individual studies. Therefore, the thesis has taken the pioneering role here. 
De Dominicis et al (2006) have given as the purpose of meta-analysis to 
review and quantitatively summarise the literature using statistical approach. 
This very general aim is in the heart of every meta-analysis but there are 
different approaches and methodologies used under that label and the unique 
definition of meta-analysis is still not worked out. 
The term meta-analysis was first coined by Gene Glass in 1976, although 
some procedures later known as meta-analytic (for example the concept of 
effect size) were already present in Karl Pearson’s study in 1904. By Glass’s 
definition meta-analysis “…refers to the statistical analysis of a large collection 
of results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings. It 
connotes a rigorous alternative to the casual, narrative discussions of research 
studies which typify our attempt to make sense of the rapidly expanding 
research literature.” (Glass 1976: 3). By Schultze (2004) meta-analysis is a 
method for systematic literature reviews on a certain substantive question of 
interest, more specifically on his words: “meta-analysis is a systematic process 
of quantitatively combining empirical reports to arrive at a summary and an 
evaluation of a research findings”. 
Basu (2003: 3) defines meta-analysis as “synthesis of available literature 
about a topic. Ideally, synthesis of randomized trials to arrive at a single 
summary estimate is used”. By James Neill’s (2006) version meta-analysis is a 
statistical technique for amalgamating, summarising, and reviewing previous 
quantitative research. The simplest definition the author of the dissertation has 
seen was given by Hunter and Schmidt (1990) who defined meta-analysis as 
analysis of analyses. 
To summarise various definitions, it follows that meta-analysis is a research 
method that amalgamates, quantitatively synthesizes and summarises data from 
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previous empirical analyses on a subject. To achieve these tasks the meta-
analytic procedure can be shortly summarised as follows. Every meta-analysis 
uses an established singular measure that is common to all studies to be 
analysed. This measure is called the ‘effect size’ – an important concept in all 
meta-analyses. Synthesizing and summarising is carried out by aggregating all 
individual effects and after the characteristics of the study have been 
considered, the resulting overall outcomes can be presented as the ‘meta-effect 
size’. 
Many advantages that a meta-analysis has over a traditional literature review 
have been pointed out, from which some of the most important are: 
 Quantitative estimation and statistical testing of overall effect sizes 
 Generalization to the population of the studies 
 Finding moderator variables to explain heterogeneity in the distribution. 
The main difference between a meta-analysis and a traditional literature review 
is that a meta-analysis uses summary statistics from individual studies as data 
points. By accumulating results across studies, it is possible to obtain a more 
accurate representation of the population relationship than any of the individual 
studies can provide. 
The main disadvantage of a meta-analysis is the fact that the number of 
studies included in the analysis is mostly smaller than in a qualitative analysis 
because not all studies provide numerical results that are comparable across 
studies. This is also the case in the present analysis, where the meta-analysis is 
based on a much smaller number of studies than the qualitative analysis of 
previous empirical findings presented in the previous chapter. However, this is 
not a problem inherent in meta-analytic tools and techniques, but rather to do 
with individual studies that do not provide findings that are useful as inputs in a 
meta-analysis. 
In order to implement the meta-analysis here, six steps were put in place in 
the thesis. The first step was to calculate relevant individual effect sizes and 
control for their independence. The next was to calculate weights for all 
individual effect sizes. In the third step, the meta-effect sizes were computed 
based on previously calculated effect size weights. The confidence intervals for 
the meta-effect sizes were then determined along with the statistical significance 
of the meta-effect sizes. Penultimately, homogeneity was tested before finally 
concluding and interpreting the results. 
Before the first of these steps, data from all of the studies to be analysed 
must be collected. When searching for appropriate studies to use in the meta-
analysis, the Thomson Reuters (formerly ISI) Web of Knowledge database and 
the Contagion of Financial Crisis Website from the World Bank Group were 
used. From the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge database, studies 
corresponding to the keywords financial contagion were used. The Contagion 
of Financial Crisis Website also included some working papers that had not yet 
been published, but none of these were included in the meta-analysis so the 
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meta-sample was only based on publications and not working papers. The 
potential publication bias that may occur if only published articles are included 
in the meta-analysis will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis. 
For the purposes of the meta-analysis, financial contagion is defined in the 
dissertation as an increase in cross-country asset15 price correlations during a 
crisis relative to asset price correlations during non-crisis times. This is the most 
common definition of financial contagion in empirical analyses in the 21st 
century, also known as shift-contagion as introduced by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001 and 2002) and according to which financial contagion is interpreted as the 
change in transmission mechanisms that takes place during a period of turmoil 
(see definition 3 in the first chapter). As noted in chapter one, this definition 
excludes scenarios characterized by a constant high degree of co-movement, 
where markets are instead deemed as interdependent. This very restrictive 
definition is adopted not only for the meta-analysis but for the quantitative 
analysis in this dissertation. In addition to its straightforward testing framework, 
the chosen definition is preferred because its ability to shed light on the 
following three main issues: international diversification, evaluation of the role 
and potential effectiveness of international institutions and bail-out funds and 
propagation mechanisms (Forbes and Rigobon 2001, Billio and Caporin 2010). 
Given the chosen definition, the only studies included in the analysis are 
those that report on the asset price correlations between countries for both pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods (or the difference between them). These re-
strictions reduce the data set for the meta-analysis to 716 data points, of which 
394 are independent (independent means that these data points come from 
different sources or differ in some important characteristics like the crisis under 
observation, destination country or financial market). The data points have been 
drawn from 28 constructs and 17 studies (by 12 authors). In the event that post-
crisis correlations are reported for both the long and short-term period, 
independency problems are avoided by opting to include only the short-term 
data, although the problem of independence is discussed in greater detail later 
on in the thesis. As can be seen, the number of studies included in the analysis 
is much smaller than was the case in the empirical literature review, where the 
respective number was more than 75. The fact that the meta-analysis is based on 
a much smaller number of studies than the qualitative literature review, of 
course, makes it disputable whether the results obtained using the meta-analysis 
can be more reliable, but one has to keep in mind that all data points in the 
meta-sample are standardized so they correspond to the same definition and 
testing methodology of financial contagion. Thus, the meta-analysis makes it 
possible to deal with the multidimensionality of a research task, which caused 
problems in the qualitative literature review. In addition, as the sample size in 
the meta-analysis is not the number of studies but the number of individual 
effect sizes, then the sample size is actually much larger than in a traditional 
                                                 
15  Typically, the assets used are stocks, bonds, interest rates and exchange rates. 
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literature review (more than 700 instead of more than 70). Of course, some 
information is lost as the findings from the studies that do not use correlation 
coefficients cannot be used; therefore, the focus of the meta-analysis is much 
narrower than that of the qualitative empirical literature review, being related 
only with the most restrictive definition of contagion (shift-contagion). One 
additional positive aspect of the current meta-analysis is that being aware of this 
kind of analysis in the field of financial contagion, and its potential for being 
implemented again in the future, may influence future authors so they report 
quantitative values that can be used as comparable individual effect sizes in 
future meta-analyses. 
To conduct the first step, appropriate individual effect sizes have to be 
found. The effect size statistic produces a statistical standardization of the study 
findings so that the resulting numerical values are interpretable in a consistent 
fashion across all the variables and measures involved (Lipsey and Wilson 
2001). An effect size statistic must be defined so that it is capable of re-
presenting the quantitative findings of the studies in a standardized way that 
affords meaningful numerical comparison between studies. The “correct” 
individual effect sizes for the research problem of financial contagion had not 
previously been worked out in the meta-analysis literature, so the author had to 
make some choices. It is proposed in the thesis to use the difference between 
pre- and post-crisis correlations of asset prices as an effect size in any given 
study or construct16. If individual effect sizes are defined as such the above-
mentioned requirements are achieved. Mathematically, the individual effect 
sizes used in the analysis are computed as: 
ii preposti
rrES      (1) 
where iES is the individual effect size for study (construct) i and iprer  and ipostr  
are pre- and post-crisis correlations respectively for study (construct) i. 
After establishing individual effect sizes they have to be aggregated into one 
meta-effect size. Here the traditional meta-analysis approach is used assuming 
that the best estimate for the population effect size is the weighted average of 
the individual effect sizes. 
The weights have to be determined for every individual effect size so that an 
overall value could be found. Hedges (1982) (Hedges and Olkin 1985) has 
demonstrated, that the optimal weights are based on the standard error of the 
effect size. For Hedges (1982), as a larger standard error corresponds to a less 
precise effect size value, the actual respective weights of the individual effect 
sizes should be computed as the inverse of the squared standard error value, 
                                                 
16  It can not be right to use the results of statistical significance testing as individual effect 
sizes. It is easy to show that the same quantitative finding (for example value of correlation 
coefficient) can be statistically significant in one study and insignificant in another. 
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known in the meta-analysis lexicon as the inverse variance weight. This same 
approach is used in the present thesis. 
Computing weights depends on which type of individual effect sizes we are 
dealing with. There are no rules given in the literature for which is the correct 
type of effect sizes if the individual effect sizes that are going to be summarised 
are changes in correlation coefficients over time. More precisely, it is not 
intuitively clear whether these differences should be dealt with as pre-post 
contrasts or associations between variables. On the one hand, even if one is not 
interested in the correlation coefficients themselves but their changes over two 
points in time, it is not quite clear why these two approaches should differ so 
much (in terms of the properties of the effect sizes) that one could not use the 
same computational procedures. As such, it could be concluded that these 
individual effect sizes should be taken to signify correlations. On the other 
hand, there are data points for both before and after crises and we are interested 
in the difference between them – the change to be precise. The situation is 
analogous to that when the treatment effect is analysed (the crisis starting point 
can be thought of as a treatment). So, taking these individual effect sizes as pre-
post contrasts does not seem to be a bad choice either. The decision made in the 
thesis is to use both approaches in parallel. As such, when individual effect 
sizes are treated as mean differences, this is referred to as Approach 1 in the 
following analysis, and when treating individual effect sizes as correlations it is 
referred to as Approach 2. 
Computing weights start with calculating standard errors for individual 
effect sizes. For both the mean differences (gains) and the correlation 
coefficients as individual effect sizes that are used in the present analysis, the 
standard error formulations have been worked out and are available17. Using 
Approach 2 (taking effect sizes as correlations), in order to be able to find the 
weights for individual effect sizes, the individual effect sizes need to be altered 
a little to avoid problems in standard error formulations (such problems are 
discussed in more depth by Rosenthal 1994). A widely accepted modification 
method to transform the correlations is Fischer’s Zr-transformation (see Hedges 
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where r is the correlation coefficient. In the present analysis the difference 
between post- and pre-crisis correlations is in the placement of r . So in 
Approach 2, formula (2) is used instead of formula (1). Once the results are 
obtained (the meta-effect sizes are found), in order to interpret them, the Fischer 
Z-transformed meta-effect sizes are transformed back into standard correlation 
                                                 
17  The exact procedures for computing standard errors and weights for individual effect 
sizes are not discussed in the dissertation. One can see detailed information on the subject 
for example from Rosenthal (1994) or Hedges and Olkin (1985). 
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After Fischer’s z-transformation, the standard error formula for (correlation 
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and inverse variance weights are therefore: 
3 nw
rz
     (5) 
where n  in both equations is the sample size of the analysis from which 
correlation coefficients are obtained. 
However, some of the data that is necessary to calculate weights when 
treating individual effect sizes as treatment effects (Approach 1) is not 
available. More specifically, information on the correlations between pre-
treatment and post-treatment (pre-crisis and post-crisis in this case) asset prices 
in individual studies is missing, and this is needed for calculating the weights. 
These data problems make it impossible to calculate inverse variance weights in 
the standard manner. Therefore, when computing meta-effect size, sample size 
is designated as the proxy for weight instead. 
Now, when suitable weights have been found, the overall meta-effect size 







ES     (6) 
where iES  is the i-th individual effect size and iw  is the weight (inverse 
variance weight in the case of Approach 2 and sample size in the case of 
Approach 1) of the i-th effect size.  
In the next step, the homogeneity of the effect size distribution is examined. 
This means investigating whether all of the effect sizes that are averaged into a 
mean value (meta-effect size) estimate the same population effect or not (see 
Hedges 1983, Rosenthal and Rubin 1982). If the distribution is homogeneous, 
the dispersion of the effect sizes around their mean is no greater than the 
dispersion expected from the sampling error alone18. 
                                                 
18  The sampling error is associated with the subject samples upon which the individual 
effect sizes are based 
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Homogeneity testing is based on the Q-statistic19, which is distributed as a 
chi-square with 1k  degrees of freedom, where k  is the number of individual 
effect sizes (Hedges and Olkin 1985). The formula for the Q-statistic is: 
    2ESESwQ ii     (7) 
where iES  is the individual effect size for 1i  to k  (the number of individual 
effect sizes); 
ES  is the meta-effect size over the k  individual effect sizes; 
and iw  is the weight for iES .  
If Q  exceeds the critical value for a chi-square with 1k  degrees of freedom, 
then the null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected. A statistically significant 
Q  therefore indicates a heterogeneous distribution and means that there are 
differences among the effect sizes that have some source other than a subject-
level sampling error. That source is typically some study characteristic, which 
in the case of the present thesis may for example be the crisis under 
investigation, the destination country, the formula that is used for calculating 
post-crisis correlations or some other characteristic (see previous chapter for 
potential factors that may influence the results of contagion tests). 
Before being able to run a meta-analysis, some independency concerns have 
to be dealt with. There are cases for multiple individual effect sizes within the 
same studies. This conflicts with the assumption of independence and 
overestimates the weights of studies with multiple effect sizes. The traditional 
way to deal with the situation is to choose only one effect size per study or per 
construct. However, this approach does not include some of the information 
contained in the primary studies, and it is not wished to lose any of the 
information available on different correlation measurement methodologies as 
possible moderators. It is well known that correlation coefficients adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity are lower than unadjusted coefficients, and therefore, the 
contagion seems to be more likely to occur in cases where there are unadjusted 
correlation coefficients (see chapter 2). Therefore, rather than dropping some of 
the data points, the weights of studies with multiple effect sizes per construct 
are diminished by dividing the sample size by the number of effect sizes per 
construct (For a discussion of multiple measurements within studies see also 
Rosenthal 1994). 
 
                                                 
19  Alternative approach to homogeneity testing, so called 75% rule, is given by Hunter and 
Schmidt (1990). They partition the observed effect size variability into two components - the 
portion attributable to subject-level sampling error and the portion attributable to other 
between-study differences. According to their rule of thumb, the distribution is 
homogeneous if sampling error accounts for 75% or more of the observed variability. 
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3.2. Data and methodology for investigating 
contagiousness in the US 2008 crisis 
3.2.1. Correlation coefficients based method 
To investigate contagiousness in the US 2008 crisis, two alternative 
methodologies were used – one that is based on the differences between the 
post- and pre-crisis correlation coefficients of stock returns between countries 
and the ARCH-GARCH framework that studies mean and volatility spillovers. 
These two have been the most popular testing methodologies of financial 
contagion and as there are no alternatives that are generally agreed to be 
superior, these two were chosen. 
Employing a correlation coefficients based analysis, the stock indexes of US, 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian stock markets are analysed. The data set 
consists of daily returns on the closing prices of the S&P 500 (US), OMXT 
(Estonia), OMXR (Latvia) and OMXV (Lithuania) stock indexes from 3 March 
2008 until 9 March 2009, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 
September 2008 is chosen as the starting point of the crisis. According to this 
approach, the period from 3 March 2008 to 15 September 2008 will be 
considered as a tranquil period and the period from 16 September 2008 to 
9 March 2009 as a crisis period. Moving average two-day logarithmic returns20 
are used to control for the fact that the stock markets in the US and the Baltic 
countries are not open during the same hours (for how to avoid the problem of 
non-synchronous trading periods for different markets, see Lin, Engle and Ito 
1994). 
The use of stock indexes is primarily pragmatic. Stock market index data can 
be accessed relatively easily compared to other variables that are sometimes 
used in financial contagion analyses (interest rates, bonds or exchange rates to 
name a few). Also, the stock market data is available on a daily basis, which 
decreases the probability of not having a reasonably large number of 
observations for the analysis. Also, equity holdings have become an 
increasingly significant source of wealth for people in many parts of the world, 
which means that changes in asset values could directly affect consumption 
levels and other real variables (Didier et al (2012)). The point selected as the 
start of a crisis is quite clear; commonly crises have been defined using the date 
of some relevant exogenous shock, and there is also higher variance in stock 
returns (which is sometimes used for determining a crisis period) after the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy,21 but the chosen starting point of the tranquil 
                                                 
20  The moving average for period i is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the values for 
periods i and i-1. 
21  The author is well aware of the fact that the signs of the subprime crisis were evident 
already in 2007. Still, given the reasons explained in the text, 15 September 2008 as the 
starting point of the crisis seems more appropriate. Idier (2011) also did not choose the 
14
54 
period and the ending point of the crisis period need some further explanation. 
The ninth of March 2009 is chosen as the ending date for the crisis period 
because it was the local minimum for the S&P500 during the crisis. This kind of 
logic was previously used by Mishkin and White (2003) and Serwa (2005). The 
tranquil period cannot be considered to stretch for too long because structural 
breaks are not wanted during that time. There was quite a sharp fall in the 
S&P500 index at the end of February 2008, which stopped at the beginning of 
March. So, 3 March as the first trading day in March (1 and 2 March being the 
weekend) is taken as the starting date for the tranquil period. This approach also 
makes it possible to have a tranquil and crisis period with a relatively similar 
length. As shown by Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001), if the crisis period is a 
lot shorter than the tranquil period then a statistical significance test has very 
little power. 
As said in the first chapter of the thesis, the correlation coefficients based 
method is most widely used in the field of financial contagion. One of the main 
reasons for the popularity of the method is relative simplicity, but it also has 
other positive features. As noted by Billio and Pellizon (2003) and Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), the correlation based analysis is more suitable than other 
approaches for shedding light on the issues of international diversification, the 
role of international institutions and bail-out funds, as well as propagation 
mechanisms. 
This framework is used to test the hypothesis of whether the 2008 financial 
crisis spilled over contagiously from the US to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The logic of the following tests is based on the assumption that contagion 
occurs when, if there is a crisis in the US, correlation is stronger because of 
some structural change in the international economy affecting the links across 
markets. Relying on this hypothesis and data sample, contagion is considered 
here as a significant increase in the correlation coefficient in stock returns 
between the country of the origin of the crisis (the US) and the country of 
destination (Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania) during the crisis compared to the non-
crisis period. 
As in many earlier papers (for example Forbes and Rigobon 2002), the thesis 
considers a model where stock returns on the country of the origin of the crisis 
is independent variable and influences returns on the country of destination. 
More specifically, the following linear model is used (see Forbes and Rigobon 
2002 and Serwa and Bohl 2005): 
y
ttt uxy       (8) 
x
tt ux       (9), 
                                                                                                                       
starting point in 2007, as the long-term volatility component did not jump to a high value at 
the time (although he chose 21 January 2008 not the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers). 
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where xt are stock returns in the crisis market (US) that are exogenous and 




tu are idiosyncratic shocks to the respective stock markets. Alpha and 
beta are model parameters. 
The basic logic of the model is that the change in the relationship between 
x and y  at some point is measured by a change in . If the change in   is 
statistically significant, this is considered evidence of contagion. 
It is assumed that the volatility of stock returns on the crisis market changes 
during crisis times, but the model parameters and the volatility of idiosyncratic 
shocks in the destination market remain constant. As in the move between a 
non-crisis and a crisis period, the volatility of the error term usually changes, 
violating the assumption of homoscedasticity, a respecification of the testing 
procedure is used and a statistically significant change in the correlation 
coefficient between the two periods is tested. The correlation coefficient is 
estimated in both tranquil and crisis times and then controlled for a significant 
increase in the correlation coefficient after the crisis hits. 
































  (10) 
To obtain separate correlation coefficients for periods of calm and turmoil, the 
values of the respective period are used in the formula (10) above. 
The author of the thesis agrees with Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who show 
that correlation is conditional on the volatility of stock returns in the crisis 
market, and therefore, the correlation between stock returns in the crisis and 
non-crisis country may rise even when contagion does not occur. Thus, it is not 
fully correct to test for contagion using simple correlations, as they do not take 
into account the increased volatility during crises. Therefore, it is considered 
that the testing approach with a heteroskedasticity adjustment in post-crisis 
correlations seems to be more reliable. 
Thus, by estimating correlation coefficients, adjustments for heterosce-
dasticity are also made using the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach, who 
propose an adjustment so that the correlation coefficient does not depend on the 
volatility of returns in the crisis market: 





      (11), 
where crisis  is the simple correlation coefficient (calculated using formula 10) 
between the crisis and the non-crisis market observed during the crisis period.  
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The parameter  represents the relationship between the variances of stock 
returns from the crisis country during the turmoil period, )( t
crisis yVar  and 
during the calm period, )( t











     (12). 
One has to keep in mind the criticisms that Bartram and Wang (2005) and 
Corsetti et al (2005) have made of the Forbes and Rigobon methodology, 
claiming that their adjustments make results rely heavily on the particular 
assumptions about the stochastic process of idiosyncratic shocks, so that their 
adjustment may cause the correlation test to be severely biased towards the null 
hypothesis of no contagion. So the true values probably exist somewhere 
between unadjusted and adjusted correlations. 
The analysis starts by estimating simple correlations with the adjustments 
proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) subsequently implemented. The 
correlation coefficients (both not adjusted and adjusted) are transformed using a 
Fisher transformation22, so that they are approximately normally distributed. 
This transformation is necessary in order to have relevant results from control-
ling the hypotheses (Dungey and Zhumabekova 2001, Jokipii and Lucey 2006, 
Lee et al. 2007). Finally, statistically significant difference between pre- and 































   (13) 
where crisisnonN   and crisisN  are sample sizes in tranquil and crisis period 
respectively. 
 
3.2.2. The ARCH-GARCH framework 
Although easy to use and providing some other advantages, the correlation 
coefficients based methods also have several drawbacks. For example, as 
demonstrated by Baur (2003), contagion tests based on correlation coefficients 
can be misleading when the correlations are time-varying and volatility is 
contagious per se. 
                                                 













ln5.0 , where r is the 
correlation coefficient. 
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In order to check for the robustness of the empirical results, the thesis also 
implements the autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) and 
generalized ARCH (GARCH) framework of statistical models to explore for 
possible contagion from the US stock market (S&P 500) to the Baltic stock 
markets. A similar framework to investigate contagion in emerging markets is 
used for example by Hamao et al (1990) and Edwards and Susmel (2001 and 
2003). 
This framework is used to investigate the two main hypotheses. Firstly, 
whether price changes on the US stock market influence prices in the Baltic 
stock markets, and secondly, whether changes in price volatility on the US 
stock market are related to changes in price volatility on the Baltic stock 
markets. In order to test these hypotheses, daily logarithmic stock returns are 
examined in the US and Baltic stock markets from 3 March 2008 to 9 March 
2009. For the US stock market the Standard & Poors Composite Index is used, 
for Estonia OMXT, for Latvia OMXR and for Lithuania OMXV. The sample 
period used in the thesis includes September 2008, when one of the most severe 
stock market crashes in history took place. To investigate the contagion effect, 
the models are estimated over two sub-periods, before and after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. 
The thesis uses many extensions of the basic ARCH model developed by 
Engle (1982) and generalized to the GARCH model by Bollerslev (1986). 
Firstly, it makes it possible for the conditional means to be a function of the 
conditional variance, which was first proposed by Engle, Lilien and Robins 
(1987). This extension gives the GARCH(1,1)-M model. According to French 
et al (1987), a member of the ARCH family, GARCH-M, is a good represen-
tation of the daily stock-return behaviour in the US because of its successful 
capture of the effects of time-varying volatility on an expected return of stock. 
Secondly, the extension first given by French, Schwert and Stambaugh 
(1987) is used; they adjusted the conditional means return for a first-order 
moving average. This is done primarily because of the non-synchronous trading 
in the US and Baltic stock markets as this causes problems in the ARCH family 
of models (see for example Cohen et al 1980). 
Third, a dummy variable is included in the model that helps to capture the 
fact that there are no price movements during weekends. The weekend influence 
that gives Mondays a somewhat special status is well known in the literature 
(see French 1980, Gibbons and Hess 1981 and others) and is called the Monday 
effect. 
And finally, stock returns in the crisis market are included as an explanatory 
variable in the non-crisis market stock-return equation. 
Thus, the thesis implements the MA (1) – GARCH (1, 1) – M model given 
by the formula: 
 tttttt uuYDbX  1  (14) 
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 ttttt fZdDcubbab  
2
11   (15), 
where  
Xt – stock index return in non-crisis market (Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania) at 
time t; 
 bt – conditional variance of X at time t;  
D – dummy variable for Monday effect (D takes value of 1 on days 
following weekends and holidays and is 0 otherwise);  
Yt – stock index return in crisis market (US) at time t; 
ut and ut-1 – error terms at time t and t-1 respectively;  
Zt – squared residual derived from an MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M model applied 
to the returns of the US stock market. 
As Zt is not available, the following equation has to be estimated first 
 ttttt uuDbY  1  (16) 
 tttt dDcubbab  
2
11  (17) 
and from there the necessary squared residual can be derived (
2
tu ). 
The empirical results obtained using the abovementioned methodology are 
presented in sub-chapter 4.2. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Findings from the meta-analysis 
4.1.1. Overall findings 
The methodology described in sub-chapter 3.1 is used for the meta-analysis. 
Employing formulas (1) – (6) from sub-chapter 3.1, the following respective 
estimates of the meta-effect size are derived: 0.053 if Approach 1 is used and 
0.072 if Approach 2 is used (these values are given in Table 2). The 
corresponding standard errors are 0.005 in both cases and the associated 95% 
confidence interval values are well above zero. The results for both approaches 
indicate that, relative to tranquil periods, asset price correlations are on average 
observably, albeit moderately, higher during turbulent periods. The Q-statistic 
(recall formula (7)), however, clearly exceeds the critical value, indicating that 
the dispersion of the individual effect sizes around their mean is greater than 
expected from a sampling error alone, and therefore, each effect size does not 
estimate a common population mean. 
Because of heterogeneous distribution (indicated by the Q-statistic), the 
analysis continues by seeking moderators to explain the variabilities in effect 
sizes. As mentioned above, the correlation coefficient calculating methodology 
is widely accepted as a significant explaining variable for financial contagion. 
The logic behind this is that when not adjusting for heteroskedasticity, the post-
crisis correlations are higher, and therefore, finding evidence for contagion is 
more probable. To check whether the correlation coefficient measurement 
performs as a potential moderator, the sample will be divided into two sub-
samples, differentiating heteroskedasticity adjusted (A) post-crisis correlation 
coefficients from their unadjusted (U) counterparts. In the sample with 
unadjusted correlation coefficients, the weighted mean effect size is found to be 
0.168 using Approach 1 and 0.208 in the case of Approach 2 (see Table 2). In 
the sample with heteroskedasticity adjusted correlation coefficients, the 
respective values are 0.030 for both approaches 1 and 2. The difference is more 
than clear, and it can be concluded that whether correlation coefficients are 
heteroskedasticity adjusted or not significantly affects the results of financial 
contagion analyses. By dividing the overall Q-statistic into the within and 
between groups components, it is found that the between group Q is highly 
significant, which also indicates that the differences in correlation measurement 
(heteroskedasticity adjusted or not) accounts for a significant variability in 
effect sizes. 
However, the Q-statistic indicates that there is still some heterogeneity left in 
the distribution. Therefore, it is necessary to also control for other potential 
moderator variables. The focus of interest is, for example, whether different 
crises have been contagious to differing extents. 
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For the Thai 1997 crisis the treatment effects based (Approach 1) weighted 
mean effect size23 is 0.132 and 0.173 if the effect sizes are treated as correlation 
coefficients (Approach 2). For the Hong Kong 1997 crisis the same values are 
0.100 and 0.098; for the Mexican 1994 crisis 0.141 and 0.160; for the Russian 
1998 crisis –0.001 and 0.006; and for the Brazilian 1999 crisis –0.016 and  
–0.014 respectively. From these numbers, it is apparent that the Mexican, Thai 
and the Hong Kong crises were on average contagious, while the Russian and 
Brazilian crises were not. From among the less investigated crises, the US 1987 
and the US 2002 crises were contagious, while the opposite is true for the 
Argentinean 2001 crisis, the Turkish 2001 crisis and the Indian 2004 crisis – 
asset prices correlations decreased during these crises; pre-World War II crises 
on average were not contagious, as neither were the Czech 1997 crisis and the 
US 2001 crisis with some albeit insignificant increase in average asset prices 
correlations. However, one has to keep in mind that the results regarding the 
contagiousness of crises are based on the average of the sample and may depend 
on the chosen destination countries in the individual studies. The given crisis as 
a grouping variable accounts for the significant variability in effect sizes, but 
there is still some heterogeneity left within the groups. 
 
Table 2. The results of a meta-analysis of previous empirical findings in the field of 




ESs as treatment effects 
(Approach 1) 












All 716** 0.053* 0.005 2782.0* 0.072* 0.005 5568.0* 
U 159 0.168* 0.007 956.7* 0.208* 0.007 3432.2* 
A 545 0.030* 0.007 668.0* 0.030* 0.007 716.1* 
Tha 1997 86 0.132* 0.007 853.9* 0.173* 0.007 3367.1* 
HK 1997 154 0.100* 0.009 295.6* 0.098* 0.009 323.0* 
Rus 1998 46 –0.001 0.027 48.8 0.006 0.027 52.5 
Bra 1999 33 –0.016 0.039 17.33 –0.014 0.039 15.4 
Prewar 344 0.045 0.026 165.8* 0.059* 0.028* 197.3* 
Mex 1994 372 0.141* 0.038 45.7 0.160* 0.045 39.0 
 
                                                 
23  In the thesis “weighted mean effect size” and “meta-effect size” are used as synonyms. 
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ESs as treatment effects 
(Approach 1) 












US 1987 70 0.185* 0.062 5.8 0.181* 0.071 4.7 
Ind 2004 68 –0.091* 0.028 122.0* –0.116* 0.031 153.5* 
Tur 2001 19 –0.194* 0.055 22.2 –0.209* 0.066 19.3 
US 2001 82 0.014 0.055 22.4 0.019 0.066 17.8 
Arg 2001 33 –0.374* 0.015 126.6* –0.391* 0.015 156.6* 
US 2002 33 0.126* 0.055 12.8 0.133* 0.066 10.3 
Cze 1997 45 0.057 0.039 26.2* 0.058 0.041 26.3* 
Emerg 344 0.054* 0.006 2254.3* 0.078* 0.006 5116.5* 
Devel 372 0.052* 0.009 527.6* 0.051* 0.008 555.8* 
* denotes statistically significant results (in 95% confidence interval). 
** the meta-sample, numbering 716, exceeds the sum of 159 (U) and 544 (A), since 12 
observations in sample ‘All’ could not be categorized by either U or A. 
ES – effect size. 
All – all observations (data points) from the sample with all countries. 
U – cases with unadjusted (for heteroskedasticity) correlation coefficients. 
A – cases with adjusted (for heteroskedasticity) correlation coefficients. 
Tha – Thai crisis; HK – Hong Kong crisis; Rus – Russian crisis; Bra – Brazilian crisis; Mex – 
Mexican crisis; US – United States crisis; Ind – Indian crisis; Tur – Turkish crisis; Arg – 
Argentinean crisis; Cze – Czech crisis; Prewar – average of 6 pre-World War II crises 
(Argentinean crisis 1890, Baring crisis (UK) 1890, US banking crisis 1893, US stock market 
crash 1929, Sterling crisis (UK) 1931, devaluation of the US dollar (US) 1933). 
Emerg – cases reflect 152 emerging (developing) countries, numbered 31 through 182 per the 
Human Development Index 2008. 
Devel – cases reflect 30 developed countries, numbered 1 through 30 per the Human Develop-
ment Index 2008. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
 
Using only data where correlation coefficients are adjusted for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (see Appendix 5) the results do not change much. The 
Mexican, Thai and the Hong Kong crises are still contagious, although the 
weighted mean effect sizes are somewhat smaller. Also, the Russian and 
Brazilian crises are not contagious with weighted mean effect sizes slightly 
negative. The only notable change relates to the US 1987 crisis, which is no 
longer contagious at the 95% confidence interval. However, with the weighted 
16 
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mean effect size clearly above zero (0.17) and only slightly below the 
unadjusted (U) case, the reason seems to be mainly due to the small sample size. 
As another possible moderator variable, whether the level of development in 
the destination country influences how susceptible a country is to the 
propagation of a financial crisis is also investigated. This kind of differentiation 
is suggested by some authors; for example, by Hartmann et al (2001), who find 
only very weak evidence of contagion in a sample of G5 countries, and 
speculated that this may be different for emerging economies. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) 2008 values are used for dividing countries as more 
or less developed. The top 30 countries in the HDI list are referred to as 
developed and all other countries as developing (emerging). This produces quite 
comparable sample sizes for both groups with 372 and 344 respectively. For the 
sample of less developed countries, the weighted mean effect size is 0.054 
according to Approach 1 (effect sizes as treatment effects) and 0.077 according 
to Approach 2 (effect sizes as correlations). For the sample of more developed 
countries the corresponding values are 0.052 and 0.051 respectively. So with 
Approach 1, there is no difference in the susceptibility to the spread of crises 
between developed and developing countries, while according to Approach 2, 
less developed countries are somewhat more susceptible to the carryover of 
financial crises. The variability analysis reveals that the level of the develop-
ment of the destination country does not account for significant variability in 
effect sizes. From this it may be judged that herding behaviour seems to be the 
more likely transmission force for financial crises than real and stable linkages. 
This finding is in line with that of Serwa (2005), who found that CEE stock 
markets are no more vulnerable to contagion than Western European markets. 
On the other hand, the finding contradicts that of Dungey and Tambakis (2003), 
who argue that developing countries are more affected by contagion than 
developed countries. Additionally, Billio and Caporin (2010) believe that deve-
loping economies are more sensitive to shocks because of their underdeveloped 
financial markets and their large public deficits. This is confirmed by their 
empirical analysis, which similar to that of Lee et al (2007), indicates that 
contagion effects are more obvious in developing financial markets than those 
of developed ones. 
Developed and developing (emerging) country groups are also compared 
separately for adjusted (A) and unadjusted (U) cases and under Approach 1 
(individual effect sizes as treatment effects) and Approach 2 (individual effect 
sizes as correlations). The findings are displayed in Appendix 5. Using 
Approach 1 for the unadjusted (U) cases, the respective meta-effect sizes are 
0.12 for developed countries and 0.19 for developing countries, which is a 
significant difference, as the confidence intervals of the two point estimates do 
not overlap. Under Approach 2 for the unadjusted (U) cases, the disparity 
between meta-effect sizes for developed versus developing country groups is 
even more pronounced – 0.12 and 0.24 respectively. Accordingly, results using 
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case U indicate that, relative to developed countries, developing countries are 
more susceptible to contagion of financial crises. 
However, there are no significant differences between meta-effect sizes in 
these two subgroups for the adjusted (A) cases. Under both Approach 1 and 
Approach 2 the meta-effect sizes are 0.02 for developed countries and 0.04 for 
developing countries, but the differences in these values are not significant at 
the 95% confidence level. 
As different financial markets are included in the sample, the analysis is also 
conducted separately for stock, bond, exchange rate and interest rate markets. 
The results are not presented in Table 2, but are available for heteroskedasticity 
adjusted cases in Appendix 5. It can be seen that on average contagion appears 
strongest in interest rate markets (where the meta-effect size is 0.14) with 
exchange rate markets closely behind (meta-effect size is 0.09). In stock mar-
kets, the meta-effect size is very small (0.02) but still statistically significantly 
different from zero. In bond markets, the meta-effect size is not statistically 
significantly positive, although higher than the respective value in stock markets 
(0.04 when Approach 1 is used and 0.06 in the case of Approach 2). 
Two important remarks have to be made before drawing conclusions from 
the meta-analysis. As can be seen in Appendix 5, there is some heterogeneity 
left in the distribution in most of the subgroups even after these groups are 
based on two moderators together. This means that the results must be taken 
with caution, as all individual effect sizes inside groups may not estimate the 
same population mean. However, the author of the thesis is quite forced to be 
reconciled with the heteroskedasticity, as there are not enough studies in the 
sample to conduct a meta-regression, which typically may help in such 
situations. As a rule of thumb, there have to be ten studies per explanatory 
variable in a meta-regression, which the present analysis is clearly short of. 
Bringing in dummies for all crises in addition to those for the methodology (A 
or U) and development level of the destination country (developed or emerging) 
and also all cross-effects, makes the number of exogenous variables far too 
great for a meta-regression to be feasible. 
A further remark should be made regarding the publication bias. Publication 
bias refers to the fact that studies with significant results are more likely to be 
published. In the field of financial contagion it is not clear which of the two 
types of results – supporting or contradicting the contagion hypothesis – is more 
interesting. Therefore, controlling for publication bias is not thought to be 
necessary in the thesis. 
Summing up the results of the sub-chapter it can be concluded that on 
average asset market correlations have increased during turbulent periods, 
which provides some evidence in support of the financial contagion conception. 
Nevertheless, the increase is quite moderate and after controlling for hetero-
geneity in correlations in turbulent periods it is even smaller although still 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Both the calculating 
methodology for the correlations (heteroskedasticity adjusted or not) and the 
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crisis under observation are significant moderators explaining the heterogeneity 
in the distribution. From among the most important financial crises during the 
past two decades, the Mexican, Thai and Hong Kong crises are contagious, 
while the Russian and Brazilian crises are not. The level of development in the 
destination country does not account for significant variability in effect sizes. 
 
4.1.2. Findings for CEE economies 
Next, the meta-analysis is run for the CEE countries (as destination countries), 
and an attempt is made to compare the results (presented in Table 3) with those 
obtained on the basis of the whole sample (comprised of all 716 observations). 
 






ESs as treatment effects 
(Approach 1) 
ESs as correlation 











All 89 0.019 0.020 108.7 0.023 0.021 107.1 
U 15 0.148* 0.034 32.6* 0.161* 0.034 35.0* 
A 74 –0.051 0.025 53.6 –0.057 0.027 46.7 
HK 1997 15 –0.004 0.037 14.9 –0.005 0.038 13.7 
Rus 1998 19 0.057 0.039 35.4* 0.071 0.041 39.0* 
Bra 1999 9 –0.084 0.075 5.3 –0.087 0.081 4.7 
Tur 2001 9 –0.187 0.105 5.6 –0.203 0.126 5.1 
US 2001 9 0.024 0.105 4.2 0.026 0.126 3.2 
Arg 2001 9 –0.052 0.071 2.6 –0.053 0.079 2.3 
US 2002 9 0.297* 0.105 2.8 0.308* 0.126 2.6 
Cze 1997 10 0.056 0.045 22.2* 0.057 0.046 22.5* 
* denotes statistically significant results (in 95% confidence level). 
ES – effect size. 
All – all observations (data points) from the sample with only CEE economies. 
U – cases with unadjusted (for heteroskedasticity) correlation coefficients. 
A – cases with adjusted (for heteroskedasticity) correlation coefficients. 
HK – Hong Kong crisis; Rus – Russian crisis; Bra – Brazilian crisis; US – United States crisis; 
Tur – Turkish crisis; Arg – Argentinean crisis; Cze – Czech crisis. 




In Table 3 ‘All’ refers to the sample of 89 individual effect sizes affiliated with 
CEE economies, which includes eight financial crises: Hong Kong 1997, Czech 
1997, Russian 1998, Brazilian 1999, Turkish 2001, US 2001, Argentinean 2001 
and US 2002 and four CEE countries for which comparable data is available, 
namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. 
The meta-effect size calculated for the sample of CEE countries based on 89 
individual effect sizes is 0.019 according to Approach 1 (effect sizes as 
treatment effects) and 0.023 according to Approach 2 (effect sizes as correlation 
coefficients). Recall from Table 2 that corresponding meta-effect sizes for the 
whole sample were 0.053 under Approach 1 and 0.072 under Approach 2. Thus, 
on average, the rate of contagiousness with CEE transition economies as desti-
nation countries has been lower than average, although not statistically signi-
ficantly so. Additionally, the meta-effect size in the sample of CEE transition 
economies is not statistically significantly above zero. This outcome bears some 
congruence with Serwa and Bohl (2005) and Serwa (2005), who argue that 
there is no evidence of CEE being more prone to financial contagion compared 
to western countries. 
If only heteroskedasticity adjusted (A) correlation coefficients are included 
in the sample with CEE as destination countries, then the meta-effect sizes are 
negative at –0.051 and –0.057 according to Approach 1 and Approach 2 respec-
tively. Thus, asset price correlations have, on average, even decreased during 
times of financial crisis. Also, compared to the corresponding meta-effect size 
value representing the whole sample, the meta-effect size value for CEE 
transition countries is statistically significantly lower. 
Comparing different financial crises we can see that, on average, the US 
2002 crisis (accounting scandals) has been the most contagious crisis for CEE 
countries with a weighted mean effect size of 0.30 according to Approach 1 and 
0.31 according to Approach 2 with both values statistically significantly above 
zero. Next, in terms of contagiousness, come the Russian 1998 crisis and the 
Czech 1997 crisis with meta-effect sizes above 0.05, but statistically in-
significant at a significance level of 0.05. Other crises do not seem to have 
spread significantly to CEE economies.  
Compared to the average, CEE economies seem to have been affected more 
by both the Russian 1998 and the US 2002 crises, while the Hong Kong 1997 
crisis has not propagated to CEE countries vigorously despite being contagious 
overall. This finding is in line with that of Weller and Morzuch (2000), who 
found that although the Asian financial crisis of 1997 spread to Russia and 
Brazil, the CEE transition economies remained largely unaffected. 
If we narrow our focus to results obtained using only heteroskedasticity 
adjusted (A) data points, (results not reported in Table 3 but are available on 
request) then the US 2002 crisis emerges as the sole crisis contagiously propa-
gating to CEE countries. The only other crisis during which heteroskedasticity 
adjusted asset price correlations have increased is the US 2001 crisis. For all 
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other financial crises, asset price correlations have either remained constant or 
even decreased. 
One of the most unanticipated finding that the meta-analysis returned is that 
CEE transition economies have, on average, been more susceptible to financial 
crises originating in the US as opposed to financial crises originating elsewhere, 
most notably Russia and the Czech Republic. One reason for this is large 
number of agents who are investing their money to the US. The other reason 
may be that the US is extremely influential both economically and politically 
around the world, and therefore, crises in the US are always resounded in the 
media worldwide. Therefore, investors are well informed about crises 
originating in the US, but may not be so about crises emerging elsewhere. 
 
 
4.2. Contagion from the US 2008 financial  
crisis to the Baltic States 
4.2.1. Some specific features of the Baltic States 
In this sub-chapter two main approaches are employed to test for possible 
financial contagion from the US to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the 
crisis that started in the US in 2008. First, the correlation coefficients based 
methods are implemented, and second, the ARCH-GARCH framework. 
The events associated with the US 2008 crisis, which saw many countries 
falling into serious problems one after another like dominoes, reminded us once 
again that the phenomenon of financial contagion is a systematic component of 
financial risk. Small open economies like those in the Baltic States are 
particularly vulnerable to global economic developments. Therefore, financial 
contagion analysis is exceptionally important for these new EU member 
countries with their post-socialist path-dependence. 
The three Baltic countries investigated in the chapter as destination countries 
have an interesting economic background. Since regaining their independence 
in 1991, the Baltic States have undergone similar processes of economic, politi-
cal and social transformation. Under the Washington Consensus policy frame-
work, these countries aimed to create stability and international trust as well as 
attractiveness for foreign direct investment through a fixed exchange rate, 
balanced state budget and comparatively low tax and administrative burdens. In 
the late 1990s, the transition and restructuring paradigms were replaced by the 
concepts of catching up and economic convergence to the level of the developed 
economies of the enlarged EU. Unfortunately, large amounts of foreign invest-
ment and private lending went into financing consumption and the real estate 
boom, and as a consequence, the export competitiveness of the Baltic eco-
nomies started to weaken in the 2000s (see also Estonian Development Report 
2008). Furthermore, the deepening downturn of the main trading partners of the 
Baltic States during the recent global crisis has remarkably weakened the 
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economic outlook for these countries. Estonia is the only country among the 
three Baltic States that has joined the euro zone, doing so in 2011. Adopting the 
euro in itself is unlikely to trigger any major change in the pace of recovery, but 
it was expected during the joining that it may remove liquidity risks, add 
stability to the economy and help attract new investments. These small count-
ries are facing a double challenge of simultaneously overcoming the recent 
economic downturn resulting from the global economic crisis as well as 
implementing national economic policies. The Baltic countries are particularly 
interesting to investigate as destination countries of the propagation of financial 
crises because of their small and open economies and post-socialist path-
dependence. There are two main reasons why Baltic countries may differ from 
other countries in how they might be affected by contagion. On the one hand, 
the openness that has been taken almost to extremes in these countries and was 
one of the main reasons behind their noticeable success in the transition period, 
may have now performed a disservice, as a high level of openness may make a 
country more vulnerable to financial contagion. On the other hand, as argued by 
Weller and Morzuch (2000), there has been less speculative financing on the 
stock markets of the Baltic States as compared to many other countries, which 
decreases the likelihood of bubbles and should offer some protection against 
financial contagion. It would be an interesting finding to discover which of 
these two aspects prevail. 
 
4.2.2. Results of the correlation coefficients based test 
In the empirical section of the sub-chapter, the correlation coefficients between 
stock returns from the US (a crisis country) and the Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) during non-crisis and crisis periods are compared first. 
Secondly, changes in volatility are measured to examine whether conditional 
means and conditional variances of financial variables are related to each other 
among these countries and whether these relations are stronger during the crisis. 
The investigation of the correlation coefficients is based on the methodology 
outlined in chapter three (sub-chapter 3.2), and uses the data and time periods 
that are also explained in the same chapter. Two-day average24 rolling loga-
rithmic stock returns are used to control for the non-synchronous trading hours 
in the US and Baltic States. The number of observations used is 266. All stock 
indexes used are denominated in US dollars. 
Unadjusted correlation coefficients are calculated using formula 10 in sub-
chapter 3.2.1 separately for crisis and non-crisis periods using estimates and 
variances of the respective period. The results are given in the second (pre-crisis 
correlations) and third row (post-crisis correlations) in Table 4. The final row in 
                                                 
24  To get more robust results also weekly rolling average logarithmic stock returns are 
investigated. The results do not change significantly, although correlations are lower in all 
periods for all three countries. These results are not reported in the dissertation but are 
available upon request. 
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Table 4 is obtained by adjusting the unadjusted post-crisis correlations given in 
the previous row using the adjustment procedure given in formulas 11 and 12 
(see sub-chapter 3.2.1). 
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients between US and Baltic stoct markets before and 
during 2008. financial crisis period 
Period US and Estonia US and Latvia US and Lithuania 
Pre-crisis 0.087 0.086 0.068 
Post-crisis, unadjusted 0.345* 0.222 0.368* 
Post-crisis, adjusted 0.231 0.146 0.248 
* indicates statistically significant difference from pre-crisis value at 95% confidence level 
(sample size is 266 observations). 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
 
As seen in Table 4, the correlation coefficient for the pre-crisis period (after the 
Fischer transformation) between the US and Estonia is 0.087, between the US 
and Latvia 0.086 and between the US and Lithuania 0.068. The corresponding 
simple correlations for the crisis period are 0.345, 0.222 and 0.368. The post-
crisis correlations are significantly higher, which is confirmed by the t-test in 
the cases of Estonia and Lithuania25. This finding supports the contagion 
hypothesis according to which linkages between crisis and non-crisis countries 
have become stronger after the starting point of the crisis. Therefore, there has 
to have been some changes in the structure of stock market linkages, which can 
be explained by herding behaviour or switches in investor expectations and 
attitude. 
However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, the higher correlation 
coefficients in this simple model may be caused by the higher volatility that is 
present during crisis times. Because of this bias, correlations in crisis times are 
adjusted for the higher volatility bias. After doing this (adjusting post-crisis 
correlations for the presence of heteroskedasticity), the correlations are much 
lower, 0.231 for Estonia, 0.146 for Latvia and 0.248 for Lithuania. Comparing 
these values with the pre-crisis correlations, the differences are not statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. So it is clearly seen that not adjusting 
for heteroskedasticity increases the probability of finding supporting evidence 
for the existence of financial contagion. Still, in the case of Estonia and 
Lithuania, the post-crisis correlations are more than three times higher than pre-
                                                 































crisisnonN   and crisisN  are sample sizes 
in tranquil and crisis periods respectively. 
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crisis correlations, and in the case of Latvia the difference is twofold, from 
which it can be deduced that there may have been some kind of structural break 
in the financial shocks’ transmission mechanism, although not quite as strong as 
suggested by the simple unadjusted correlations. Furthermore, two aspects 
regarding statistical significance testing have to be kept in mind: firstly, the  
t-statistic used only takes into account absolute differences in correlation 
coefficients and not relative differences which arise much more clearly in the 
present case; and secondly, the adjustment methodology suggested by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) adjusts correlation coefficients only for heteroskedasticity, 
but there are also problems with omitted variables and simultaneous equations. 
Therefore, as subsequently claimed by some authors (for example Corsetti et al 
2005), the adjusted correlations found using the methodology of Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) tend to be biased towards the null hypothesis of no contagion. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to conclude that as even adjusted post-crisis 
correlations were two or even three times higher than pre-crisis ones, at least 
some, albeit not very strong, evidence of financial contagion was found. 
One additional aspect has to be mentioned. A characteristic of Baltic stock 
markets is that liquidity in all of them is in general rather low, which may 
decrease the probability of finding strong correlations of stock returns in the 
crisis period. For example, Didier et al (2010) have found that stock market 
illiquidity can explain a low degree of co-movement with the US. However, low 
liquidity levels should negatively affect both pre- and post-crisis correlations, so 
its impact on contagion effects is hardly important. This is in accordance with 
the findings by Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2011), who find intensified links 
between the US and countries with illiquid stock markets, while between the US 
and countries with more liquid stock markets links did not intensify during 
crisis periods. 
 
4.2.3. Results of the MA (1) – GARCH (1, 1) – M model 
It is understood that the level of volatility in these countries is likely to increase 
in more turbulent times. This means that conditional and unconditional 
variances may change over time. In order to capture a better picture of the 
contagion, it is assumed that there are two regimes in the volatility where one 
regime relates to lower volatility, tranquil times, and the other to high volatility, 
turbulent times. So, to test for contagion, an ARCH-GARCH framework for 
estimating the variance-covariance transmission mechanism is used across the 
countries as a second approach. The methodology is given in formulas 14–17 in 
sub-chapter 3.2.2. Table 4 shows the results of the model estimation. 
Starting with the pre-crisis period, it is seen that statistically significant mean 
spillover effects (see values of sigma in the Table 5) are observed in the 
Estonian and Lithuanian but not in the Latvian stock markets. This means that 
the conditional mean return in Estonian and Lithuanian stock markets exhibits a 
positive spillover effect from the US stock market – a high (low) return in the 
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S&P 500 index is followed by a high (low) return in the OMXT and OMXV, 
but such a relationship is not found between S&P 500 and OMXR. This result is 
similar to the one found using the correlation coefficients based method, which 
also showed a stronger increase in correlations between US and Estonia and US 
and Lithuania compared to the increase in correlation between US and Latvian 
stock returns. It is an interesting finding for which a good theoretical 
explanation still needs to be worked out. 
 
Table 5. The results of estimating the MA (1) – GARCH (1, 1) – M model for 
contagion effects between the US and Baltic States stock markets during the US 2008 
crisis. 













α –0.002* –0.01* 0.002 –0.01* –0.002 –0.001 
β 11.53 16.24* –32.34 9.27 15.72 –0.99 
γ –0.004 –0.001 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 –0.002 
δ 0.15* 0.20* 0.07 0.14 0.14* 0.20* 
ε 0.13 0.06 –0.25* –0.13 0.09 0.03 
a –0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
b 1.05* –0.17 0.68* 0.07 0.50* 0.67* 
c –0.004 0.49* 0.08 0.32* 0.38* 0.27* 
d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
f –0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 –0.08 –0.001 
The coefficients are estimated from the MA(1)–GARCH(1, 1)–M model 
tttttt uuYDbX  1  




Xt – stock index return in a non-crisis market at time t; 
bt – conditional variance of the tX  at time t;  
D – dummy variable for the Monday effect (D takes value of 1 on days following weekends and 
holidays and is 0 otherwise);  
Yt – stock index return in a crisis market at time t, ut and ut–1 are error terms at time t and t–1 
respectively;  
Zt – squared residual derived from an MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M model applied to the returns of US 
stock market. 
Non-crisis period: 3 March 2008 – 14 September 2008. 
Crisis period: 15 September 2008 – 9 March 2009. 
* indicates statistically significant difference from zero at 95% confidence level. 




Turning attention to the crisis period, it can be seen that mean spillover effects 
are now stronger in all three markets. In the crisis period, mean spillover effects 
are statistically significant even between US and Latvian stock markets if a 90% 
confidence level is used. This finding is in line with the contagion hypothesis, 
as post-crisis linkages seem to be stronger than those in the pre-crisis period, 
although the differences are quite moderate. 
In addition to spillover effects in conditional mean also are investigated 
spillover effects in conditional variance (see values of f in Table 5). Unlike 
conditional mean, conditional variance does not exhibit statistically significant 
positive spillovers in any of the observed markets in the crisis period or the non-
crisis period. The only statistically significant spillover effect is observed in the 
Estonian stock market in the pre-crisis period and it is negative. Therefore, high 
volatility in the S&P 500 index does not give any reason to expect that we will 
also see high volatility in Baltic stock markets. The conditional variance 
spillover effects are not stronger in the crisis period than in the non-crisis 
period. This means that no structural breaks in volatility transmission mecha-
nisms are observed, and therefore, no support for the contagion hypothesis is 
found. 
Summarising the findings of the empirical section, it can be said that the 
results of the correlation coefficients based and the volatility spillovers based 
methods are somewhat mixed. Correlations in returns on stock indexes between 
US and Baltic stock markets are clearly higher during the turmoil period 
compared to the tranquil period, which supports the contagion hypothesis. 
However, if post-crisis correlations are adjusted for heteroskedasticity the diffe-
rences when compared to the pre-crisis period are much smaller and not 
statistically significant. The estimation results of the MA(1)-GARCH(1, 1)-M 
model, although showing some increase in spillover effects on the conditional 
mean, did not show any sign of positive spillover effects on conditional 
variance, neither did these spillover effects increase during crisis times. So 
changes in US stock market returns are likely to be followed by changes in the 
same direction in the Baltic stock markets, but the same cannot be said about 
changes in volatility. Thus, there is some evidence indicating contagious 
transmission of financial crisis of 2008 from the US to Baltic stock markets, but 
the contagion has been rather weak. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The financial contagion puzzle has become one of the most newsworthy 
research tasks for economists in recent decades. This elevated attention was 
caused by the rapid transmission of initial country-specific shocks to other 
economies, some of which were very different in terms of their size and 
economic structure compared to the country of origin. The crises spread over 
the world like snowballs becoming larger and larger, and even countries far 
away from the crisis country and apparently with sound fundamentals were not 
left unaffected. The events a few years ago, with yet another financial crisis 
snowballing around the world, show that developing an understanding of 
financial contagion is clearly important for policy makers to help them manage 
and diminish the future spread of crises. 
The aim of the study is to find out whether the propagation of financial 
crises in numerous past crisis episodes has been amplified by financial con-
tagion or is based solely on stable fundamental linkages between countries. The 
importance of the research question emerges most clearly in the following 
aspects. Firstly, the existence or nonexistence of financial contagion is straight-
forwardly related to the merits of international diversification. Theoretical 
concepts postulate that international diversification should significantly reduce 
portfolio risk, but in the case of financial contagion, when cross-country corre-
lations increase during crises, much of this rationale is undermined. In this case, 
the fundamentals of countries are overruled by the self-fulfilling expectations of 
financial agents, whose irrational actions at a collective level bring down even 
the soundest of countries. Secondly, at government level, it is important to 
know whether there is something that can be done in order to prevent crises 
from spilling over to other countries or to mitigate the negative consequences of 
such propagation. In the case of strong financial contagion, there is no good 
way to mount a defence against the propagation of crises, and therefore, 
countries should have tools at their disposal to deal with the consequences. One 
recommendation in this case could be to retain finances in reserve during the 
good times, even if there seems to be no particular reason to expect the 
economic outlook to worsen. 
Practically, the dissertation is based on four published articles mentioned in 
the list of papers and presented in the appendices. However, as the research 
theme of financial contagion is extremely topical and new findings and 
theoretical ideas develop rapidly, the need to consider up-to-date information 
has resulted in the thesis being presented in the form of a monograph. In 
addition to updating those sections that have become out of date minor, short-
comings in the articles have also been corrected so the thesis as a monograph 
can be considered an improved version of the four base publications. 
The thesis consists of four chapters, but there are no specific chapters for 
each article, instead the chapters and publications are somewhat intertwined. 
Study 1 (see the list of papers at the beginning of the introduction) is basically 
73 
the sum of sub-chapter 1.1 and chapter 2 (with the exception of sub-chapter 
2.7). Study 2 comprises the second half of both the third and fourth chapter 
(sub-chapters 3.2 and 4.2). The main parts of Studies 3 and 4 are covered in the 
first halves of the third and fourth chapters, with sub-chapters 3.1 and 4.1.1 
being slight modifications of both these Studies, while sub-chapter 4.1.2 is 
based only on Study 3 (Study 3 is a follow up on Study 4). The sub-chapters not 
covered by the four base articles are 1.2 and 2.7. These sub-chapters are the 
product of the process of updating the findings in the articles. 
The first chapter of the thesis provides the theoretical framework for the 
research problem by taking a look at alternative definitions of financial con-
tagion and theories explaining the propagation of shocks and crises. It is shown 
in the chapter that financial crises and their contagion have long been studied 
and modelled by economists, and several alternative definitions of financial 
contagion have been used without coming to a unique definition that all authors 
agree on. The other contribution of the chapter is to separate the theories explai-
ning the propagation of crises into two groups: theories that are in accordance 
with interdependence and not contagion – non-crisis-contingent theories – and 
theories that are in accordance with contagion – crisis-contingent theories. 
The second chapter of the thesis provides an overview of the empirical 
literature in the field of financial contagion by introducing theoretical aspects 
that may influence the results of empirical studies and looking at previous 
empirical findings separately for four groups of studies based on the testing 
methodologies. This analysis is based on Study 1. The results that are based on 
around 75 empirical studies show that empirical studies provide heterogeneous 
results depending on the definitions and methods applied, the crises chosen, and 
the markets observed. These analyses contain both evidence confirming and 
evidence contradicting financial contagion. Summing up by simply counting all 
the relevant empirical findings, the results supporting the contagion hypothesis 
are clearly dominant, but this can be attributable to the broader definition used 
or having not adjusted for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the crisis period. 
Taking into account the differences in the definitions and testing methodologies, 
the qualitative analysis of previous studies of financial contagion did not reveal 
clear results as to which evidence dominates or should dominate. 
One of the conclusions that can be made based on the second chapter of the 
thesis is that qualitative analysis of published research materials about previous 
financial crises does not give sufficient answers to the research question of 
whether the propagation of crises from one country to others is contagious in 
nature or not. Therefore, one contribution of the thesis is to suggest future 
research be conducted on the field of financial contagion with more emphasis 
on finding singular numerical values that are interpretable and comparable, and 
therefore, summarisable across all relevant studies, rather than trying to come 
out with some statistical significance measure of some contagion parameter. 
One potential measure of this kind is proposed in the third chapter and is used in 
the empirical analysis in the fourth chapter of the thesis. 
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The research results presented in the second chapter clearly showed that the 
multidimensionality of the financial contagion puzzle makes it almost 
impossible to obtain adequate findings based on a qualitative literature review. 
Therefore, the third and fourth chapter of the thesis are dedicated to quantitative 
analyses and are divided into two parts: meta-analysis of previous empirical 
findings (based on Studies 3 and 4) and a separate econometric analysis regar-
ding the US 2008 crisis (based on Study 2). In the third chapter the data and 
methodology are introduced separately for both analyses, and in the fourth 
chapter the main findings obtained using these methods are presented in a 
similar fashion. 
One of the contributions of the thesis regarding the meta-analysis is working 
out a quantitative measure that is interpretable across studies and permits 
meaningful numerical comparison and aggregation. As such the thesis proposes 
the use of an increase in cross-country asset price correlations between crisis 
and non-crisis country during crisis times relative to asset price correlations 
between the same countries during non-crisis times. Defined so the contagion 
measure is in accordance with the definition proposed by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2000, 2001 and 2002), according to which financial contagion is denoted as a 
structural break in the linear transmission mechanism of financial shocks during 
crisis times. The given measure is used as an input in the meta-analysis with 
meta-effect size being the weighted average of the values of the measure. 
The results of the meta-analysis, presented in the first part of the fourth 
chapter and in a nutshell given in Figure 1, indicate that on average asset market 
correlations have increased during turbulent periods, but the increase is rather 
moderate (see column All in Figure 1). Therefore, it seems that financial 
contagion has been present in past crisis episodes, but it has not been strong. 
Whether correlation coefficients are adjusted for the presence of hetero-
scedasticity or not in the individual studies is a clear moderating variable in 
explaining heterogeneity in distribution (see columns Unadjusted and Adjusted). 
In the case of adjusted correlation coefficients, the increase in correlations 
during turbulent periods is considerably smaller, but still statistically significant. 
It has been shown by many authors (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon 2001) that not 
adjusting for the presence of heteroskedasticity overestimates the contagion 
effects, and therefore, finding support for the contagion hypothesis is more 
likely than it should be. Now we can see for the first time how large the gap is 
between the estimation results of these two approaches (the difference in meta-
effect size values is approximately 0.15), and thus how inadequate it is to mix 




























































Figure 1. The main values for meta-effect sizes (using Approach 126 – individual effect 
sizes as treatment effects) 
A – post-crisis correlations are adjusted for the presence of heteroskedasticity 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Further results of the meta-analysis show that from the deepest financial crises 
in the last two decades (with the exception of the US 2008 crisis that was not 
included into the meta-analysis) the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Thai crisis of 
1997 and the crisis in Hong Kong in 1997 were contagious, while the crisis in 
Russia in 1998, in Brazil in 1999 and the one in Argentina in 2001 were not27. 
The reasons behind this finding are not investigated in the thesis, so future 
investigation is needed in this respect. 
Other findings indicate that the degree to which the destination country can 
be considered developed does not seem to be a significant contributory factor in 
determining whether a financial crisis will spread or not (see columns 
Emerging*A and Developed*A). The meta-effect size is a little bit higher in the 
case of emerging economies (compared to the developed ones) as destination 
countries but not statistically significantly so. This finding suggests that even 
economically strong economies are not protected if financial crises start to 
snowball. 
In addition, whether the observed financial market affects the likelihood of 
finding evidence of contagion is also investigated. It turns out (see columns 
                                                 
26  The values of Appoach 2 do not differ much. 
27  These findings are not reflected in the Figure 1, but can be found in Table 2 in the fourth 
chapter and in the Appendix 5. 
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Stocks*A, Bonds*A, Exchange rates*A and Interest rates*A) that in interest rate 
markets contagion occurs more strongly than in stock markets. According to the 
meta-effect sizes, contagion effects also seem strong in exchange rate markets, 
but there is no statistically significant difference with any of the other three 
markets. 
An important policy implication from the results of the meta-analysis is that 
potential benefits from international portfolio diversification are significantly 
lower than one might expect. If one country falls, others are not safe either, as 
herding behaviour or some other form of collectively irrational behaviour 
among financial agents can easily occur. At the government level, some guide-
lines for appropriate financial architecture that take into account the presence of 
financial contagion in international markets can be drawn. It may not be enough 
to have good policies and good macroeconomic fundamentals, as financial 
contagion can bring down even strong countries. As closeting themselves 
behind an iron curtains seems neither realistic nor reasonable, nothing more 
than countries putting aside financial reserves during good times for use when 
financial contagion hits can really be suggested. This way a country can be 
better prepared and mitigate the negative consequences of crises. As there 
seems to be no good way to build a defence against the propagation of crises, 
countries should have tools at their disposal to deal with the consequences. 
With respect to the CEE economies, the results indicate somewhat surpri-
singly that, on average, CEE economies are less susceptible to financial con-
tagion compared to the average from the entire sample (compare columns CEE 
and All). The meta-effect size for CEE countries is statistically insignificant 
and, after adjusting for the presence of heteroskedasticity, takes on a negative 
value. 
An interesting finding is that the CEE economies seem to be the most 
susceptible to the propagation of financial crises that originate in the US. Crises 
originating elsewhere, most notably in Russia and the Czech Republic, seem not 
to have contagiously propagated to CEE countries. The reason behind this may 
well be the fact that the US has been extremely influential financially, economi-
cally and politically around the world. Therefore, a lot of agents are investing 
their money in the US, and most of them are well aware of every crisis episode 
almost immediately after its occurrence. At the same time, small crises in less 
influential countries may be of no interest for the international media, and given 
the smaller number of investors losing investments, it is less likely for such 
local crises to become global. Here it is worth remembering that this does not 
mean that crises like those in Russia in 1998 and the Czech Republic in 1997 do 
not affect other Central and Eastern European countries. Rather the propagation 
of these crises happens through stable fundamental linkages, and breaks in 
transmission channels do not occur. 
One of the most important limitations of the sub-chapters regarding the 
meta-analysis is that the analysis is restricted to empirical studies based exclu-
sively on correlation coefficients. The majority of studies use this methodology, 
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and it is no simple task to construct the comparable individual effect sizes 
necessary for the meta-analytic approach using other methodologies as well. 
Nonetheless, this might be one subject future research could focus on, if the 
authors of subsequent studies provide numerical findings that can be used in 
future meta-analyses. Another limitation is associated with the heterogeneity 
that is left in the data even after dividing the sample into several subgroups. 
Thus, one has to keep in mind that the numerical values of some meta-effect 
sizes are of questionable validity because all individual effect sizes within the 
groups may not represent the common population, and the groups could be 
divided even further. Studies investigating the US 2008 crisis should also be 
included in the sample in any future meta-analyses on the subject. 
At the time of writing the papers that the dissertation is based on, there was 
not a single study that investigated the contagiousness of the US 2008 crisis. 
This made it impossible to add the mentioned crisis to the articles utilising a 
meta-analysis (Studies 3 and 4). Therefore, a separate analysis was conducted to 
examine contagiousness from the US 2008 crisis. This analysis was published 
as Study 2 and is presented as an improved version at the end of the third 
(where the model is presented) and fourth chapter (where the results are given 
and discussed) of the thesis. The more recent analyses that investigate the US 
2008 crisis are considered in the second chapter of the thesis, and more 
specifically in sub-chapter 2.7, which is one improvement the thesis provides in 
addition to the four base articles. 
In regard to the US 2008 crisis, the thesis examines whether there has been 
financial contagion from the US to the three Baltic States during the 2008 
financial crisis using data on two-day rolling average stock returns during the 
period from 3 March 2008 to 9 March 2009. As with the definition used in the 
meta-analysis, financial contagion is defined as a structural break in the linear 
transmission mechanism of financial shocks during the crisis and is tested by 
applying both correlation coefficients based tests and the ARCH-GARCH 
framework. 
The logic of the correlation coefficients based tests is to measure the corre-
lation in stock returns between the US (crisis country) and the Baltic States 
(destination countries) during the period before the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers (stable period), and then test for a significant increase in this corre-
lation coefficient during the period after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
(crisis period). A significant increase in the correlation coefficient after the 
starting point of the crisis is considered evidence of contagion. Correlation 
coefficients based testing reveals some but not strong supporting evidence for 
financial contagion. The unadjusted (for the presence of heteroskedasticity) 
post-crisis correlation between the US and all three Baltic countries is clearly 
higher than the pre-crisis correlation (the pre-crisis correlations were 0.087, 
0.086 and 0.068 in case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively and the 
respective values for the post-crisis period were 0.345, 0.222 and 0.368), and in 
the case of Estonia and Lithuania the increase is statistically significant. This 
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finding supports the contagion hypothesis and indicates that linkages between 
the US (crisis country) and Estonia and Lithuania (non-crisis countries) have 
become stronger after 15 September 2008, which was agreed upon as the star-
ting date of the crisis. 
Because of the bias of unadjusted correlation coefficients towards overesti-
mating contagion effects, the correlations in crisis times are adjusted for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Using these adjusted correlations, the differences 
between pre- and post-crisis correlations are much smaller and statistically 
insignificant in the case of all three Baltic countries (the values of adjusted post-
crisis correlations were 0.231, 0.146 and 0.248 in the case of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania respectively). To obtain a complete picture, it should nevertheless 
be mentioned that the differences are still two or three times in favour of post-
crisis correlations, and given the slight downward bias of the adjusted 
correlation coefficients, the general conclusion of the analysis is in favour of 
some weak contagion effects. 
Within the framework of the ARCH-GARCH models, the MA(1)-
GARCH(1,1)-M model is estimated to analyse both mean and volatility 
spillovers from the US to the Baltic countries. Significantly stronger spillovers 
in the crisis period compared to the tranquil period are considered as evidence 
of financial contagion. The results obtained using that model are mixed. The 
mean spillover effects from the US to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are stronger 
during the crisis period compared to the tranquil period. During crisis times the 
conditional mean return in all three Baltic stock markets exhibits a positive 
spillover effect from the US stock market. However, this is not true for the 
conditional variance, which does not exhibit statistically significant positive 
spillovers in any of the observed markets. Furthermore, there is no sign of 
spillovers of conditional variance becoming stronger during crisis times. 
Summarising the results of the two alternative testing methodologies, some 
evidence of financial contagion was found, but it seems to have not been 
particularly strong. These results also confirm once again that financial con-
tagion is a complex phenomenon, and examining it requires further investment 
in the employment and development of study methods, probably with future 
meta-analysis in mind.  
The transmission of the crisis from the US to the Baltic stock markets (and 
economies), that the unadjusted correlation coefficients based testing indicated, 
shows the risks that small open economies have to face. However, although the 
Baltic States in 2009 faced similar problems as Greece is undergoing in the 
recent crisis, they managed to overcome this problem by reducing human 
resources costs. The rating agency Standard & Poor’s has increased the rating 
outlook for all three countries, on the basis of their success in decreasing the 
budget. Thus, as shown by the analysis of adjusted correlation coefficients, one 
can judge that the infection was not especially difficult for the Baltic countries, 
as many countries with less open economies are facing even larger problems. 
The low level of susceptibility (to financial contagion) among the Baltic 
79 
countries was even more clearly indicated by the meta-analysis and testing the 
spillover effects of the conditional mean and conditional variance. The latter 
revealed that, in spite of being extremely open economies, the Baltic stock 
markets exhibit only a slightly stronger mean spillover effect from the US stock 
market during the crisis, they do not exhibit a positive variance spillover effect 
from the US stock market and the presence of the 2008 crisis in the US did not 
make variance spillovers significantly stronger. 
Thus, small open economies like those in the Baltic States do not seem to be 
more susceptible to financial crises than other countries, and should probably 
continue to be as open as possible for foreign trade and investments, an aspect 
which has been one of the main reasons for their success so far. In order to deal 
with some unavoidable contagion from elsewhere, government intervention to 
direct knowledge and innovation based development, which could enable better 
mitigation of the negative consequences of crises, are probably necessary. 
As the analysis of the US 2008 crisis is restricted to two methodological 
approaches, and the results of these approaches are somewhat mixed, this can be 
considered as one of the main limitations of this analysis. Therefore, further 
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Appendix I. Studies investigating financial contagion: 
correlation coefficients based tests 
 
Author(s) Year Method; 
Definition 




1990 Shift-contagion Yes US, UK and Japan 







Yes US, 1960–1985 Commodity 
prices 
Lee, Kim 1993 Shift-contagion Yes 12 major markets 











1996 Shift-contagion Yes 1994 Mexican peso 





Valdes 1997 Excess 
comovement 





















Mixed emerging markets 
during the 1997–98 























No Germany and GB 
(Germany and 










No Latin American 















2001 Shift-contagion Yes from the Czech 
Republic, Asia, and 







2001 Shift-contagion No from the Czech 
Republic, Asia, and 






No 28 countries, 1987 
US stock market 
crash, 1994 
Mexican peso 












































Serwa 2005 Shift-contagion, 
adjusted 
Weak 7 crises, 1997–
2002; 17 Western 







Yes 6 Asian countries, 









Mixed 1997 Asian crisis; 
from Thailand, 
Indonesia, Korea, 









Yes Hong Kong crisis 
1997, 17 countries 
Stocks 






















2007 Correlations and 
distance 
relationships 









No earthquake in 
South-East Asia on 








Yes earthquake in 
South-East Asia on 











Yes Asian crisis, 

















Yes 82 US industry 
indexes, 1976–2001
Stocks 
* Result column indicates whether evidence in favor of financial contagion was found or not. 





Appendix II. Studies investigating financial contagion: 
conditional probability based tests 
Author Year Method; 
Definition 









Park, Song 1998 Conditional 
probability 









































2000 Probit model Yes Mexican 1994 and 














2004 Panel probit 
model 
Yes Mexican 1994, 
Asian 1997, 
Russian 1998; 41 
emerging countries 
Currencies 




Haile, Pozo 2008 Panel probit 
model 






* Result column indicates whether evidence in favor of financial contagion was found or not. 





Appendix III. Studies investigating financial contagion:  
tests measuring changes in volatility 
 
Author Year Method; 
Definition 









Park, Song 1998 Conditional 
probability 






Lomakin, Paiz 1999 Probit 
analysis 































2000 Probit model Yes Mexican 1994 and 














2004 Panel probit 
model 
Yes Mexican 1994, 
Asian 1997, 
Russian 1998; 41 
emerging countries
Currencies 




Haile, Pozo 2008 Panel probit 
model 






* Result column indicates whether evidence in favor of financial contagion was found or not. 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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Appendix IV. Studies investigating financial contagion:  
other tests  






No US and Japanese 
stocks 
Stocks 
Kali, Reyes 2005 Network 
approach 
Yes Tequila Crisis 
Mexican 1994), the 
Asian Flu, and the 
Russian Virus  
Stocks 
Kali, Reyes 2005 Network 
approach 


































Abeysinghe 2001 Structural 
full trade 
model 
Yes Asian crisis, East-
Asian countries 
Stocks 
Tornell 1999 Regression 
analysis 
No Mexican 1995 and 
Asian 1997 
Currencies 
Woo 2000 Qualitative 
analysis 
Yes Asian crisis; from 








Yes Asian crisis 1997; 








No Asian crisis 1997; 
from South-Korea to 
Brazil 
Stocks 
Cerra, Saxena 2002 Markov 
switching 
framework 




Serwa 2005 Markov 
switching 
framework 
No HSI and Nikkei 225; 













































Czech, Asian and 
Russian crisis to 
CEE 
Stocks 






Czech, Asian and 




















Yes 22 Asian firms and 7 
indeces, Asian crises
Stocks 
Moussalli 2007 OLS and the 
bootstrap 
method 










Yes   
* Result column indicates whether evidence in favor of financial contagion was found or not. 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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Appendix V. Results of meta-analysis  




ESs as treatment effects 
(Approach 1) 














Emerg and A 237 0.04* 0.009 261 0.04* 0.009 280* 
Emerg and U 95 0.19* 0.008 846* 0.24* 0.008 3257* 
Devel and A 308 0.02 0.010 404* 0.02 0.011 433* 
Devel and U 64 0.12* 0.014 92* 0.12* 0.015 92* 
Mex and A 41 0.12* 0.044 30 0.15* 0.050 28 
Mex and U 27 0.20* 0.075 15 0.22* 0.103 10 
HK and A 116 0.04* 0.012 167* 0.04* 0.012 173* 
HK and U 38 0.17* 0.026 78* 0.17* 0.013 93* 
US87 and A 9 0.17 0.108 1.7 0.18 0.131 1.2 
US87 and U 10 0.19* 0.04 4.0 0.18 0.084 3.4 
Ind04 and A 41 –0.10* 0.040 70* –0.13* 0.044 98 
Ind04 and U 10 –0.08* 0.040 52 –0.10* 0.044 55 
Cze97 and A 7 0.01 0.056 9.1 0.01 0.058 9.0 
Cze97 and U 7 0.10 0.056 16* 0.11 0.058 16* 
Stocks and A 416 0.02* 0.007 420 0.02* 0.008 435 
Bonds and A 48 0.04 0.029 129* 0.06 0.031 163* 
Exchange 
rates and A 
23 0.09* 0.046 21 0.09 0.050 21 
Interest rates 
and A 
36 0.14* 0.033 49 0.14* 0.036 48 
* denotes statistically significant results (in 95% confidence level) 
There are no data points for Brazilian, Turkish, US01, Argentinean and US02 crisis with U (all 
the data points in case of these crises are calculated using heteroscedasticity adjusted post-crisis 
correlations). 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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Appendix VI. Studies and constructs used in the meta-analysis 
Author(s) Year Within study distinction No. of effect 
sizes 
Bordo and Murshid 2000 na 106 
Forbes and Rigobon 1999 U 63 
Forbes and Rigobon 1999 A 63 
King and Wadhwani 1995 U 1 
Lee, Wu and Wang 2006 U, stocks 23 
Lee, Wu and Wang 2006 A, stocks 23 
Lee, Wu and Wang 2006 U, interest rates 18 
Lee, Wu and Wang 2006 A, interest rates 18 
Wang, Thi 2006 Conditional 3 
Wang, Thi 2006 Unconditional 3 
Kleimeier, Lenhert, 
Verschoor 
2008 Closing prices 28 
Kleimeier, Lenhert, 
Verschoor 
2008 Matched intra day prices 28 
Baig, Goldfajn 1999 Exchange rates 4 
Baig, Goldfajn 1999 Stocks 4 
Baig, Goldfajn 1999 Interest rates 4 
Baig, Goldfajn 1999 Sovereign spreads 4 
Corsetti, Pericoli, Sbracia 2005 Na 17 
Serwa 2005 Forbes-Rigobon 
methodology 
76 
Serwa 2005 Corsetti-Pericoli-Sbracia 
methodology 
76 
Serwa 2005 Residuals based 
methodology 
76 
Alvarez-Plata, Schrooten 2003 Stocks 6 
Alvarez-Plata, Schrooten 2003 Interest rates 6 
Chiang, Jeon, Li 2007 Adjusted 14 
Chiang, Jeon, Li 2007 Unadjusted 14 
Gelos, Sahay 2001 Stocks, unadjusted 12 
Gelos, Sahay 2001 Stocks, adjusted 12 
Gelos, Sahay 2001 Exchange rates, U 9 
Gelos, Sahay 2001 Exchange rates, A 5 










SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Finantskriiside nakkuslikkus: meta-analüütiline lähenemine 
rõhuasetusega Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikidele 
1. Töö aktuaalsus ja olulisus 
Finantskriiside ülekandumine teistesse riikidesse on majandusteadlaste hulgas 
oluliseks uurimisobjektiks tõusnud eelkõige viimase kahe aastakümne jooksul. 
Põhjuse selleks andis möödunud sajandi viimase kümnendi finantskriiside kiire 
levimine üle maailma riikidesse, mis olid tugevad nii makromajanduslike näita-
jate kui rakendatava finantspoliitika osas ega pruukinud omada sarnast majan-
duse struktuuri kriisi lähteriigiga võrreldes. 
Sellist nähtust on epidemioloogiast tuleneva laenu analoogial hakatud nime-
tama nakkuslikkuseks (ka lumepalliefekt) ning antud teema on viimastel aastatel 
rahvusvahelises rahanduses olnud üheks peamiseks uurimisobjektiks. 2008. 
aasta finantskriis koos sellele järgneva majandussurutisega on selgeks näiteks, 
et finantskriiside nakkuslikkus (edaspidi finantsnakkus) on endiselt teravalt 
päevakorral ning selle vastu võitlemiseks on vaja teda põhjalikult analüüsida ja 
tundma õppida. Kriis alles kestab, aga juba on ilmunud kümmekond teadus-
artiklit antud kriisi nakkuslikkuse uurimiseks, mis tõestab ilmekalt, et teema 
aktuaalsus ja olulisus on võib-olla kõrgem kui kunagi varem. 
Finantsnakkuslikkuse teema uurimine on oluline mitme aspekti osas. Kõige 
otsesemalt ilmneb antud teema tähtsus rahvusvahelisest investeerimisportfelli 
diversifitseerimisest tulenevate kasutegurite kontekstis. Vastavalt üldlevinud 
teoreetilisele seisukohale võimaldab rahvusvaheline diversifitseerimine inves-
teerimisportfelli riskantsust oluliselt vähendada, kuid see teooria peab paika 
ainult juhul, kui kriis ei taba paljusid riike üheaegselt või ajas lähestikku. 
Finantsnakkuse esinemise korral saavad aga ühes riigis alguse saanud kriisist 
kiiresti kannatada ka paljud teised riigid, kaasa arvatud need, mille langemist 
nakkuse ohvriks pole millegagi võimalik põhjendada ega seega ka ette ennus-
tada. See aga õõnestab oluliselt kõnealuse teooria aluspinda. Finantsnakkus-
likkuse esinemise hüpoteesi toetuseks tõendite leidmine võimaldab järeldada, et 
finantskriiside lumepallina riigist riiki ülekandumisel ei ole määrava tähtsusega 
mitte riikide makromajanduslikud fundamentaalnäitajad, vaid finantsagentide 
ühiskondlikus mõttes irratsionaalsest käitumisest tulenev ootuste isetäitumine 
ning investeerimisportfelli diversifitseerimisest tulenevad kasud on teooria 
põhjal eeldatust oluliselt väiksemad. 
Lisaks diversifitseerimise teooriale on finantsnakkuslikkuse uurimisel olu-
line panus ka näiteks optimaalse finantsarhitektuuri alastes küsimustes ning 
kohalikesse turgudesse investeerimise riski hindamisel. Riigi ja valitsuse tasan-
dil on oluline teada, mida saab teha, et vältida kriisi ülekandumist riiki ning kas 
ja kuidas on võimalik vähendada riigi vastuvõtlikkust kriiside ülekandumisele. 
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Rõhuasetus Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa (KIE) riikidele kui peamiselt väikese ava-
tud majandusega ja postsotsialistliku rajasõltuvusega riikide grupile on oluline 
eelkõige leidmaks, kas need riigid on keskmisest rohkem finantsnakkuslikku-
sele vastuvõtlikud, mis tähendaks spetsiifiliste poliitikameetmete vajadust. Teo-
reetilistest lähtekohtadest võib välja tuua kaks peamist põhjust, miks Kesk- ja 
Ida-Euroopa riigid võiksid olla keskmisest erineva finantsnakkuslikkusele 
vastuvõtlikkuse tasemega, seejuures on need põhjused vastupidiste mõjudega. 
Ühest küljest on antud riikide rühmale omane olnud kohati äärmuslik majandus-
vabadus ja majanduse avatus, mida võib pidada väga olulisteks põhjusteks, et 
transformatsiooniprotsess turumajandusele üleminekuks kujunes paljude Kesk- 
ja Ida-Euroopa riikide jaoks kiireks ning edukaks, kuid mis võib muuta riigi 
vastuvõtlikumaks finantskriiside ülekandumise suhtes. Senises empiirilises 
kirjanduses pole majanduse avatuse mõju nakkuslikkusele vastuvõtlikkuse mää-
rale uuritud kuni Didier et al (2012) artiklini, milles tuvastati mõningane 
finantsnakkust soodustav mõju suurema finantsvabaduse puhul mitte aga suu-
rema kaubanduse avatuse puhul. Teisest küljest on Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riigid 
paistnud silma sellega, et neisse on tehtud keskmisest oluliselt vähem spekula-
tiivse eesmärgiga investeeringuid, mis omakorda peaks neid kriiside lumepalli 
eest paremini kaitstuna hoidma. Seega võimaldab KIE riikide finantsnakkus-
likkuse üldise keskmisega võrdlemine selgitada, kumb neist kahest ülaltoodud 
aspektist on domineerivam ning kas poliitikategijatel võiks finantsnakkusele 
vastuvõtlikkuse vähendamiseks olla kasulik majandusvabadust piirata. 
Lisaks teema aktuaalsusele ja olulisusele ilmneb doktoritöö vajalikkus ka 
asjaolus, et vaatamata uuringute paljususele, on finantsnakkuse pusles endiselt 
enamus tükke kokku panemata. Individuaaluuringute tulemused on tihti üks-
teisele vasturääkivad ning varasemate tulemuste agregeerimisel on seni piir-
dutud vaid traditsiooniliste kirjandusülevaadetega, mis aga olulist selgust pole 
toonud. Seega on vajadus kvantitatiivse agregeeriva analüüsi jaoks ilmselge, 
mida doktoritöös on tehtud meta-analüüsi metoodikat kasutades. Sellest 
tulenevalt on doktoritööl oluline panus nii praktilises kui teoreetilises vaate-
vinklis. Praktilise külje pealt on lõpuks ometi olemas respekteeritava usaldus-
väärsusega tõestusmaterjal finantsnakkuse eksisteerimise või mitteeksis-
teerimise kohta, teoreetikud on aga varustatud teadmisega, kuhu suunas peaksid 
edasi liikuma tulevased individuaaluuringud, et edasised meta-analüüsid nende 
tulemusi sisenditena paremini kasutada saaksid. 
 
2. Töö eesmärk ja uurimisülesanded 
Oluline on mõista, et kriiside riikidevaheline ülekandumine ei ole veel finants-
nakkus. Kriiside levimine on ilmselge ja seda testida pole erilist mõtet. Doktori-
töö rõhuasetus on pigem sellel, kas riikidel on võimalik ennast võimalike tule-
vaste finantskriiside eest kaitsta ning investoritel potentsiaalseid kriisi levimise 
sihtriike ette ennustada. Siinkohal ongi oluline finantsnakkuse eristamine liht-
salt kriiside riikidevahelisest ülekandumisest. Kui ülekandumise taga on ainult 
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nö objektiivsed tegurid nagu tugevad kaubanduslikud sidemed riikide vahel või 
nõrgad makromajanduse fundamentaalnäitajad28, ei ole vastavalt doktoritöös 
kasutatavale definitsioonile tegu veel finantsnakkusega, vaid lihtsalt tugeva 
vastastikuse sõltuvusega (interdependence) riikide vahel. Finantsnakkuslikkuse 
eksisteerimisest saab rääkida alles siis, kui kriiside ülekandumise taga on lisaks 
nimetatud objektiivsetele faktoritele ka käegakatsumatud tegurid nagu investo-
rite käitumisega seonduv. 
Lähtuvalt eelnevast on doktoritöö eesmärk leida vastus küsimusele, kas 
finantskriiside riikidevahelist ülekandumist on võimendanud finantsnakkus-
likkus või on see põhjustatud ainult stabiilsetest ühenduskanalitest kriisi- ja siht-
riigi vahel. Kui kriiside ülekandumine toimub ainult läbi stabiilsete funda-
mentaalkanalite (nagu kaubanduslikud ja finantskanalid), peaks ohus olema eel-
kõige nõrkade fundamentaalnäitajatega riigid ning head makromajanduslikud 
fundamentaalnäitajad võiks võimaldada kaitset kriisi leviku eest. Kui aga 
kriiside levimise taga on lisaks stabiilsetele ühenduskanalitele ka finants-
agentide kollektiivses mõttes irratsionaalne käitumine, avaldugu see karjakäitu-
mise, finantspaanika või millegi muuna, siis võivad tõsiselt kannatada saada ka 
tugevate fundamentaalnäitajatega riigid. Vastavalt sellele, kumb nimetatud 
alternatiividest kinnitust leiab, on võimalik teha järeldusi riigitasandi poliitika-
soovituste ning rahvusvaheliste investeerimisstrateegiate kohta. 
Uurimiseesmärgi saavutamiseks on püstitatud järgmised uurimisülesanded: 
1)  selgitada ja sünteesida šokkide ja kriiside ülekandumist selgitavaid 
teooriaid; 
2)  anda teoreetiline ülevaade finantsnakkuslikkuse alternatiivsetest definit-
sioonidest ja ülekandumise kanalitest; 
3)  anda varasemate uurimuste põhjal ülevaade peamistest finantsnakkus-
likkuse testimismeetoditest ja senistest tulemustest; 
4)  töötada välja sobiv kvantitatiivne mõõdik varasemate empiiriliste tule-
muste adekvaatseks võrdlemiseks ja agregeerimiseks ning läbi viia 
kvantitatiivne analüüs meta-analüüsi raamistikku ja metoodikat kasu-
tades; 
5)  teostada eraldi analüüs 2008. aasta USA finantskriisi nakkuslikkuse koh-
ta, kuna doktoritöö baasartiklite valmimise ajaks ei olnud selle kriisi 
kohta empiirilisi uuringuid, mida meta-analüüsi kaasata. Nende uurimis-






                                                 
28  Fundamentaalnäitajate hulka kuuluvad väga erinevad näitajad, näiteks välisvõla suhe 
SKP-sse, täitmata laenude osakaal, lühiajalise võla suhe rahvusvahelistesse reservidesse, 
pankade krediidireitingud, jooksevkonto osakaal SKP-sse, rahvusvahelised reservid jne. 
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3. Töö ülesehitus 
Doktoritöö tugineb neljale avaldatud artiklile, mis on muutmata kujul ära 
toodud eelnevates lisades (vt Appendix 7). Kuna aga finantsnakkuslikkuse 
teema on äärmiselt aktuaalne ning uued publikatsioonid koos varasemate seisu-
kohtade edasiarendustega ilmuvad pidevalt, siis täienduste ja edasiarenduste 
sisse viimise eesmärgil on doktoritöö formaalselt monograafia kujul. Lisaks 
oluliste uute aspektide kajastamisele võimaldab see ka täiustada mõningaid 
baasartiklites kasutatud metoodikaid. Kõigis baasartiklites on doktoritöö autoril 
olnud juhtiv ja vastutav roll nii teoreetilise alusraamistiku loomisel, andmete 
kogumisel ja analüüsil kui ka tulemuste tõlgendamisel ja nende baasil järelduste 
tegemisel. Uurimused 1, 2 ja 4 käsitlevad antud uurimisobjekti erinevaid tahke 
ning kasutavad erinevaid metoodikaid. Uurimus 3 on edasiarendus Uurimusest 
4. 
Doktoritöö koosneb neljast peatükist, kuid nad ei ole seotud konkreetse 
artikliga, vaid peatükkide ja artiklite sisu on omavahel läbi põimunud. Baas-
artiklite metoodika ja analüüsi objekt ning artiklitele vastavad peatükid ja 
alapunktid doktoritöös on ära toodud järgnevas Tabelis 1. 
Tabel 1. Ülevaade doktoritöö baasartiklite metoodikast, analüüsi objektist ja vastavatest 
peatükkidest ning alapunktidest doktoritöös. 




Uurimus 1 Kvalitatiivne kirjanduse 
analüüs 
Üldine 1.1. 
2.1.–2.6. ja 2.8 
Uurimus 2 Korrelatsioonikoefitsientide 
võrdlus ja GARCH raamistik
USA-st Balti riikidesse 1.1., 3.2. ja 4.2. 
Uurimus 3 Meta-analüüs KIE majandused 
sihtriigina 
1.1, 3.1. ja 4.1. 
Uurimus 4 Meta-analüüs Üldine 1.1, 3.1.1. ja 4.1. 
Allikas: autori koostatud. 
 
 
Töö esimene peatükk käsitleb finantsnakkuslikkuse teoreetilist raamistikku, 
alternatiivseid definitsioone ja ülekandumise kanaleid. Peatüki esimeses osas 
tutvustatakse finantsnakkuslikkuse olulisust ja alternatiivseid definitsioone. Pea-
tüki teises osas on toodud ülevaade šokkide ülekandumist selgitavatest teoreeti-
listest käsitlustest, klassifitseerituna dissertatsiooni eesmärgile vastavalt finants-
nakkuslikkusele viitavateks ja mitteviitavateks teooriateks. Peatüki esimeses 
osas on kasutatud kõiki nelja artiklit, peamiselt aga Uurimust 1. Peatüki teine 
osa on spetsiaalne täiendus doktoritöö tarbeks. 
Teine peatükk on pühendatud seniste empiiriliste tulemuste kirjanduse üle-
vaatele. Peatükk algab selliste teoreetiliste aspektide välja toomisega, mis 
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loogilistest kaalutlustest lähtudes võiksid põhjustada empiiriliste analüüside 
tulemustes olulist varieerumist. Seejärel esitatakse ülevaade empiirilistest tule-
mustest klassifitseerituna testimismetodoloogiate alusel nelja gruppi: riikide-
vahelistel korrelatsioonikoefitsientidel põhinevad meetodid, tingimuslikel tõe-
näosustel baseeruvad meetodid (eelkõige logit- ja probit-mudelid), volatiilsuse 
muutustel põhinevad meetodid (ARCH-GARCH raamistik) ning muud enim-
kasutatud meetodid. Seejärel on eraldi välja toodud KIE riike käsitlevate 
empiiriliste uuringute tulemused. Kõik need osad põhinevad Uurimusel 1. Pea-
tüki eelviimane alapunkt käsitleb värskeid empiirilisi uurimusi, mis analüüsivad 
USA 2008. aasta kriisi nakkuslikkust. Need uuringud on ilmunud pärast baas-
artiklite valmimist ning seega on tegu täiendusega puhtalt doktoritööks. Peatükk 
lõpeb kokkuvõtva kvalitatiivse analüüsiga seniste empiiriliste uuringute tule-
muste kohta ning soovitusega liikuda edasi kvantitatiivse analüüsi juurde. See 
kokku võttev analüüs põhineb samuti peamiselt Uurimusel 1. 
Doktoritöö kolmas peatükk käsitleb empiirilises osas kasutatud andmeid ja 
uurimismeetodeid. Esmalt tutvustatakse meta-analüüsi ideed ja meetodeid ning 
vastavas analüüsis kasutatud andmestikku. Välja on toodud meta-analüüsi idee 
ning eelised võrreldes traditsioonilise kvalitatiivse kirjanduse ülevaatega, kogu 
protseduuri etapid ja põhiliste komponentide – nagu individuaaltulemus, meta-
tulemus ja homogeensuse testimine – olemus. See osa põhineb Uurimustel 3 ja 
4. Peatüki teises pooles selgitatakse metoodikat, mida on kasutatud 2008. aasta 
USA finantskriisi nakkuslikkuse uurimisel. Esiteks tutvustatakse korrelatsiooni-
koefitsientidel põhinevat metoodikat ja kasutatud andmeid ning seejärel tehakse 
analoogne protseduur läbi ARCH-GARCH raamistikku kuuluva MA (1) – 
GARCH (1, 1) – M mudeli ja selle hindamiseks kasutatud andmete osas. Siin 
tuginetakse Uurimusele 2. 
Töö neljandas peatükis tutvustatakse empiirilise analüüsi tulemusi. Ana-
loogiliselt kolmanda peatükiga on esmalt välja toodud olulisemad tulemused ja 
järeldused, mis ilmnesid meta-analüüsi metoodika rakendamisel ning lõpuks 
esitatakse tulemused 2008. aasta USA finantskriisi Balti riikidesse ülekandu-
mise kohta. Viimatinimetatud tulemused ja järeldused on jällegi eraldi välja 
toodud korrelatsioonikoefitsientide muutude uurimise ja MA (1) – GARCH  
(1, 1) – M mudeli puhul ning lõpuks on neid tulemusi omavahel võrreldud ja 
sünteesitud. Nagu kolmandaski peatükis põhineb meta-analüüsi puudutav osa 
Uurimuste 3 ja 4 tulemustel ning 2008. aasta finantskriisi puudutav analüüs 
Uurimus 2 tulemustel. 
Doktoritöö lõpeb kokkuvõtva osaga, kus on rõhutatud peamisi asjaolusid ja 
tulemusi kõigi töö osade kohta. Sellele tuginedes on esitatud mõningad majan-
duspoliitika soovitused, mis võiksid aidata ennetada või vähendada finants-
nakkuslikkusega kaasnevaid negatiivseid tagajärgi. Samuti on välja toodud 





4. Teoreetiline ja empiiriline taust 
Vaatamata intensiivsele uurimisele ja empiiriliste analüüside rohkusele, pole 
endiselt saavutatud üksmeelt finantsnakkuse täpse definitsiooni ega levimis-
kanalite kohta. Tarvilik tingimus finantsnakkuse esinemise jaoks on kindlasti 
finantskriiside ja krahhide ülekandumine kriisi lähteriigist muudesse riikidesse, 
kuid erimeelsused tekivad selle tingimuse piisavuse osas. Kõige laiema definit-
siooni pooldajad leiavad, et nimetatud tingimus on tõesti piisav, teised väida-
vad, et vajalik on ka kontrollimine riikide fundamentaalnäitajate (majanduse 
suurus ja struktuur, rakendatav poliitika jms) suhtes ning kolmandate arvates 
saab nakkuslikkusest rääkida sootuks alles siis, kui riikide vahelised ühendus-
kanalid on pärast kriisi ilmnemist (võrreldes nö rahuliku ajaga) oluliselt 
tugevnenud. 
Finantsnakkuse defineerimisel on kasulik aluseks võtta just kriiside levimise 
kanaleid. Kõige üldisemalt saab kriiside ülekandumise kanalid jagada funda-
mentaalseteks ehk stabiilseteks ühenduslülideks ja investorite käitumisest tule-
nevateks ebastabiilseteks ühenduskanaliteks. Olulisimateks fundamentaalseteks 
ühenduslülideks peetakse: 
 finantskanalid (financial linkages) – riigid on omavahel seotud läbi 
rahvusvahelise finantssüsteemi; 
 kaubanduslikud seosed (real linkages) – riigid on seotud läbi rahvus-
vahelise kaubanduse, kas olles kaubanduspartnerid või konkureerides 
samal välisturul; 
 poliitilised ühenduskanalid (political links) – riikidevahelised poliitilised 
suhted. 
Paljud autorid on jõudnud seisukohale, et fundamentaalsed ühenduslülid ei 
suuda täielikult selgitada erinevate finantsnäitajate riikidevahelisi koosliikumisi 
ning muutusi selliste seoste tugevuses. See pöörab tähelepanu investorite käitu-
misega seotud irratsionaalsetele aspektidele, eriti nn herding-kontseptsioonile 
ehk karjakäitumisele. Herding-kontseptsioonis on kesksel kohal informatsiooni 
asümmeetrilisus, mis põhjustab informatsiooni hankimise kulukuse tõttu 
väheminformeeritud investorite poolse (eeldatavalt) paremini informeeritud 
agentide tegevuse jälgimise ja matkimise. Kui selline matkiv käitumine muutub 
massiliseks, võib kogu turg liikuda kiirelt ühes ja samas suunas. Taolise massi-
lise pikast positsioonist loobumise katalüsaatoriks olnud eeldatavalt hästi infor-
meeritud investorite poolne raha välja võtmine ei pruukinud aga olla põhjus-
tatud mitte olemasolevast siseinformatsioonist, vaid puhtalt vajadusest kohan-
dada mujal ilmnenud kriisi põhjustatud investeerimisportfelli balansist välja 
langemist. Karjakäitumise ilmnemisel on riikide aktsia- või valuutaturu rünnaku 
alla sattumine täiesti etteennustamatu ja probleemid võivad tekkida ka väga 
heade fundamentaalnäitajatega riikides. 
Viimasel kümnendil, alates K. Forbes’i ja R.Rigoboni töödest (2000, 2001 ja 
2002) on valdavaks muutunud seisukoht, et kriiside ülekandumisel fundamen-
taalsete levimiskanalite kaudu ei ole tegemist finants-nakkuslikkuse vaid lihtsalt 
vastastikuse sõltuvusega (interdependence) riikide vahel. See omakorda seab 
kahtluse alla kõige laiema tingimusteta finants-nakkuse definitsiooni ning käes-
oleval sajandil käsitletaksegi finantsnakkusena peaaegu eranditult kitsamaid 
variante. Nagu eespool mainitud, on niisugust eristamist järgitud ka antud dok-
toritöös ning empiirilise analüüsi juures igasugust kriiside ülekandumist finants-
nakkuseks ei loeta. 
Nagu mainitud, on finantsnakkuse kontseptsiooni viimastel kümnenditel 
empiiriliselt väga palju uuritud. Seejuures on saadud väga erinevaid tulemusi, 
mis on arvestades käsitletava probleemi mitmedimensionaalsust ka teatud mõt-
tes loogiline. Erinevad ju empiirilised uurimused lisaks kasutatavale finants-
nakkuslikkuse mõistele ka mõõtmismetoodika, vaadeldavate kriiside ja finants-
turgude ning mitmete muudegi tehniliste aspektide osas. Heaks näiteks on 
siinkohal Serwa (2005) uurimus, kes kasutas nelja erinevat testimismetoodikat 
ja nelja erinevat valimit ning erinevad olid ka tulemused. 
Tulemuste üldistamiseks on käesolavas doktoritöös läbi uuritud üle 75 
finants-nakkuslikkuse empiirilise analüüsi, mille tulemused on kokkuvõtvalt 
esitatud lisades 1–4. Pelgalt loendades võib järeldada, et finantsnakkuse esi-
nemist toetavaid tulemusi (Jah-tulemus) on ligi kaks korda rohkem kui mitte-
toetavaid (Ei-tulemus). Suur osa Jah-tulemustest on aga saadud korrelatsiooni-
koefitsientide muutusel põhinevate testidega, kus tulemusi pole heteroskedas-
tiivsuse esinemise suhtes kontrollitud ega kohandatud. Viimase kümnendi uuri-
mused on aga selgelt näidanud sellise kohandamise vajalikkust. Selliseid kaht-
lase väärtusega tulemusi mittearvestades on Jah- ning Ei-tulemused ligikaudu 
tasakaalus, samuti ei ole mitmete uuringute puhul ühtne järeldus Jah või Ei 
kasuks päriselt õigustatud, kuna ühe uuringu raames võib esineda nii finants-
nakkuslikkust toetavaid kui ka mittetoetavaid tulemusi. 
Peamiseks probleemiks traditsioonilise kirjanduse ülevaate põhjal konkreet-
sete üldistavate järelduste tegemisel on aga siiski juba mainitud uurimisprob-
leemi mitmetahulisus. Uuringusse kaasatud kolmveerandsajast empiirilisest 
analüüsist on vaid väga üksikud, mis kasutavad nii sama finantsnakkuslikkuse 
definitsiooni, sama testimismetoodikat, samu kriise kui ka sama uuritavat 
finantsturgu. Kõik need valikud võivad aga mõjutada saadud tulemusi. 
Kõigest sellest järeldub, et pelgalt kvalitatiivse empiiriliste tulemuste ana-
lüüsiga finantsnakkus kohta konkreetseid järeldusi teha on äärmiselt proble-
maatiline kui mitte võimatu. Seetõttu oleks järgmiseks loogiliseks sammuks 
edasi kvantitatiivse agregeeriva analüüsi rakendamine adekvaatsetele tule-
mustele jõudmiseks. 
 
5. Metoodika, andmed ja tulemused 
5.1. Meta-analüüsi metoodika, andmed ja tulemused 
Meta-analüüsi jaoks vajaliku andmestiku kogumiseks on kaasatud uuringud 
Maailmapanga (World Bank Group) Financial Crisis Website leheküljelt ning 
Thomson Reuters (varem ISI) Web of Knowledge andmebaasist vastavalt 
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märksõnadele financial contagion. Sellisel viisil leitud uuringuid, kus finants-
nakkuslikkuse eksisteerimist kvantitatiivselt testiti, leidus üle 70 (viimastel 
aastatel lisandunud uuringud pole meta-analüüsi kaasatud, kuid ülevaade neist 
on töös toodud alapunktis 2.7.). 
Kuna varasemalt finantsnakkuse teemal meta-analüüsi läbi viidud ei ole, siis 
tuli autoril välja pakkuda omapoolne kontseptsioon sobivaks kvantitatiivseks 
mõõdikuks, mis oleks üle uuringute võrreldav, ühtselt interpreteeritav ja agre-
geeritav. Kuna finantsnakkuse hüpoteesi testimistulemuse statistiline olulisus 
(kas finantsnakkuslikkus leidis kinnitust või mitte) ei ole sellise mõõdikuna 
sobiv29, siis kõiki uuringuid kaasavat mõõdikut leida polnud paraku võimalik. 
Valituks osutus kriisi- ning sihtriigi finantsvahendite (aktsiad, väärtpaberid, 
intressimäärad või vahetuskursid) hinnamuutuse korrelatsioonide vahe kriisi 
aegsel ja kriisi eelsel perioodil. Antud valiku otstarbekust kinnitab asjaolu, et 
see on otseselt seotud kitsaima finantsnakkuse definitsiooniga, mille kohaselt 
esinevad finantsnakkuse korral olulised struktuursed muutused riikidevahelistes 
ühenduskanalites ning mille testimiseks kasutatakse peamiselt just korrelat-
sioonide erinevuse suurust kriisi aegsel ja kriisi eelsel perioodil. Paraku aga 
tähendas selline valiku langetamine, et valimisse on kaasatud ainult need 
uuringud, kus on ära toodud nii kriisi eelse kui ka kriisi aegse perioodi finants-
vahendite hindade korrelatsioonid (või nende vahe). Sel viisil on saadud 28 
uuringut ja 716 individuaaltulemust, mis pärinevad 17-st publikatsioonist. Juhul 
kui uuringus on esitatud nii lühiajalise kui pikaajalise kriisijärgse perioodi 
korrelatsioon, on sõltumatuse probleemi tõttu uuringusse kaasatud vaid lühi-
ajalise perioodi näitaja. 
Traditsiooniliselt on meta-analüüsi eesmärk ühe konkreetse numbrilise tule-
museni jõudmine. Antud töös on aga leitud kaks meta-tulemust: ühel juhul on 
alusmõõdikuks võetud korrelatsioonikoefitsientide muutu käsitletud kui mõju-
efekti (kontseptsioon 1) ning teisel juhul kui korrelatsiooni (kontseptsioon 2). 
Kahe alternatiivse lähenemise kasutamise tingis asjaolu, et meta-analüüsi käsit-
levas kirjanduses pole sellist alusmõõdikut (individuaaltulemust) käsitletud ning 
töö autori arvates pole ka intuitiivselt selge, millise neist valima peaks30 (valik 
on oluline, kuna meta-analüüsi agregeerimismetoodika on nende lähenemiste 
puhul erinev). Seetõttu ongi paralleelselt toodud tulemused mõlema kontsept-
siooni korral. 
Meta-analüüsi tulemused on kokkuvõtlikult esitatud alljärgneval Joonisel 1 
(lihtsuse huvides on esitatud vaid kontseptsiooni 1 meta-tulemused). Kontsept-
siooni 1 kasutades on meta-tulemuseks (kaalutud keskmiseks korrelatsiooni-
koefitsientide muuduks) 0,053 standardhälbega 0,0047 ja kontseptsiooni 2 
kohaselt 0,072 standardhälbega 0,0049. Mõlemal juhul jäävad 95% 
                                                 
29  Lihtne on näidata, et täpselt seesama kvantitatiivne tulemus võib olla ühes uuringus 
statistiliselt oluline ning teises ebaoluline. 
30  Ühest küljest võiks korrelatsioonide vahe olla samade omadustega kui korrelatsioon ise, 
teisest küljest on tegu tüüpilise mõjuefektiga, kus kriisi võib vaadelda kui mõjurit. 
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usalduspiirid selgelt üle nulli ning võib järeldada, et keskmiselt on kriisi-










































































Joonis 1. Meta-analüüsi põhitulemused finantsnakkuslikkuse uurimisel. 
Korrigeerimata – meta-tulemus leitud heteroskedastiivsuse suhtes korrigeerimata kriisiperioodi 
korrelatsioone kasutades. 
Korrigeeritud – meta-tulemus leitud heteroskedastiivsuse suhtes korrigeeritud kriisiperioodi 
korrelatsioone kasutades. 
A=korrigeeritud. 
Allikas: Autori koostatud 
 
Kontrollides jaotuse homogeensust Q-statistiku31 abil selgub aga, et jaotus on 
heterogeenne ning seega ei pruugi kõik individuaaltulemused esindada ühte ja 
sama üldkogumit. Seetõttu on vajalik jätkata analüüsi otsimaks võimalikke 
varieeruvust põhjustavaid moderaatormuutujaid (moderator variables). 
Esmalt on võimaliku moderaatorina kontrollitud heteroskedastiivsuse suhtes 
kohandamist või mittekohandamist kriisijärgsete korrelatsioonide arvutamisel. 
Selleks on valim jagatud kaheks vastavalt sellele, kas heteroskedastiivsuse 
suhtes kohandamist on teostatud (juht A) või mitte (juht U). Selgub, et kaalutud 
meta-tulemus on juhul A tunduvalt väiksem, olles 0,030 nii kontseptsiooni 1 kui 
2 korral, samas kui juhul U on vastavad tulemused 0,168 ja 0,208. Sellest järel-
dub selgelt, et tegu on olulise moderaator-muutujaga, mida kinnitab samuti 
gruppide vahelise Q-statistiku statistiline olulisus. 
                                                 
31  Q-statistik on leitud valemiga     2ESESwQ ii , kus iES  on i-s individuaal-
tulemus, ES on meta-tulemus ja iw  on i-nda individuaaltulemuse kaal (erineb kontsept-
sioonide 1 ja 2 puhul). 
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Kuna aga jaotuses jäi endiselt alles heterogeensust, on moderaator-muutu-
jana kontrollitud ka erinevaid kriise. Selgub, et viimaste kümnendite suure-
matest kriisidest olid 1994. aasta Mehhiko kriis ja 1997. aasta Aasia kriis selgelt 
rohkem nakkuslikud kui 1998. aasta Vene, 1999. aasta Brasiilia ning 2001. 
aasta Argentiina kriisid. Samuti olid nakkuslikud USA 1987. ja 2002. aasta 
kriisid, mitte aga Türgi 2001, India 2004, Tšehhi 1997 ega USA 2001 kriisid. 
Kolmanda võimaliku moderaatorina on kontrollitud sihtriigi arengutaset, 
jagades valimi arenenud ja vähemarenenud riikide rühmaks vastavalt 2008. 
aasta inimarengu indeksile. Arenenud riikidena on siinkohal defineeritud 
nimetatud indeksi järgi 30 esimest riiki, mis on valitud eesmärgiga hoida valimi 
mahud mõlemas grupis umbkaudu võrdsed (vastavalt 372 ja 344). Selgub, et 
ülekandemehhanismid arenenud riikidesse on kriisiperioodidel tugevnenud 
keskmiselt mõnevõrra väiksemal määral kui vähem arenenud riikidesse, kuid 
see erinevus on väga väike ja statistiliselt ebaoluline. Seega sihtriigi arengutase 
võimaliku moderaatorina kinnitust ei leidnud ning võib järeldada, et riigi hea 
arengutase ei paku küllaldast kaitset kriiside nakkusliku leviku eest. 
Viimaks on analüüsitud, kas tulemusi mõjutab vaatlusalune turg – vastavalt 
aktsiad, väärtpaberid (bonds), intressimäärad või vahetuskursid. Tulemused 
näitavad, et intressimäärade ja vahetuskursside uurimise korral on metatulemus 
kõrgem kui aktsiate või väärtpaberite korral. Statistilises mõttes oluline erinevus 
gruppide vahel ilmneb intressimäärade ja aktsiate võrdlemisel. Siiski on ka 
aktsiate puhul metatulemuse väärtus statistiliselt oluliselt positiivne32. 
Uurides eraldi Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa majandusi sihtriikidena, on valimis 89 
individuaaltulemust kaheksa kriisi ja nelja riigi (Tšehhi Vabariik, Eesti, Poola, 
Ungari) kohta. Mõlema kontseptsiooni (individuaaltulemused kui korrelat-
sioonid ja kui mõjuefektid) puhul on metatulemuseks 0,02. Kõrvutades seda 
kogu valimi tulemustega – 0,05 kontseptsioon 1 ja 0,07 kontseptsioon 2 korral – 
on näha, et KIE riikide meta-tulemus on üldkeskmisega võrreldes madalam. 
Statistiliselt olulist erinevust nende meta-tulemuste vahel siiski ei ole, kuid saab 
tõdeda, et vähemalt keskmisest rohkem finantsnakkuslikkusele vastuvõtlikud 
Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riigid ei ole. Samale tulemusele on varem jõudnud näiteks 
Serwa ja Bohl (2005) ja Serwa (2005), kellel ei õnnestunud leida tõendeid selle 
kohta, et Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riigid oleksid finantsnakkuse poolt kergemini 
haavatavad kui lääneriigid. Veelgi selgemalt tuleb see tulemus esile, kui vali-
misse kaasata vaid uuringud, kus kriisi aegsed korrelatsioonikoefitsiendid on 
heteroskedastiivsuse suhtes kohandatud. Mõlema kontseptsiooni korral on KIE 
valimis meta-efekt nüüd negatiivne (ehkki mitte statistiliselt olulisel määral) 
ning statistiliselt oluliselt madalam kogu valimi põhjal leitud üldkeskmisest. 
Ühe põhjusena oodatust väiksemale finantsnakkusele vastuvõtlikkusele Kesk- ja 
Ida-Euroopa riikides võib tuua suhteliselt väiksema spekulatiivsel eesmärgil 
                                                 
32  Kui ülejäänud meta-analüüsi puudutavad osad põhinevad Uurimustel 3 ja 4, siis 
viimatinimetatud analüüs baasartiklites ei kajastu ning on täiendus doktoritöö tarbeks. 
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tehtud investeeringute osakaalu ning väiksema tõenäosuse mullide tekkeks 
teiste arengumaadega (ja ka arenenud riikidega) võrreldes. 
Huvitavaks tulemuseks on veel, et kõige tugevamini on Kesk-ja Ida-Euroopa 
riikidesse nakkuslikult üle kandunud kriisid, mis on alguse saanud USA-st. See 
võib olla üheks seletuseks praeguse, 2008. aastal USA-st alguse saanud, kriisi 
väga rasketele tagajärgedele Balti ning teiste Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikide jaoks. 
USA kriiside nakkuslikkuse põhjuseks võib olla selle riigi keskne koht nii maa-
ilma majanduses kui poliitikas, mille tõttu on sealsed kriisid alati meedia huvi-
orbiidis jõudes nii ka enamike investorite teadvusesse. 
 
5.2. Metoodika, andmed ja tulemused 2008. aasta  
USA finantskriisi nakkuslikkuse uurimisel 
Doktoritöö baasartiklite, sealhulgas meta-analüüsi rakendavate, valmimise ajaks 
ei olnud kasutada ühtegi empiirilist uuringut 2008. aasta USA finantskriisi 
nakkuslikkuse uurimiseks, mistõttu polnud võimalik seda kriisi lisada läbi 
viidud meta-analüüsi. Seetõttu on nimetatud kriisi nakkuslikkuse uurimiseks 
läbi viidud eraldi analüüs. 
Ühest küljest andmete kättesaadavuse ning teisalt töös kasutatava KIE riiki-
dele suunatud rõhuasetuse tõttu on uurimise alla võetud kriisi ülekandumine 
USA-st Balti riikidesse: Eestisse, Lätisse ja Leedusse. Andmetena on kasutatud 
riikide aktsiaindeksite (vastavalt OMXT Eesti, OMXR Läti, OMXV Leedu ja 
S&P500 USA jaoks) juurdekasve perioodil 3. märts 2008 kuni 9. märts 2009. 
Ajavahemikku nimetatud perioodi alguspunktist kuni Lehman Brothers’i 
pankrotini 15. septembril 2008 on käsitletud kui kriisi eelset perioodi ning 
järgnevat ajavahemikku 15. septembrist kuni 9. märtsini aastal 2009 kui kriisi 
perioodi. Mitte kokkulangevate kauplemistundide tõttu USA ja Balti riikide 
aktsiaturgudel on kasutatud kahe päeva libisevat keskmist33 näitajat. 
Sarnaselt meta-analüüsile on ka selles osas finantsnakkuse definitsioonina 
kasutatud kõige kitsamat alternatiivi ehk struktuurset muutust šokkide üle-
kandemehhanismis, mida mõõdetakse kui tugevnenud seost riikide aktsia-
hindade vahel kriisiperioodil võrreldes kriisieelse perioodiga. Testimiseks kasu-
tatakse alternatiivselt nii riikidevahelisel korrelatsioonikoefitsientidel baseeru-
vat kui ka volatiilsuse muutustel põhinevat metoodikat. 
Korrelatsioonikoefitsientidel baseeruva metoodika idee on leida USA ja 
Balti riikide indeksaktsia hindade muutuste korrelatsioonid kriisieelsel perioodil 
ning testida, kas see korrelatsioon on kriisiperioodil oluliselt suurem. Kui kõr-
gem korrelatsioon kriisiperioodil leiab kinnitust, siis loetakse seda finants-
nakkuse hüpoteesi toetavaks tulemuseks. Kuna antud metoodika puhul on 
problemaatiline korrelatsioonikoefitsientide võrdlemine erineva volatiilsuse 
tõttu kriisi eelsel ja kriisi perioodil (kriisi perioodil on volatiilsus kõrgem), siis 
on lisaks tavalisele korrelatsioonikoefitsiendile kasutatud kriisiperioodi jaoks ka 
                                                 
33  Käesoleva ja eelmise päeva aritmeetiline keskmine. 
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volatiilsuse erinevust arvesse võtvat kohandatud korrelatsioonikordajat. See 
kohandamismehhanism, mille pakkusid esmalt välja Forbes ja Rigobon (2001 ja 
2002) on antud valemiga 
  211* 


 , kus  on tavaline kohandamata 











 , kus )( tcrisis yVar  ja )( tcrisisnon yVar  on S&P500 indeksi 
dispersioonid vastavalt kriisiperioodil ja kriisieelsed perioodil. 
Analüüsi tulemused on kokkuvõtlikult ära toodud alljärgneval joonisel 2. 
Tulemused näitavad, et kohandamata kriisiperioodi korrelatsioonikordajad 
(korrelatsioon S&P500-ga) on statistiliselt oluliselt kõrgemad kriisieelse 
perioodi väärtusest kolmest Balti riigist kahe, Eesti ja Leedu jaoks, mis on 
vastavuses finantsnakkuse hüpoteesiga. Kui aga kriisi aegsed korrelatsioonid on 
heteroskedastiivsuse suhtes kohandatud, siis on korrelatsioonide muutused USA 
ja kõigi kolme Balti riigi aktsiaturu vahel küll punkthinnangult positiivsed aga 
statistiliselt ebaolulised. Siiski tuleb märkida, et ka kohandatud kriisijärgsed 
korrelatsioonid on kaks (Läti puhul) või kolm korda (Eesti ja Leedu puhul) 
kõrgemad kriisi eelsest väärtusest. Kuna aga suhtelised erinevused rakendatud  
t-testi tulemustes ei kajastu ning absoluutsed erinevused ulatuvad kõigest  



























Joonis 2. Korrelatsioonikoefitsientide väärtused S&P 500 ning Balti riikide aktsia-
indeksite (OMXT, OMXR ja OMXV) hinnamuutuste vahel 2008. aasta USA finants-
kriisile eelneval perioodil ning kriisi ajal. 
Allikas: autori koostatud. 
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Lisaks korrelatsioonikoefitsientide uurimisele, on 2008. aasta kriisi ülekandu-
mist USA-st Balti riikidesse parema robustsuse eesmärgil analüüsitud ka 
ARCH-GARCH raamistikku kuuluva MA (1) – GARCH (1, 1) – M mudeliga. 
See mudel on hinnatud järgmise regressiionivõrrandiga:   
tttttt uuYDbX  1  




Xt – aktsiaindeksi muut mitte-kriisi riigis (Eesti, Läti või Leedu) perioodil t; 
 bt – tX  tingimuslik dispersioon perioodil t;  
D – fiktiivne muutuja, nn esmaspäeva efekt (D omandab väärtuse 1 
nädalavahetustele ja pühadele järgnevatel päevadel ja on võrdne nulliga muudel 
päevadel);  
Yt – indeksaktsia muut kriisiriigis (USA) perioodil t,  
ut ja ut–1 – vealiikmed vastavalt perioodil t ja t–1 ;  
Zt – jääkliikme ruut USA aktsiaindeksi jaoks rakendatud MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-
M mudeli kohta. 
 
Kuna Zt pole teada, siis on selle ruutjuur esmalt hinnatud regressiooni-
võrrandiga S&P 500 jaoks: 
ttttt uuDbY  1  
tttt dDcubbab  
2
11  
ja seejärel vajalik muutuja arvutatud valemiga 
2
tt uZ  . 
 
Tulemused näitavad, et nii kriisi eelsel kui järgsel perioodil on statistiliselt 
oluline keskväärtuse ülekandeefekt (positiivne   väärtus) Eesti ja Leedu mitte 
aga Läti aktsiaturul. See tähendab, et positiivsele (negatiivsele) muutusele S&P 
500 indeksi väärtuses järgneb positiivne (negatiivne) muutus OMXT ja OMXV 
indeksis mitte aga OMXR indeksis. Teoreetilist selgitust antud tulemusele on 
aga pakkuda paraku keeruline. Ülekandeefekt on kõigi kolme Balti riigi puhul 
tugevam kriisijärgsel perioodil, mis toetab finantsnakkuse hüpoteesi. Siiski on 
vahe ülekandeefekti tugevuses võrreldes kriisi eelse perioodiga suhteliselt 
väike. Volatiilsuse ülekandeefekti USA ja Balti riikide aktsiaturgude vahel aga 
ei ilmnenud ning samuti polnud mingit indikatsiooni sellest, et nimetatud efekt 
võiks kriisi perioodil olla tugevam. 
2008. aasta kriisi analüüsi tulemusi kokku võtvalt võib tõdeda, et ilmnes mõ-
ningaid viiteid nakkuslikkuse esinemise kohta, kuid selle mõju on suhteliselt nõrk. 
Nakkuse hüpoteesi kinnitasid kriisi perioodi tugevamad korrelatsioonid ning S&P 
500 indeksi ees oleva parameetri suurem väärtus MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M mu-
delis eelneva rahumeelse perioodiga võrreldes. Absoluutsuurustes olid mõlemad 
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nimetatud efektid aga nõrgad ning kohandatud näitajate põhjal leitud korre-
latsioonide erinevused statistiliselt ebaolulised Seega on tulemused üldjoontes 
sarnased meta-analüüsi kasutades leituga. 
 
6. Põhitulemused ja järeldused 
Teoreetilist kirjandust silmas pidades on üheks olulisemaks doktoritöö 
tulemustest tulenevaks järelduseks selgusele jõudmine, et finantsnakkus kuulub 
selliste mitmemõõtmeliste uurimisprobleemide hulka, millele isegi kvalitatiivse 
kirjanduse ülevaatega, seda enam individuaaluuringutega, on keeruline selgeid 
ja adekvaatseid tulemusi ning järeldusi leida. Aastakümneid on tegeletud järjest 
täiuslikumate testimismeetodite välja töötamisega, kuid ikka ja jälle kerkivad 
kõigil neil esile omad puudused. Töö autori ettepanek antud kontekstis on loo-
buda pingsaist parima statistilise olulisuse testi otsinguist ja keskenduda hoopis 
konkreetse kvantitatiivse mõõdiku leidmisele, mis oleks üle uuringute ühtselt 
interpreteeritav ja agregeeritav ning ühismõõdustaks sellega erinevate uuringute 
tulemused. See revolutsiooniline seisukoht tähendab täiesti uut põhirõhku 
teemakohaste kvantitatiivsete uurimismeetodite valikul, kuid ei viita kuidagi 
statistilise olulisuse testimisest loobumise vajadusele. Selliste testide tulemused 
jääksid oluliseks täiendavaks väljundiks võrdlust ja agregeerimist võimaldava 
kvantitatiivse mõõdiku kõrval, kuid mitte enam põhiliseks analüüsitulemuseks. 
Sobiva ühismõõdustaja leidmine on äärmiselt oluline tuleviku meta-analüüse 
silmas pidades, kuna siis saaks kvantitatiivsesse agregeerimisraamistikku kaa-
sata juba oluliselt rohkem uuringuid, kui see antud doktoritöös võimalik oli. 
Panus teoreetilisse kirjandusse on ka ühe võimaliku üle uurimuste interpre-
teeritava ja summeeritava mõõdiku – vahe kriisi aegse ja kriisi eelse perioodi 
finantsvahendite hindade muutuste riikidevahelise korrelatsioonikoefitsiendi 
väärtuses – välja pakkumine. Samuti on välja toodud kaks alternatiivset lähene-
mist antud mõõdiku kasutamisel meta-analüüsi sisendina ning näidatud, et 
tulemused nende lähenemiste korral erinevad väga vähe. Seega on loodud 
esmane raamistik, mida tulevased meta-analüüsid antud teemal aluseks võtta 
saavad. 
Kui juba varem oli korrelatsioonikoefitsientidel baseeruva metoodika alases 
teoreetilises kirjanduses näidatud kriisiaegse korrelatsiooni heteroskedastiivsuse 
suhtes kohandamise mõju nakkuse avastamise tõenäosusele, siis antud töös läbi 
viidud meta-analüüs kinnitas korrigeeritud ja korrigeerimata korrelatsiooni-
koefitsientidel põhinevate tulemuste statistiliselt olulist erinevust. Samuti sel-
gus, et nakkuslikkuse testides on oluline ka vaadeldava finantsturu valik ning 
näiteks intressimäärade korrelatsioonide uurimisel on nakkuslikkuse avastamine 
tõenäolisem kui aktsiahindade korral. Finantsturu mõju analüüsi tulemustele 
pole samuti varem uuritud, ehkki on leitud, et järeldused võivad erinevate tur-
gude korral olla erinevad. Seega peaks edaspidine teoreetiline ja ülevaate-
kirjandus olulist rõhku panema kasutatud metoodikale ning vaadeldud 
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finantsturule, kuna erinevate valikute korral ei pruugi analüüside tulemused olla 
omavahel adekvaatselt võrreldavad. 
Püstitatud uurimiseesmärgiga kõige otsesemalt seonduv põhitulemus on 
tõendite leidmine finantsnakkuse eksisteerimise kohta, mis tõsi küll, osutus 
üpris nõrgaks. Nõrkade nakkusefektide esinemisele viitasid nii meta-analüüs kui 
korrelatsioonikoefitsientide ja volatiilsuse muutustel põhinev 2008. aasta 
finantskriisi analüüs. Seejuures selgus, et kõrgemalt arenenud riigid ei ole nak-
kuse ülekandumise eest kaitstud paremini kui vähemarenenud majandused. 
Need tulemused viitavad asjaolule, et kriiside riigist riiki levimist ei saa selgi-
tada ainult tugevate riikidevaheliste ühenduskanalite ega halbade makro-
majanduslike fundamentaalnäitajatega, vaid tuleb otsida põhjuseid investorite 
käitumuslikest aspektidest. Äärmiselt oluliseks muutuvad kriisi tingimustes 
herding-kontseptsioonist ja muudest kollektiivses mõttes irratsionaalse käitu-
mise aspektidest tulenevad iseenese täitumisele viivad ootused. Niisugustes 
tingimustes tuleb traditsioonilistesse investeerimisportfelli riskantsuse vähenda-
misele suunatud teooriatesse suhtuda ülima ettevaatlikkusega, kuna nende 
õigsus on äärmiselt küsitav. Need teooriad ülehindavad oluliselt investeerimis-
portfelli rahvusvahelise diversifitseerimisega saavutatavat riskiastme vähene-
mist, kuna eeldavad investorite ratsionaalset käitumist riski tingimustes. Seega 
tuleks nimetatud teooriaid edasi arendada käsitledes eraldi nö rahumeelseid ja 
kriisi perioode, kuna diversifitseerimise riski vähendav mõju on kriisi perioo-
didel märkimisväärselt väiksem. 
Väga olulisi järeldusi pakub antud tulemus ka sobiva finantsarhitektuuri 
kontekstis. Kuna finantskriiside levimise lumepalli eest ei ole kaitstud ka mitte 
tugevaimad riigid, peaks majanduspoliittika kujundajad senisest oluliselt roh-
kem rõhku panema kriisiga kaasnevate negatiivsete tagajärgede ennetavale 
minimeerimisele. Profülaktiline tegevus on selle eesmärgi saavutamiseks vaja-
lik, kuna puhtalt tagajärgedega võitlemiseks ei pruugi kriisist räsitud riigil olla 
piisavalt vahendeid. Seega peaks riigid juba headel aegadel mõtlema selle peale, 
et majanduskasv ei kesta pidevalt ning varuma finantsvahendeid reservi, et 
oleks mida nakkuse ohvriks langedes kasutada ja niiviisi kriisiga kaasnevaid 
negatiivseid tagajärgi pehmendada. 
Läbi viidud meta-analüüsist selgus, et erinevate kriiside nakkuslikkuse aste 
võib olla vägagi erinev. Antud töös seda aspekti põhjalikumalt ei uuritud, kuid 
see võiks olla oluline uurimisobjekt tulevasi uuringuid silmas pidades. On ju 
poliitikakujundajatel äärmiselt oluline teada, millistel kriisidel on suurem tõe-
näosus muutuda nakkuslikuks ja millistel väiksem. Seega viitab antud doktori-
töö selgelt vastavateemalise analüüsi vajalikkusele, mis seniajani praktiliselt 
puudub. 
Veel ühe olulise tulemusena selgus, et Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riigid, seal-
hulgas Balti riigid, kui väikesed ja avatud majandused ei ole vastavalt analüüsi 
tulemustele keskmisest enam finantsnakkusele vastuvõtlikud. See leid võimal-
dab pehmendada korduvalt välja käidud seisukohta, mille kohaselt väga suur 
majanduse avatus muudab riigid kriisi situatsioonis oluliselt rohkem haava-
52 
206 
tavaks. See haavatavus võib olla suurem kriiside levimisel stabiilsete fundamen-
taalkanalite kaudu, kuid nakkuslikkuse ohtu majanduse avatus ei suurenda. 
Seega võib Balti riikidele soovitada jätkuvalt suurt majanduse avatust, mis on 
neile viimastel kahel kümnendil palju edu toonud. 
Huvitavaks tulemuseks on asjaolu, et CEE riikide jaoks on kõige nakka-
vamad USA-st alguse saanud kriisid. See võib põhjustatud olla USA väga olu-
lisest rollist maailmamajanduses ja -poliitikas, mistõttu väga suur hulk investo-
reid investeerib oma raha sellesse riiki ning sealsed kriisid on alati meedia 
huviorbiidis. Seega on investorid USA kriisi korral hästi informeeritud inves-
teerimisportfelli kohandamise vajadusest ning välja võetava raha hulk on suhte-
liselt suurem võrreldes kriisidega mujal. Ühtlasi viitab antud leid asjaolule, et 
suur osa investoritest, kes paigutavad oma raha Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa turgudele 
investeerivad ka USA-sse. Mujalt (kui USA) alguse saanud kriisidesse mitte 
nakatumine ei tähenda muidugi veel, et need kriisid Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa 
riikidele negatiivselt ei mõjuks. Mõju avaldub lihtsalt pigem läbi riikide-
vaheliste stabiilsete fundamentaalkanalite kui finantsnakkuse kaudu. 
 
7. Piirangud ja soovitused edasisteks uuringuteks 
Käesoleva doktoritöö üheks olulisemaks piiranguks on meta-analüüsi piiritle-
mine vaid korrelatsioonikoefitsientidel põhinevate uuringutega. Muid testimis-
meetodeid kasutatavate uuringute kaasamise peamiseks probleemiks on rasku-
sed võrreldavate individuaaltulemuste kogumisega. Nende raskuste ületamisel 
oleks see kindlasti antud teema puhul oluliseks ja vajalikuks edasiarenduseks. 
Siinkohal on sobilik meelde tuletada ühte töö kvalitatiivsest kirjanduse üle-
vaatest tulenevat põhiseisukohta. Nimelt järgnevate meta-analüüside täiustamise 
eesmärgil on hädavajalik, et individuaaluuringute autorid oma tulemuste esita-
misel juba arvestaksid võimaliku tulevase meta-analüüsi perspektiivi. Vastasel 
juhul on paratamatu, et paljud uuringud ühismõõdustamise probleemi tõttu 
meta-analüüsist välja jäävad. 
Teine oluline meta-analüüsi puudutav piirang on seotud asjaoluga, et indivi-
duaaltulemused on kohati heterogeensed ka kõige väiksema agregeerituse tasan-
diga gruppides. See tähendab, et konkreetsetesse numbrilistesse meta-tulemus-
tesse tuleks suhtuda teatava ettevaatlikkusega, kuna kõik individuaaltulemused 
antud grupis ei pruugi esindada ühte ja sama populatsiooni, mistõttu peaks teo-
reetiliselt gruppe veelgi väiksemateks osadeks jagama (reaalselt pole see paraku 
liiga väikese valimi mahu tõttu enam teostatav). Veel üks oluline edasiarenduse 
võimalus seoses meta-analüüsiga on 2008. aasta USA finantskriisi tulemuste 
lisamine analüüsi sisendiks. 
Doktoritöö viimase osa juures, mis uurib 2008. aasta USA kriisi Balti riiki-
desse ülekandumise nakkuslikkust, on oluliseks piiranguks analüüsi piiritlemine 
vaid kahe põhilise metoodikaga: korrelatsioonide ja volatiilsuse erinevusel 
baseeruva lähenemisega. Võimaliku edasiarendusena oleks kasulik rakendada 
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